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Abstract
Martha Nussbaum’s work Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice identifies
the role that compassion plays in motivating citizens in a just society. I expand on this
discussion by considering how attitudes of indifference pose a challenge to the extension of
compassion in our society. If we are indifferent to others who are in situations of need, we
are not equipped to experience compassion for them. Building on Nussbaum’s account, I
develop an analytic framework for the public emotion of Civic Tenderness to combat
indifference.
Civic tenderness is an orientation of concern that is generated for people and groups
that are vulnerable in our society. For example, while we are all vulnerable to having
material needs, some people are more vulnerable depending on their personal, social,
political, economic, or environmental situations. I focus on two social injustices that largely
affect African American and African descended people in America—poverty and the
American Criminal Justice System.
Whereas compassion responds to suffering, tenderness responds to vulnerability.
Since occupying a situation of suffering implies having been vulnerable to suffering,
vulnerability is prior to suffering and tenderness is prior to compassion. Civic tenderness is
the expansion of tenderness among a society’s members, institutions, or systems. I argue
that its expansion is initiated and sustained by a process called tenderization. Tenderization
adjusts our perception of situations of vulnerability and motivates us to protect the
vulnerable.
Additionally, I propose a plan to initiate this process. I suggest that the state’s role
will be to increase the recognition of situational vulnerability for groups like the

imprisoned and the impoverished. This recognition encourages the society to adopt
legislation considerate of the historical circumstances that caused a particular group’s
vulnerability. In addition to legislative safety nets, I suggest the state should tenderize its
citizens in order to reintegrate vulnerable citizens into society by giving them a sense of
self-respect.
As an exercise in non-ideal political theory, this research draws on social/political
philosophy, moral and social psychology, and political science to provide an
interdisciplinary perspective of the problem and possible solutions.

Acknowledgements
Writing Civic Tenderness has been one of the most challenging things I have ever
done. Four years ago, when I set out to develop Civic Tenderness I did not yet understand
much about the undertaking. I was unaware of how low the project would take me: there
was much confusion, frustration, anger, sadness, and anxiety. I was also unaware of the
abundance of joy I’d experience when I’d complete a paragraph or hearing that my advisor
Dr. Warren Herold liked my ideas or thought they were “on the right track.” Yet, four years
later, here I sit writing the acknowledgments for the project. The journey has been full of
many challenges and triumphs both large and small in scale. More importantly, my journey
was made possible only through the undeserved love, support, and encouragement many
of you have extended to me throughout this period—providing me with light and meaning,
when there was none.
This work would not have been possible if it were not for my advisor Dr. Warren Herold
and my mentor Dr. Oksana Maksymchuk. Warren is probably one of the busiest people I
know; still, his patience, understanding, and insights were things that I came to expect and
to value. The knowledge and insight you have imparted me with—especially about
sympathy and perspective-taking—are things I will try my best to keep with me always. I
deeply appreciate the abundance of feedback that Oksana provided on my writing. It was
because of this that I felt like draft after draft, paper after paper, I was developing and
getting better as a writer. She also gave me confidence and strength to get rid of entire
drafts and rework ideas anew—practices that have become virtuous habits. Thank you
both.
I’ve been lucky to receive perspectives from people of different nations having

presented material on civic tenderness in Canada and having conversations about
tenderness and justice with citizens of Ireland and Spain. My time in Europe was also
inspirational in other respects as their magnificent architecture reminded me of the power
that buildings can have to make us experience powerful emotions such as awe and wonder.
Substantial sections of this work developed out of a series of talks and papers given at
The Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, The Eros Love as
sensual Intelligence Conference, and the University of Arkansas African and African American
Studies Dissertation Fellowship Symposium. I would like to thank both audience members
and organizers for facilitating thoughtful and constructive dialogues focused on Civic
Tenderness. Various notes from these sessions proved as valuable sources of motivation
and insight.
For comments and conversations on Civic Tenderness and other related topics, I’m
grateful for Kathryn Zawisza Bailey, Caree Ann Marie Banton, Zach Biondi, Myisha Cherry,
Jasmin Clardy, Reginald Clark, April Contway, Pearl Dowe, Kimberly Ann Harris, Marc
Lamont Hill, Chike Jeffers, Denise James, Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Sharese King, Niko
Kolodny, Richard Lee, Demi McCoy, Torsten Menge, Martha Nussbaum, Mason Marshall,
Daveon Swan, Calvin White, my students at the University of Arkansas and Pepperdine
University and Members of my PAGES Reading Group.
I am also deeply appreciative of the generous financial support of the University of
Arkansas’ Philosophy Department and African and African American Studies Department.
As an African and African American Studies Dissertation Fellow I was able to travel to
conferences and libraries that were essential to the development of this project. I was also
pushed to think about he ways that this dissertation directly impacts the situation of

African and African descended people in America.
Most importantly, I thank my loving and supportive family. Throughout it all, you guys
were my haven and my solitude. You guys have watched me cry and have allowed me to.
You all’s words have filled me up with strength and wisdom. Your hugs and smiles have
filled me with joy. Grandmother and Dad, thank you for allowing me to blab on about Civic
Tenderness and trying your earnest to engage with the ideas. I also appreciate being able to
sit in my dad’s barbershop and absorb the thoughts and perspectives of the patrons always
coming with energy, thoughtfulness, and sometimes two week old fades and going with
laughs and fresh haircuts.
Grandmother, although I tell you think all the time, I must say it here: Your care saved
my life. I am forever grateful for your overwhelming love and support for and of me. I do
not know what I would have done without you. You introduced me to reading and helped
me fall in love with it. It helped that many of the authors we had in our library were Black
and themselves tried in earnest to think critically about justice and the Black American
experience. It included, W.E.B Du Bois, Maya Angelou, James Baldwin, Malcolm X, Martin
Luther King Junior, and Eldridge Cleaver. I cannot repay you for all you have meant to me,
but as Tupac Shakur said, “my plan is to show you that I understand”.
To Monique Arrington, your sacrifices cannot be measured. I am deeply grateful for the
person that you are and I will always love you for it. To my son, Josiah, you mean so much
to me and all of this has been for you. You are Daddy’s biggest fan and even at 5 years old,
critic. Words cannot express what it has felt like to watch you grow up in to yourself and in
to your Black body. This project is about and for you in both purpose and content. Daddy
loves you and is always proud of you Mally. Granny, thank you for leading the prayer

warriors to fight on my behalf; always reminding me to “keep the faith”. To my Mom and
Sister Jordan I love you both to life and I appreciate all of the support (and meals) you guys
gave over writing this project.
Thank you all and I love you.

Dedication
For the homeless, the impoverished, the incarcerated, and all those who are civically
vulnerable before the American Criminal Justice system.

For Josiah Makai Clardy and my late Uncle Louis Nordorf; two of the most tender
people I have ever met.

Table of Contents
Introduction….......................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Civic Vulnerability………………………………………………………………………… 11
Chapter 2: Civic Indifference………………………………………………………………………….. 32
Chapter 3: Civic Tenderness…………………………………………………………………………… 50
Chapter 4: Tenderization and the American Criminal Justice System…………… 85
Chapter 5: Tenderization and American Poverty………………………………………… 120
References…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 147

Introduction
In Political Emotion, Martha Nussbaum addresses the question of whether or not, for
all intents and purposes, a society committed to justice should cultivate civic emotions in
its citizens. She argues that for societies that aspire to achieve justice, the cultivation of
political emotions are a necessary part of its realization. Her thought is that principles of
justice themselves are not enough to motivate citizens to actualize a just society, a society
partly illustrated by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.1 Because societies are made up of
real people and not angels or disembodied spirits, a society must have a way of appealing
to the motivational structure of humans to which emotions are central. Throughout the
work, Nussbaum emphasizes that if a society is to actualize Rawls’ principles then it must
take this fact seriously. Nussbaum dedicates a considerable amount of time exploring how
a nation like ours, one that has made commitments to the freedom and well being of its
citizens, could take advantage of public resources to cultivate pro-social emotions that are
important to the sustainability of the just society—sympathy and compassion.
The idea that the state should use its resources to cultivate citizens’ emotions is not
a completely novel idea. In part one of the book, Nussbaum examines proposals for such a
state as set forth by August Comte, John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore. Each of these
thinkers proposes a “Religion of Humanity” that attempts to outline the role of the state in
the cultivation of pro-social civic emotions. Nussbaum extrapolates some very important
insights from their work to establish the foundation on which her account builds.

1

John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice, Rev. Ed," Cambridge, MA: Belknap 5 (1999).
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Nussbaum maintains that compassion is “a painful emotion directed at the serious
suffering of another creature or creatures”2 and it is fundamental to her project because the
experience of compassion is an area of apparent commonality and overlap between
humans and other animals. By drawing on our kinship with other animals, Nussbaum’s
analysis of compassion expands traditional accounts of human compassion and it involves
four components: (i) seriousness, (ii) nonfault, (iii) similar possibilities, and (iv)
eudiamonistic thought.
Nussbaum says that, “First there is a thought of seriousness: in experiencing
compassion the person who feels the emotion thinks that some one else is suffering in
some way that is important and nontrivial.”3 So, if Mal does not think that Stacy’s complaint
about their situation is really serious, then Mal will not have compassion for their griping.4
This is not to say that the seriousness of the situation is dependent upon Stacy’s perception
of their situation. Some predicaments, such as that of a comatose hospital patient, are really
serious for a person in them and they themselves are unaware. In these situations, we
think a person’s situation to be serious and typically have compassion for the person
despite the fact that the person in the predicament may not think their situation to be
serious.

Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions (Harvard University Press, 2013). P. 142.
Ibid, p. 142-3.
4 A part of me wonders about whether there is a gendered element to this. What I have in
mind here is that in a patriarchal society where particular values are attached to gendered
conceptions of manliness, individuals might be conditioned to not take seriously the kinds
of sufferings that other individuals experience. Young boys in America, for instance, are
taught that “little boys don’t cry” or to “be tough” even when they occupy a position of
suffering. The failure to meet this criterion of toughness or manliness might result in
severe and sometimes even harsh (i.e. bullying) indifference by male peer onlookers.
2
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3

Nussbaum also maintains that when we experience compassion we usually make
some implicit judgment about how much responsibility a person bears for causing their
circumstances. She says, “When we think that a person brought a bad situation on him- or
herself, this thought would appear to inhibit the formation of [compassion].”5 Presumably,
this non-fault element of compassion explains why we typically don’t feel compassion if we
think the person’s predicament chosen or self-inflicted. This is why, for instance, many of
you do not feel compassion for the poor, who you believe brought poverty upon
themselves.
The third element of compassion is a thought of similar possibilities. Traditional
analyses of compassion maintain that when we experience compassion, we think that our
possibilities and the possibilities of the person suffering are similar. Nussbaum does not
believe that this thought is conceptually necessary for our experiencing compassion such as
our compassion for the sufferings of animals that aren’t much like ourselves at all. 6
However, she does think that this component has considerable importance in undoing the
denial of our animal natures in that it may be able to remove barriers to compassion that
have been created by artificial social divisions. So although this component of compassion
isn’t absolutely necessary, it is important in that its absence constitutes a sign of grave
danger by decreasing the likelihood that we will experience compassion for some other
creature.
The “Eudiamonistic thought” is a thought or judgment that places the suffering of
others among the important parts of the life of the person that is experiencing the

5
6

Nussbaum, M.C. (2013), p. 143.
Nussbaum (2001).
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emotion.7 The motivation for including this component in her conception is the fact that
“the things that occasion a strong emotion in us are things that correspond to what we have
invested with importance in our thoughts, implicit or explicit, about what is important in
life, our conception of flourishing.” 8 In other words, it is important to deem others
important.
However, we must break barricades of indifference to fully experience civic
compassion. Our society is largely indifferent to the circumstances of our vulnerable
comrades—people affected by the American Criminal Justice System and people who are
poor. 9 For example, African Americans account for a disproportionate number of
Americans who are homeless and who are incarcerated. Since the 1970s the U.S. penal
population has grown from around 300,000 to more than 2 million. About 840,000 or 40.2
percent of that population is Black.10 In my own hometown of Los Angeles, California,
What Nussbaum identifies as the eudiamonistic thought has similarities to what Nel
Noddings as described in Caring as caring “circles and chains”. We might wonder how this
is different from the first of the four components, seriousness. The thought is that in
placing the suffering of another among the important parts of one’s life thereby makes it a
serious matter to the person experiencing the emotion. When I take something serious, it is
because it is important to me. However, while seriousness entails importance, importance
does not entail seriousness. For example, I may judge it an important matter to read a
particular book that has enjoyed a place in the philosophical cannon for centuries.
However, this might not be a serious matter as one may put it off for long periods of time
and sometimes indefinitely.
8 Ibid, p.145.
9 These groups are not here meant to capture the entire scope of vulnerable citizens. In fact,
in our society, there are other groups that are civically vulnerable such as Black Americans
(in virtue of the fact that they are Black), children and elderly, people who identify as
LBGTQIA, women, etc., who I think that the program of civic tenderness would affect in a
positive way. However, I do not have the space in this project to address every vulnerable
group that our society contains. However, it is my hope that what might, in principle, be
learned from my insights into civic tenderness, may be usefully applicable to the situation
and circumstances of these other vulnerable groups in our society.
10 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
(The New Press, 2012).
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African American citizens account for roughly 41 percent of the city’s homeless population,
despite only making up around 9 percent of the city’s total population.11 Unemployed
persons, welfare recipients, and ex-convicts lives are shockingly socially scrutinized. We
blame them and in the process make perfectly clear our denial of their situations as unjust.
We highlight the few instances in which people ascend to the top, in order to prove to
ourselves and to others that that kind of success is open to all, regardless of the
circumstances. We do not extend our compassion to people that have allegedly brought
harm to themselves or others. An orientation of indifference that we direct toward the
suffering of victims of systematic injustice creates a difficulty for the outward extension of
civic compassion because it distorts our ability to accurately assess the severity of their
circumstances and whether a person is or is not responsible for the predicament in which
they find themselves. 12 So, we might wonder whether the cultivation of compassion should
be supplemented by the cultivation of a more basic emotion. Civic tenderness is that
emotion.
Civic Tenderness is prior to civic compassion. Compassion is a response to a
perceived need. Tenderness is response to perceived vulnerability. Insofar as current need
implies vulnerability, vulnerability to having some need precedes actually having the need.
By raising the awareness of those who are left vulnerable to daily lives endured with
structural oppression, or tenderizing our society, the cultivation of civic tenderness can
supplement the cultivation of civic compassion by dissolving the insensitivity and
Ross Clarke Niva Dorell, "Skid Row," (Netflix, 2007).
The tendency to blame people for the harm that they have allegedly done to themselves
is a typical result of the so-called “fundamental attribution error” or “correspondence bias.”
When we become tender we are nearer to the perspective of others and that way we are
less likely to make the attribution error. I develop this point in chapter 3.
5
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emotional callousness generated by our indifference and make people more sensitive to
systematic injustices as causes of predicaments that would normally be dismissed as an
individual’s own fault. Without altering this indifference it seems that civic compassion
cannot fully be experienced.
As a response to vulnerability, civic tenderness alters indifference, enabling us to
experience civic compassion and other empathic emotions such as sympathy. My aim, then,
is to explain what civic tenderness is and how it can be effectively enacted.
Historically philosophers have typically thought that we first need to know what an
ideal society would be like in order to know what changes an imperfect society needs to
make. As a result political philosophy has been oversaturated with ideal theory.13 How do
we get there from where we are, we ask? But the need for civic tenderness has arisen from
the seriousness of current injustices in our society. We have grown numb to a number of
social ills including the infections of our society’s institutions and the callousness of the
hearts of our fellow man. This will be an exercise in nonideal theory. So, if successful, our
exercise will result in principles that we should rely on to meet the injustices in our current
world. We do not need to know what is best in order to work toward a society that is better
than the one we have at present.
There are at least two reasons that our thinking should be rooted in nonideal theory
rather than ideal theory. First, beginning with an illustration of an ideal society runs the
risk of overlooking the injustices of our nonideal world. Political theories that ask us to
make race invisible don’t have the conceptual resources needed to confront and grapple
John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," The philosophical review (1958); Bernard Williams,
"The Idea of Equality," (1962); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, vol. 5038 (Basic
books, 1974).
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with contemporary racial injustice, for instance.14 Starting with the kinds of disadvantages
imposed say, on impoverished people because of their vulnerable position in our society
examines the real problems and complaints of our society.
Second, the principles of a political theory should take seriously the motivational and
cognitive capacities of human beings. The mechanisms and institutions of our society, if
they are going to be just, will need to work in harmony with our motivational and cognitive
talents and deficiencies. We can orchestrate this harmony with thoughtful analyses of how
our society’s institutions can redirect our energies toward more tender attitudes and
dispositions regarding our fellows.
It’s not that ideals don’t belong in nonideal theory but rather that their function is
different. Their role is one where they “can be tested in experience because the standards
they try to set are internal to our conception of what we are trying to do—solve a problem,
meet a complaint— and we could discover, through reflection on the consequences of
following the ideal, that we misconceived the problem, that our proposed solution was
confused or incoherent.”15 Ideals are not viewed as standards of assessment but instead
they embody solutions to identified problems in our society.
In the first chapter of the work I begin with an analysis of vulnerability. If, prima
facie, civic tenderness is a response to a perceived vulnerability, we do well to have an
understanding of what vulnerability is. What is vulnerability? Is vulnerability passive? If
not, how is it active? What are the dangers attached to vulnerability? How does it look in a
civic space? At times, we only talk about individual behavior and act as if political and
Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton University Press,
2010).;Charles Wade Mills, The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press, 1997).
15 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration.
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economic structures don’t exist. But sometimes people do all they can to prevent
themselves from falling into precarious positions yet still find themselves occupying them
and are unable to change their situation by themselves. But the truth is that, some people
are left situationally vulnerable to daily lives endured with structural oppression because
they are less insulated from the results of luck within a society. Whatever our notion of
civic vulnerability turns out being, it should speak intimately to these elements.
In the second chapter I ponder over indifference. What is indifference? Is it an
attitude? Is it an emotion? Is it a dimension? What causes indifference? How might societal
indifference look? It is hard to deny that there is an indefensible indifference towards
victims of structural oppression—in particular, the imprisoned and the impoverished. Too
many of us believe that something is wrong with the poor. Far too frequently have I heard
the thought that if an individual is in poverty then this means that there is something
wrong with that person’s character, or they must have bad habits or a bad lifestyle and that
they have made the wrong choices. This stigma that we attach to unemployed persons or
welfare recipients counts in favor of my point. In The Rich and The Rest of Us: A Poverty
Manifesto, Cornel West and Tavis Smiley maintain that, “We react and respond to the poor
as if they are afflicted with some flesh-eating virus and are highly contagious. We deny
poverty because we are afraid—afraid that saying the word somehow puts us at risk.”16
Our insistence upon poverty being a necessary character flaw contributes to our deep
indifference and in most cases prevents us from realizing how lives are shaped—though in
no way dictated or determined—by the larger circumstances in which people find
themselves such as social, economic, and historical forces. These alleged misbehaviors of
16

Cornel West, The Rich and the Rest of Us (Hay House, Inc, 2012).
8

the poor are transformed from adaptions to poverty in to the character failings that are
supposed to account for poverty in the first place. Admittedly, this raises a prima facie
problem: if people are motivated to actively scrutinize these groups, how is it that the
society is indifferent toward them? But it is precisely the precarious life circumstances of
the vulnerable that is failing to make a claim on them. That is why they are indifferent.
In the third chapter I introduce my notion of civic tenderness and the process of
tenderization. Is tenderness an emotion? Is it an orientation? What is the relationship
between tenderness and compassion? What is the relationship between tenderness and
empathy? How exactly does the tenderization process work? Unlike compassion that arises
from perceived suffering, tenderness is a certain kind of response that arises from a
perceived vulnerability. It is important to understand that tenderness is more than just a
positive affective feeling state. It can also make people more physically tender in their
motor behavior.
Generally, the reasons that we have for behaving tenderly are constituted by the
vulnerability of the beloved. When we track the reasons that we have for tenderness, we
are not only more wiling to respond with more tender activity but it also makes you more
able to engage in tender behavior. The process of what I call tenderization provides us with
a useful mechanism by which we can cultivate other empathic public emotions.
After the conceptual terrain has been thoroughly laid out, I segue into the applied
portion of the process of tenderization. In the fourth chapter of the dissertation I explore
the problems that the American Criminal Justice System poses for vulnerable citizens in our
society. I give particular emphasis to problems these systems pose for the community of
Black persons in America. In doing so, I engage questions such as what is the purpose
9

prison? How are prisoners vulnerable? How does tenderness work in this case? Does a
more tender society than ours include prisons? In other words, does the program of civic
tenderization prescribe prison abolition or prison reform?
The problems that prisons pose for our society are not disconnected from the
problems that arise from poor economic conditions.17 In the fifth and final chapter of this
work, I investigate the question of what is the poverty problem in America? In what ways
are impoverished persons vulnerable? What is the relationship between vulnerability and
responsibility? What does the process of tenderization have to do with influencing
economic trends? The importance of a program that does this is not merely important to
the community of populations that are majorly affected, but it is also of the utmost
importance to the sustenance of our society as a whole.

17

Ibid.
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Chapter 1:
Civic Vulnerability

Vulnerability and sociality are conditions that none of us escapes. Our humanity
inherently involves having bodily and other material needs. We all need food, drink, and
shelter, for example. At various times in our lives we “are exposed to physical illness,
injury, disability, and death.”18 We are also vulnerable to threats that our natural
environment poses which is evidenced by devastating natural disasters such as Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
We are not merely embodied beings; we are social beings too. As Martha Nussbaum
notes, as humans, “we live for and with others and regard a life not lived in affiliation with
others to be a life not worth living.”19 We can, and do, experience violence, oppression,
exploitation, manipulation, political violence and rights abuses at the hands of others. It is
because we are social beings that we are vulnerable to being affected by others in various
ways such as neglect, abuse, violence, or lack of care. The variety of forms that vulnerability
takes on makes it a difficult concept to define.
On first thought, we might think of vulnerability as a universal capacity for suffering
that is inherent to our embodiment. That is to say that, “To be vulnerable is to be fragile, to
be susceptible to wounding and to suffering; this susceptibility is an ontological condition

Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics
and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2014). P. 1.
19 Martha C Nussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice in Defense of Aristotelian
Essentialism," Political theory 20, no. 2 (1992). P.219.
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of our humanity”20 or that vulnerability is “a universal, inevitable enduring aspect of the
human condition.”21 It is true that all members of our society are vulnerable to a variegated
range of inherent threats or harms. Still, what makes some people or groups—such as
people who are poor or people who, because of their racial or gendered identities, stand a
higher likelihood of contact with the criminal justice system or to be convicted of crimes—
more vulnerable is their diminished capacity to protect themselves. Thinking of the
universiality of vulnerability in this way masks the identification of the context-specific
needs of particular groups or individuals within populations at risk in American society.
Consequently, so broadly construed, vulnerability is of limited use in responding to specific
vulnerabilities in our society.
While some vulnerability is inherent to embodiment, other vulnerabilities may be
caused or exacerbated by the social, political, or economic situations of individuals or social
groups. 22 This means that vulnerability takes on a social or relational character that
encapsulates the contingent susceptibility of particular persons or groups to specific kinds
of harm or threat by others.
Focusing on the social dimension of vulnerability rather than the vulnerability of
embodiment suggests different responses to the question, “what is vulnerability?” On one
hand, vulnerability is characterized by an emphasis on features common to our
embodiment and so suggests an equal susceptibility to suffer. On the other hand,
vulnerability is characterized by inequalities of power, dependency, capacity, or need and
Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds, Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist
Philosophy. P. 4.
21 Martha Albertson Fineman, "The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition," Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 20, no. 1 (2008). P. 8.
22 Robert E Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social Responsibilities
(University of Chicago Press, 1986). P. 124.
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renders some members of society more vulnerable to harm or exploitation by others.
Importantly, both characterizations identify distinct features of vulnerability and the
relation between them should be incorporated in to our analysis if it is going to be
satisfactory. The first aim of the present chapter, then, is to explore the social dimension of
vulnerability. I call this civic vulnerability. Ultimately, (as I argue in Chapter 3) civic
tenderness is a response to civic vulnerability. So, our account of civic vulnerability should
include an analysis of why civic vulnerability should be responded to. So we also have an
additional aim of explaining how civic vulnerability generates duties of justice.

Vulnerability: Sources and States
One helpful way to integrate both characterizations of vulnerability and to
distinguish between the distinct, and in some cases overlapping, modes of vulnerability is
through taxonomizing the different sources and states of vulnerability. A satisfactory
taxonomy of vulnerability will acknowledge both the ontological vulnerability inherent to
the human condition while simultaneously allowing us to identify context-specific modes of
vulnerability. Context-specific vulnerabilities enable us to elucidate responsibilities that are
owed to those who, because of their context, are more vulnerable than one would
ordinarily be.
Vulnerability arises from at least three different sources (inherent, situational, and
pathogenic) and there are at least two different states of vulnerability (dispositional and
occurent).23 The first source of vulnerability, inherent vulnerability, “refers to sources of

Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds, Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist
Philosophy. P. 7.
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vulnerability that are intrinsic to the human condition.”24 In virtue of that fact that we are
embodied creatures, we are all vulnerable to things such as fatigue and hunger. Since we
do not give birth to ourselves the human condition is necessarily social, making us also
vulnerable to things such as emotional hostility, violence, and social isolation.25 Other
inherent vulnerabilities vary as they pertain to features of our embodiment such as age,
gender, and health. For instance, women are vulnerable to vaginal health risks that men are
not26; men are vulnerable to testicular risks that women are not. Also, aging generally,
exaggerates the extent to which elderly persons are able or unable to meet their everyday
needs.
Another source of vulnerability is situational. Situational vulnerability is
vulnerability that is mediated by social context and may be short term, enduring, or
intermittent. Situational and inherent vulnerability are categorically connected. The extent
of the effect of situational vulnerabilities can also be greater or lesser depending on a
person’s resilience, which is a product of genetic, social, and environmental influences.
Inherent vulnerability on the other hand reflects features of the environments in which a
person is born, raised, and lives. If it appears that the divide between situational
vulnerability and inherent vulnerability is not very sharp, it is because it isn’t. Each
involves reference to the other: someone’s situation wouldn’t be affected their if it were not
for their inherent features (need for food, etc.); and someone’s inherent vulnerabilities
Ibid.
Ibid.
26 Women and girls who are incarcerated are especially vulnerable to vaginal health risks.
For example, “The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls Story” reports that many
justice facilities often fail to meet standards for comprehensive women’s physical
reproductive health, including gynecological and obstetric care. (Malika Saada Saar et al.,
"The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story," (2015).
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include an implicit reference to their situation. Yet the distinction is just sharp enough to
index the extent to which one’s particular social situation is not inherent to their humanity.
An important feature of situational vulnerability is that it “may be caused or
exacerbated by the personal, social, political, economic, or environmental situations of
individuals or social groups.”27 In the United States in 2005 for example, Hurricane Katrina
resulted in the vast destruction of homes and a shortage of food in the southeast region of
the United States.28 While the people directly affected by Katrina were forced to seek
shelter and scavenge, even still, the overall effects were mediated by social contexts
specific to the affluent United States. In affluent countries, the situational vulnerability that
is caused in the wake of a disaster like Katrina is limited by social factors such as
infrastructure or homeowners insurance. In contrast, in 2010 Haiti, a far poorer country
than the United States, suffered a similarly devastating earthquake that caused an enduring
situational vulnerability because of their general lack of support from government and
non-nongovernment agencies.29
Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds, Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist
Philosophy.
28 Melissa V Harris-Perry, Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America
(Yale University Press, 2011).
29 I would like to emphasize here that I am by no means making a qualitative evaluation
about which disaster was “worse” than the other. Both disasters were devastating and
evoked powerful emotional responses—rightfully, so. Additionally, I am not meaning to
assert that because the governmental assistance available to those effected by Hurricane
Katrina could offer more support to them as citizens of the United States, that the
government actually did so. On the contrary, in the introduction to her work Sister Citizen:
Shame, Stereotype and Black Women in America, Melissa Harris-Perry notes, “In vulnerable
neighborhoods there was little warning and no means of escape. Stranded, the people
waited for relief and rescue that, for days, did not come. The power went out and the
floodwaters rose. Food and water became scarce. The city’s shelters became centers of
disease, hunger, and death. For three days the victims of the storm were left to manage on
their own. As they waited, President George W. Bush shared a birthday cake with Senator
John McCain, visited a senior citizens’ home, gave a speech on the war in Iraq, and played
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There is a subset of situational vulnerability that is particularly troubling—
pathogenic vulnerabilities. A key feature of pathogenic vulnerability is the way that it
undermines autonomy or exacerbates the sense of powerlessness engendered by
vulnerability in general. Pathogenic vulnerability may result when social policy
interventions aim to ameliorate inherent or situational vulnerability have the opposite
effect of increasing vulnerability or of generating new ones.30, 31 These may be generated by
a variety of sources, including morally dysfunctional or abusive interpersonal and social
relationships, sociopolitical oppression, or injustice.
Both situational and inherent vulnerability may be dispositional or occurent. Rather
than referring to sources of vulnerability, this distinction references the potential or actual
states of vulnerability. Occurent vulnerability is a state of vulnerability which requires
the guitar with a popular country singer. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice shopped for
shoes in New York City and took in a Broadway show. FEMA director Michael Brown sent
lighthearted interoffice emails about which shirt and tie he should wear during his live
television appearances about the disaster. Despite aggressive and continuing coverage of
the destruction on cable news, it seemed that federal government officials refused to
recognize what was happening in New Orleans.” However, my contrast of the two disasters
is only meant to show that in an affluent country like the United States, when support for
relief of natural disasters is deployed, the extent to which it can provide support and
resources for those affected is generally greater than that in impoverished countries like
Haiti.
30 In her paper, Challenging Indifference to Extreme Poverty: Considering Southern
Perspectives on Global Citizenship and Change, Barbara Heron examined the effects on
developing countries of the Canadian government’s commitment to foster “global citizens.”
She finds that sending Canadian students for short-term stays in developing countries
actually generates a larger cost on behalf of the host country and often times leave those
countries more vulnerable than they were before the arrival of Northern students. The
vulnerability in this case is pathogenic in that it results from an attempt to protect
vulnerability in the molding of global citizens that are “incapable of indifference to the lack
of freedom that accompanies extreme poverty.” (Barbara Heron, "Challenging Indifference
to Extreme Poverty: Considering Southern Perspectives on Global Citizenship and Change,"
(2011).)
31 Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds, Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist
Philosophy. P. 9.
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immediate action to limit the harm being done. Dispositional vulnerability is a state of
vulnerability that indexes a harm that is not yet or not likely to become a source of harm.
For example, a person who is not driving but does sometimes drive is vulnerable to having
an auto accident. Whether or not a motorist is occurrently vulnerable depends on whether
or not they are presently driving.
The foregoing taxonomy enables us better explore the notion of civic vulnerability
by disambiguating the different senses that vulnerability is used.

Civic Vulnerability
The American society aspires toward justice, but the pursuit of justice in our society
does sometimes fail. The wealth gap and antipathetic race relations are evidence of this
failure because it shows how our society falls short in fairly dealing with its most
vulnerable citizens.32 For example, African-Americans account for a disproportionate
number of Americans who are homeless and who are incarcerated. Since the 1970s the U.S.
penal population has grown from around 300,000 to more than 2 million. About 840,000 or
40.2 percent of that population is Black.33 In my own hometown of Los Angeles, California,
African American citizens account for 41 percent of the city’s homeless population, despite
only accounting for 9 percent of the city’s total population.34 The truth is that in America,
some people are left civically vulnerable because they are necessarily less insulated from
the effects of bad luck as a result of structural oppression. The fact that civic vulnerability
Cornel West, Race Matters (Vintage, 1993); The Rich and the Rest of Us; Marc Lamont Hill,
Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond
(Simon and Schuster, 2016).
33 Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
34 Niva Dorell, "Skid Row."
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results from structural oppression emphasizes that the vulnerability is of a particularly
civic and social nature.
Darren Wilson’s tragic execution of Michael Brown in 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, is
one example. To see how, we have to understand that racism exists beyond the level of
personal intentions; it has structural dimensions as well. Marc Lamont Hill recounts
Michael Brown’s death saying:
With regard to Darren Wilson, even if he held no personal racial animus, he
nonetheless approached Michael Brown with a particular set of assumptions about
the world… Beyond the level of the personal, Wilson, [an officer of the state],
obediently and uncritically followed the protocol of a system already engineered to
target, exploit, and criminalize the poor, the Black, the Brown, the queer, the trans,
the immigrant and the young.35
Hill is alluding to a set of beliefs and conditions that structurally shape situations of
oppression for the groups mentioned. In America, these beliefs are widespread and are
often assumptions that are generalized and less often true. These assumptions include
assumptions that all people of color are violent criminals, aggressive, or criminals; that
petty crimes point to more serious crimes; and that poverty, race, and gender
nonconformity “are identifiers of moral failings so rich that there is no longer any reason to
recognize the rights, the citizenship, or the humanity of those so identified.”36 This
structure of beliefs was (and still is) in place prior to Wilson encountering Brown. As a
result Brown’s, a Black man, position in society was such that an encounter of this kind was
far more likely to end in his death than a white counterpart—which it ultimately did.37
Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond. P. 11.
36 Ibid.
37 Insensitive readers may point out that Michael Brown was not “innocent”; after all,
Michael Brown was seen on a convenience store surveillance tape taking cigarillo “blunt
wraps”—often used for wrapping paper of marijuana cigars after emptying its tobacco
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The water crisis in Flint, Michigan unfortunately provides another example of civic
vulnerability. At the time of this writing about 40 percent of the residents in Flint live at or
below the poverty line and Flint is has the second largest unemployment numbers in
Michigan; Flint is second only to Detroit.38, 39 The city’s water supply used to come from
Detroit’s water company up until 2014. Because Detroit had been facing its own economic
problems for years, Flint had been asked to pay increasing rates for their water between
2004 and 2013.40 As a result, the Flint’s city council voted to bypass Detroit for their water
by way of a Lake Huron water pipeline. Yet, before Flint would be able to make the
complete switch to the Lake Huron pipeline, city authorities had arranged to get water
from the Flint River.41
According to Hill, “ almost immediately after the switch was made, Flint residents
discovered that their drinking water tasted different, looked different, and had a distinct
color.”42 The reason for this, the city would later find out, was high chloride levels and
coliform bacteria in the river’s water.43 The water in flint also carried lead and TTHM. Hill
contents—without paying. I don’t wish to dispute the footage. But I do wish to mention that
making mention of Brown’s innocence or guilt obscures the more important fact that one
should not have to be innocent to avoid being executed by the state.
38 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
39 "Flint, Mi, Unemployment Rate Report,"
http://www.homefacts.com/unemployment/Michigan/Genesee-County/Flint.html.
40 Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond.
41 Ron Fonger, "Ex-Emergency Manager Says He's Not to Blame for Flint River Water
Switch,"
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/ex_emergency_manager_earley_sa.
html.
42 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
43 Importantly, Hill’s retelling of Flint’s narrative illuminates dimensions of civic
indifference (chapter 2) as Flint ignored opportunities to take measures to “stop the
bleeding”. On p. 160 and 161 he says that “Had the authorities actually listened to Flint’s
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notes that “In January 2015, Flint water showed alarmingly high levels of total
trihalomethanes (TTHM), a chlorination by product, in violation of the Clean Water Act”
and that “excessive amounts of TTHM over a prolonged period could result in central
nervous system problems and increased risk for cancer.”44 Additionally, lead poisoning has
effects on neurological, psychological, and reproductive health that are irreversible.
Residents of Flint were thereby made more vulnerable by the actions and inactions of
agents of the state. The extent to which their vulnerability has been increased reflects a set
of structural problems that surrounds their situation.
On my account, a person or group is civically vulnerable if they are susceptible to
suffer or commit harm based on their position in society. The civically vulnerable are so, in
large part, because of their social context. This makes the notion of civic vulnerability a
situational vulnerability. This characterization of vulnerability differs from traditional
analyses of vulnerability because doing harm—engaging in behavior that is not just
harmful to oneself but also to others—is not what we typically think about vulnerability as

residents, the crisis could have ended after a few weeks…For example, the water could
have been treated with an anticorrosion agent like the one Detroit had long used. It was
also possible for the emergency manager to open emergency negotiations to reconnect
with Detroit, something that a democratically elected (rather than privately appointed)
official would likely have considered essential in her role as the people’s representative…
while public officials were focused on measuring Flint’s savings and deflecting complaints
from worried residents, the people of Flint continued to drink, bathe, clean, and play in
water that carried toxins into their bloodstreams on a daily basis.” In this case, the city’s
officials failed to cultivate and sustain an appropriate orientation of concern toward
current residents and future generations of Black and Brown people in Flint as they were
being poisoned. Further, this failure played an instrumental role in the pursuit of their own
ends of fiscal conservativism.
44 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
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being.45 Regularly, we privilege people whose vulnerability is passive or people who are
vulnerable to being affected in a certain way, in our moral evaluations. 46 However, we
cannot exclude this other dimension of vulnerability which is engaging in actions. When we
ignore the active dimension of vulnerability we blame people who tend to join criminal
gangs, for instance, and do not to perceive them as vulnerable. In contrast, we perceive
those who are executed or are physically harmed as a result of not joining a gang, as
vulnerable. Civic vulnerability gives us a way to understand that sometimes the reason
people commit wrong’s is because they, often times, are selecting from a squandered set of
choices or because of their social or economic positioning. So we can understand how
people who become prisoners are vulnerable but part of the reason that they are
vulnerable is because they are more likely to become part of a gang or becoming drug or
sex traffickers. Still, others are vulnerable because they stand a higher likelihood of coming
in to contact with the criminal justice system by being simply by being poor, Black, Brown,
or LBGTQIA.47
For instance, David Lishner’s work distinguishes empathy from tenderness
psychologically. In particular, his results suggest that perceiving someone’s vulnerability
elicits tenderness. However, Lishner’s discussion of vulnerability focuses on the very
passive nature of vulnerability that is typical in traditional analyses of vulnerability. See,
David A. Lishner, C. Daniel Batson, and Elizabeth Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct
Empathic Emotions Elicited by Different Forms of Need," Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 37, no. 5 (2011).
46 Jay M Bernstein, "Trust: On the Real but Almost Always Unnoticed, Ever-Changing
Foundation of Ethical Life," Metaphilosophy 42, no. 4 (2011); Martha Albertson Fineman,
"Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, The," Emory LJ 60 (2010); Goodin, Protecting
the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social Responsibilities; Susan Dodds et al., "Dependence,
Care, and Vulnerability," Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy
(2014); Mary C Ruof, "Vulnerability, Vulnerable Populations, and Policy," Kennedy Institute
of Ethics Journal 14, no. 4 (2004).
47 Saar et al., "The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story."; Hill, Nobody:
Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond;
Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
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Importantly civic vulnerability does not rely on notions of dependency. I agree with
Susan Dodds that:
Dependence is one form of vulnerability. Dependence is vulnerability that requires
the support of a specific person (people)—that is, care… In this way dependence can
be contrasted with those vulnerabilities that do not involve immediate reliance on
specific individuals, for example those vulnerabilities that can be addressed by
generalized public health and safety measures.48
One can be vulnerable without being dependent. I am inclined to think of dependency as a
kind of vulnerability rather than as a necessary part of vulnerability. Not all situational
vulnerabilities involve dependencies. The way that a society is arranged shapes and
mitigates what dependencies people will have. Dodds notes, “while some physical
disabilities may mean a person is dependent in the physical domain on others to secure a
wide range of her needs and to foster her capacities, there is considerable variation in the
level of dependence experienced by people with physical impairments.”49 A person who
uses a wheelchair, for example, may be vulnerable in more ways than others that lack
similar impairment. However, whether or not they are dependent, depends on whether
their needs can be met without relying on the specific assistance of another person.50 In
other words, whether or not that person is more dependent on others for their care
depends upon the social or legal factors mitigating their access to paid employment, home
and workplace design, and their access to public services such as public busses that
accommodate people who use wheelchairs. Dependency encapsulates instances of
vulnerability where a person relies on care. Civic vulnerability is a kind of vulnerability that
does not, out of necessity, evoke notions of dependency.
Dodds et al., "Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability." P. 182-3.
Ibid. P. 186.
50 Ibid.
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Building our political theory around a political subject that is vulnerable enables us
to appreciate differences in power, circumstance, and actual ability. 51 We have already
explored the ways that we are inherently vulnerable to things like hunger, thirst, and being
effected by our natural environment. We also know that while some human vulnerability is
inherent and universal, it is also particular. At times this inherent vulnerability is
compounded by social and political factors. If for example, I fall ill or injured, there may be
accompanying harm or disruption of existing employment, economic, or family
relationships. Martha Fineman states “These harms are not located in the body itself, but in
the interruption or destruction of institutional or social relationships.”52 Suffice it to say
that we are situated within different economic and institutional relationships. To an extent,
as members of a society we all rely and depend upon our societies institutions to enable
our pursuit of well-being. Our vulnerability can be and is mitigated by our social and
political contexts. To the extent to which a society mediates vulnerability then, it is possible
that the society can compensate or lessen our vulnerabilities through its programs,
institutions, systems and structures.
In many cases, “economic and institutional harm can accumulate in a vulnerable
individual’s life, compounding the situation and experience of vulnerability and resulting in
greater harm.”53 Yet individuals themselves are not the only subjects vulnerable in this
way; individual vulnerability provides a basis for recognizing accumulated harm to social
groups. For example these, “economic and institutional harms suffered by individuals also
affect their families. Disparities and disruptions and the burdens they generate can be
Fineman, "Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, The." P. 27.
Ibid. P. 29-30.
53 Ibid. P. 30. Additionally for a thorough analysis of what this accumulation looks like in
American society, readers should see West, The Rich and the Rest of Us.
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transferred from one generation to another.”54 The threats for harm that a society’s
institutions pose may also agglomerate around the members of a social or cultural
“grouping who share certain societal positions or have suffered discrimination based on
constructed categories used to differentiate classes of persons, such as race, gender,
ethnicity, or religious affiliation.”55

Civic vulnerability and Democratic Equality
In most democratic societies, the laws that a given society adopts usually reflect, on
a larger level, the moral commitments that that society has. In our society, I think that it is
uncontroversial to assert that the American commitment to equality is something that
many Americans take to be a good thing not merely in a political sense, but also in the
moral sense. But equality of what? My response to this question follows the tradition of
democratic equality articulated by Elizabeth Anderson.56
The nature of human vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that the state must be
more responsive to that vulnerability. The reality of our individual frailty and the frailty of
certain groups within our society has played a role in the design and construction of our
societal institutions.57 The Code of Federal Regulations for the Department of Health and
Human Services, for example, outline specific protections for vulnerable groups as research
subjects. It reads:
If an IRB regularly reviews research of a vulnerable category of subjects,
consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more IRB members
Fineman, "Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, The." P. 30. Additionally, readers
should see chapter two, “Poverty of Opportunity” in West, The Rich and the Rest of Us.
55 Fineman, "Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, The."
56 Elizabeth S Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?*," Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999).
57 Ruof, "Vulnerability, Vulnerable Populations, and Policy."
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knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these subjects. Selection of
subjects must be equitable and particularly cognizant of the special problems of
research involving vulnerable populations. And when subjects are likely to be
vulnerable to coercion or under influence, additional safeguards must be included in
the study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.58
Additionally, the United States National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical research states:
When vulnerable populations are involved in research, the appropriateness of
involving them should itself be demonstrated. A number of variables go in to such
judgments, including the nature and degree of risk, the condition of the particular
population involved and the nature and level of the anticipated benefits.59
Our society’s institutions collectively form systems that provide “resources in the form of
advantages or coping mechanisms that cushion us when we are facing misfortune, disaster,
and violence.”60 Since the vulnerability of certain groups within our society has played a
role in the design and construction of our societal institutions, it makes sense that
vulnerability should play a role in measuring the effectiveness and the justice of operation
of our society’s institutions.
I understand democratic equality as Elizabeth Anderson has articulated it.61 What is
meant by democracy is “collective self-determination by means of open discussion among
equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all.”62 The requirement of equality for a
democratic society means that “one is entitled to participate, that others recognize an
The emphasis is my own. US Department of Health and Human Services, "Code of Federal
Regulations. Title 45 Public Welfare. Department of Health and Human Services. Part 46:
Protection of Human Subjects," Washington,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.html.
59 The emphasis is my own. Education Department of Health, "The Belmont Report. Ethical
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research,"
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html.
60 Fineman, "Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, The." P. 32.
61 Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?*."
62 Ibid. P. 313.
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obligation to listen respectfully and respond to one’s arguments, that no one need bow and
scrape before others or represent themselves as inferior to others as a condition of having
their claim heard.”63 Under this theory of equality, equality is certain kind of social
relationship.
The aim of democratic equality is put an end to socially created oppression.64
Democratic equality thus pays less attention to injustices generated by the natural order
and more attention to the social dimension of injustice. As such, democratic equality is not
a call for equality of outcome or result. Further, the notion of democratic equality is a
relational rather than a distributive theory of equality. Thus equality is conceived of as a
social relationship rather than a pattern of distribution. Democratic egalitarians emphasize
the relationship within which goods are distributed and not the distribution of the goods
themselves.65 These social relationships “are largely seen as instrumental to generating
[just] patterns of distribution.”66 Because of this, democratic equality contains a certain
sensitivity to the importance of the demands of equal recognition rather than to those of
equal distribution.
The fundamental obligation of a democratic community of citizens committed to
equality is to secure the social conditions of everyone’s freedom where a free life is
understood here as one that stands in relations of equality with others.67 As a result,
democratic equality disallows oppressive relationships. Anderson marks the conditions of
democratic equality as follows:
Ibid.
Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
63
64
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•

Equals are not subject to arbitrary violence or physical coercion by others.
Choice unconstrained by arbitrary physical coercion is one of the fundamental
conditions of freedom.

•

Equals are not marginalized by others. They are therefore free to participate in
politics and the major institutions of a civil society.

•

Equals are not dominated by others; they do not live at the mercy of others. This
means that they govern their own wills, which is freedom.

•

Equals are not exploited by others. This means that they are freer to secure the
fair value of their labor.

•

Equals are not subject to cultural imperialism: they are free to practice their own
culture, subject to the constraint of respecting everyone else.68

Since “Citizenship involves functioning not only as a political agent—voting, engaging in
political speech, petitioning the government, and so forth—but also standing as an equal in
a civil society,”69 in an equal society, individuals are free from oppression to participate in
and enjoy the goods that a society has to offer including participation in democratic selfgovernment.
The egalitarian aim of securing the social conditions of their freedom can be
understood in terms of capabilities for functioning.70 The well-being of a person can be
thought of in terms of the quality of one’s being. Sen says that “living may be seen as

Ibid. P. 315.
Ibid.
70 Ibid. P. 75. See also, Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford University Press, 1992).
P. 39-42.
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consisting of a set of interrelated ‘functionings’, consisting of beings and doings.”71 Some
relevant functioning’s correspond to needs generated by both inherent and civic
vulnerability including such things as being adequately nourished, being in good health,
having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, etc.72 In part, functioning’s
constitute a person’s being and so evaluations of well-being have to make an assessment of
these constitutive elements.
A notion related to functioning’s is a person’s capability to function.73 Capabilities
represent the combination of beings and doings that a person can achieve. Sen says,
“Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead
one type of life or another…the ‘capability set’ in the functioning space reflects the person’s
freedom to choose from possible livings.”74 A helpful analogy for thinking about capability
sets is to liken them to a person’s budget in relation to purchasing. When a person has
allocated a budget it represents that person’s freedom to purchase commodities or
services. They cannot purchase what their budget will not allow. In a similar way, a
person’s capability set represents a person’s freedom to choose from possible ways of
living; a person cannot achieve functioning that they are not capable of achieving.
The relationship between capabilities and well-being is thus:
1. If the achieved functionings constitute a person's well-being, then the
capability to achieve functionings (i.e. all the alternative combinations of

Inequality Reexamined. P. 39.
Ibid.
73 Ibid.; Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?*."; Martha C Nussbaum, Creating
Capabilities (Harvard University Press, 2011).
74 Sen, Inequality Reexamined. P. 40.
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functionings a person can choose to have) will constitute the person's
freedom—the real opportunities—to have well-being.
2. Achieved well-being itself depends on the capability to function. As a
result, choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of
genuine choice with serious options may be seen to be—for that reason—
richer.75
The relevance of (1) to our political analysis is that it shapes our view of what the good
democratic state is in a way that emphasizes the freedoms that different people engage to
achieve well-being. The second component, (2), makes it clear that some capabilities (i.e.
the capability for choice itself) contribute directly to well-being. Further, the notion of
capability sets “gives us information of the various functioning vectors that are within
reach of a person”.76 This last point highlights the relevance of a notion of capability sets no
matter how well-being is conceived.
Democratic equality thus aims for equality across a wide range of capabilities.
Specifically it aims for equality across those capabilities that enable citizens to function as
equals.77 Functioning as an equal citizen in a society presupposes functioning as a human
being and it involves the ability to participate in the exercise of specific political rights and
the ability to participate in the civil society more broadly. So whatever functioning as an
equal participant of a democratic state amounts to, it must include securing effective access
to the means of sustaining one’s existence (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) and access to the
basic condition of human agency (knowledge of one’s circumstances and options, the
Ibid.
Ibid. P. 41.
77 Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?*." P. 317.
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ability to deliberate about means and ends, the psychological conditions of autonomy,
freedom of thought and movement). Specifically, in order to function as a citizen requires
rights to political participation and effective access to the goods and relationships of civil
society. These include but are not limited to the right to freedom of speech and assembly
and access to public spaces such as parks and public accommodations such as public
transit.
There are three advantages of using capabilities as the metric of equality. First,
capabilities accounts of justice are “attentive to human diversity, with respect to both
individual differences in endowments, personal characteristics, and value and values and to
the external circumstances of people’s lives—their natural, social, cultural, and political
environment.”78 Whatever a person’s functioning’s, and so well-being turn out to be, they
will be the result of a conversion from a person’s capability set. Next, the attention to the
specificities of context enable an analysis of the different sources of social injustice,
inequality, and disadvantage and the impacts these have on a person’s opportunities for
functioning.79 Mackenzie says, “Specific capability deficits can signal sources of occurent or
dispositional vulnerability and vice versa. The notion of vulnerability also signals the actual
or potential harm that may result from particular capability deficits and highlights the
obligation to address those deficits in order to remediate vulnerability.”80 The third upshot
of capabilities as the metric for equality is that it weds the importance of choice with
attention to the social conditions from which a choice is made. Mackenzie notes that “The
Catriona Mackenzie, "The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an
Ethics of Vulnerability," Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (2014).
P. 49.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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notion of choice is built into the concept of capabilities, as freedom or opportunity to
achieve valuable functionings…[according to the capabilities theorist] the political goal of a
just society should be to enhance citizens’ (combined) capabilities, in the sense of ensuring
equal access to a wide range of opportunities rather than ensuring the achievement of
specific functionings.”81
At this point in our discussion, we have defined the notion of civic vulnerability.
Additionally, to the extent a society committed to mediating vulnerability, we have
explored how a society’s commitment to equality generates obligations of social justice to
ensure the social conditions of everyone’s freedom where a free life is understood here as
one that stands in relations of equality with others. We can now turn our attention to the
notion of civic indifference and the role that is plays in the prevention of democratic
equality.

81

Ibid. P. 51.
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Chapter 2:
Civic Indifference
Indifference can take on a variety forms. Sometimes when we speak of indifference
we are talking about a lack of interest or attention. You might be indifferent to the exact
number of cracks in the concrete sidewalks of your native city, for example. Other times we
speak about indifference and are talking about some thing’s being unimportant or lacking
significance. In this case, for example, you might think that the free agency transactions
that do not involve a sport’s superstar players are a matter of indifference. Indifference is
also commonly used to mean neutrality. In this sense, we commonly speak of professional
sport officials being indifferent to the outcome of the match they are officiating.
In moral philosophy, there has been relatively little work done that concentrates
explicitly on indifference. This fact is interesting because of the role that indifference
appears to play in the work of some philosophers.82 It should be noted that this problem is

In “Liberalism and multiculturalism: The politics of indifference”, Chandran Karthucas
argues that liberalism as a political doctrine or idea is indifferent to the ends of people and
indeed the happenings of people but does not substantively lay out what is meant by
indifference. (Chandran Kukathas, "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of
Indifference," Political theory 26, no. 5 (1998).)
In Living With Indifference, Charles Scott adopts a phenomenological approach to
talking about indifference. Scott thinks that indifference is a dimension of our lives that is
very much real. Yet on Scott’s own account indifference is difficult to articulate in any
explicit way because no one articulation would be, or even could be sufficient to capture
the dimension. He says that "The problem is that the happening of sheer neutrality is not a
thing at all. “It” lacks specific determination, and that makes thinking and speaking of
indifference awkward. My guess is that the most appropriate address of indifference is
indirect and that directness regarding indifference is at best preparatory for another kind
of perceptiveness." (Charles E. Scott, Living with Indifference (Indiana University Press,
2007). Notably, in “Indifference, Description, and Difference, John Stuhr offers
considerations for Scott’s work but generally continues in the tradition of presenting “no
argument and no conclusion” about indifference. (John J. Stuhr, "Indifference, Description,
Difference," Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2012).
32
82

not specific to moral philosophy, but also exists elsewhere (albeit to a lesser degree)
throughout the social sciences.83
The aim of the present chapter is to illuminate what civic indifference is. As I conceive
of it, civic indifference damages our ability to protect those who are civically vulnerable
and our ability to establish emotions that are important for social justice such as civic
compassion.84 I first provide a scheme for interpreting and analyzing indifference through
the work of Hallvard Lillehammer. From there I proceed to an understanding of what civic
indifference is and why it is undesirable for societies that strive for justice.
Much like vulnerability, the variation of uses that indifference receives to suggests
different responses to the question of “what is civic indifference?” In one of the few works of
contemporary philosophy to address this issue at length, Hallvard Lillehammer presents a
scheme for “the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant states of indifference in
terms of how different subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in
different circumstances.”85 Looking to his efforts will provide insight that proves helpful for
conceptualizing what civic indifference is.

A scheme for understanding indifference
To get clear on what civic indifference is, it is helpful to distinguish between the distinct
states of indifference. Once we get clear on what civic indifference is, we will be in a much
better position to see why it is undesirable for societies aspiring toward social justice.
For example, Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering
(John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Heron, "Challenging Indifference to Extreme Poverty:
Considering Southern Perspectives on Global Citizenship and Change."
84 Nussbaum, Political Emotions.
85 Hallvard Lillehammer, "The Nature and Ethics of Indifference," The Journal of Ethics
(2016). P. 1.
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Lillehammer defines a state of indifference as, “the absence of one or more of a range of
possible orientations of concern about some object on the part of some subject in a certain
context.”86 It follows from this that indifference admits of variation. For example, you might
be indifferent to people who are incarcerated or impoverished, by not thinking about them,
not worrying about them, or by not doing anything about them. Lillehammer’s use of
“orientations” characterizes ways of relating to some object, person, or group. You can have
this attitude in a variety of circumstances such as a state of ignorance of the causes of their
conditions or through a state of false belief or denial about their conditions, for example.
Still, we might wonder how much and what is required to qualify as not indifferent?
Insofar as indifference is an orientation of not being concerned about, not being
indifferent requires that we take up an attitude of concern about. The concern needn’t be
positive. Lillehammer says, “You can move out of a state of indifference in more than one
direction, either by taking up a positive attitude towards it (as by way of affection) or by
taking up a negative attitude towards it (as by way of hostility).”87 Importantly, indifference
is flexible enough to allow for someone to be non-indifferent so long as the state of some
other person or group makes a difference to how they think, feel, or act at some point in
time.88 It is quite possible, however, that moving out of a state of indifference by adopting
an attitude of hostility, may increase rather than reduce the distance between others, and
ourselves although this claim has not yet been tested empirically.
When we say that someone is indifferent about something we express a relation
between a subject of indifference (someone or something that is indifferent), an object of
Ibid. P. 11.
Ibid. P. 10.
88 I am indebted to my advisor Warren Herold for both helping me see this point and
encouraging me to bring it out explicitly.
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indifference (something that they are indifferent about), an attitude or orientation of some
subject towards the object, and a context of indifference (the facts of the situation in which
the relevant orientation is embedded).
Lillehammer holds that, “A subject of indifference (‘subject’ being used here in a
schematic sense) is a something or somebody capable of having an attitude or orientation
towards some aspect of the world (including themselves).”89 Subjects of indifference
include humans, social groups, institutions, or systems.90 A subject of indifference needn’t
possess an intentional state. This is implied from the fact that an indifferent subject could
include social groups, institutions and systems. For example, the commissioner of the
National Football League (NFL) might be said to be indifferent to the potential risk of
bodily harm to players in the league, more so than NFL fans in general, but less so than the
league itself. The first of these uses resonates most with the use of indifference in an ethical
sense and for that reason is perhaps more paradigmatic of the ethically interesting uses of
indifference. Still, the extension to the latter cases is at least intelligible.
The object of indifference is what an indifferent subject is indifferent to.91 Objects of
indifference can include people, groups or collections of people, social entities, facts,
events, actual and possible states of affairs. You might be indifferent to the sign-holding
homeless person as you exit the highway, prisoners, the civic vulnerability of others, animal
pain, philosophical research, the Turkish Coup of 2016, or what happens on your birthday
Lillehammer, "The Nature and Ethics of Indifference." P. 12.
I wish to note two things here. First, a subject of indifference may indeed be any ethically
relevant locus of agency. Second, my use of system here is of the same sense that is the
object of study in the social sciences. This sense of system is also often the target of political
protest and critique.
91 It should be iterated here that both ‘subject’ and ‘object’ as I am using them in relation to
indifference are being used in a schematic sense.
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5 years from now. Further, you might be indifferent across a range of aspects and this
range might be partially indeterminate. For example, you might care about the level of
police brutality in your native city but not necessarily the amount of cracks in the concrete
sidewalk or the year that the city was established.
Paradigmatically, an orientation of indifference is an attitudinal relation that connects a
subject with the object of indifference. 92 An indifferent orientation might be characterized
by absence of thought belief, judgment, feeling, motive, disposition, a specific form of
action, or an extended pattern of behavior. Systems and institutions are potential subjects
of indifference and are incapable of having the attitudes associated with an individual’s
concern or indifference. In this case, Lillehammer says that:
it can be useful to include in the range of possible orientations of concern any
kind of responsiveness to the world that is attributable to entities
describable as acting for reason, or as having beliefs, purposes or aims
whether they are individuals, groups, corporation, institutions, social
systems, structures, or entire societies.93
This means that the domain of indifference extends further than the domain of mental
states (i.e. thoughts and feelings) that a person can have. Indifference, therefore, is neither
essentially human nor essentially individual.
The context of indifference is the circumstances where the subject, object, and
orientation of indifference are jointly realized. Facts, both internal and external to the
subject of indifference, make up the relevant circumstances according to Lillehammer.94
You might, for example, be indifferent to the treatment of prisoners in the context that
none of your immediate family members or friends is incarcerated. In this case the relevant
Lillehammer, "The Nature and Ethics of Indifference." P. 15.
Ibid. P. 15-6.
94 Ibid. P. 16.
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circumstances are facts external to you. Contrastingly, you might be indifferent to the
treatment of prisoners in the context that you have no beliefs about the treatment of
prisoners or in a context where you have family or friends who are incarcerated and think
that they are deserving of such treatment. In this case the relevant circumstances are facts
internal to you. Some of the features of the context of indifference can partly explain the
emergence and persistence of the indifferent aspects of a certain situation.95 Take a lack of
concern for people in poverty for example. This lack of concern may vary in respect to an
explanation for it—it might be because of a personal belief (i.e. you believe that the group
of people in poverty are in poverty because they habitually made poor choices); a selfregarding motive (i.e. protecting the monetary resources that you have); a social cause (i.e.
in-group/out-group tension); or a historical function (i.e. ensuring social stability).
This scheme uncovers a few more features of indifference. For instance, indifference is
juxtaposed with an orientation of being concerned about. Lillehammer says “to be
indifferent to something is to display an attitude or orientation towards some aspect of that
thing, where that orientation involves the absence of care or concern.”96 While to be
concerned about something is to be more or less concerned about it, to be indifferent to
something towards something is to not be concerned about it at all in some relevant
respect.
To say that a person is concerned about something is to say that some state of the
concerned person would change in certain ways in response to the state of the thing that

95
96

Ibid. P. 17-8.
Ibid. P. 22.
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the person is concerned about.97 To say that a person displays an indifferent orientation
towards (or a lack of concern about) something is to say that some state of the indifferent
person would not change depending on the state of the thing that is the object of their
indifference. As Lillehammer puts it, “you are indifferent to something (in a certain way)
just in case it makes no difference to you (in that way) whether it is the case or not.”98 In
other words, if you are indifferent towards people in poverty or people imprisoned, then
the impoverished and the imprisoned will make no difference in what you think, feel, or do.
This is the case irrespective of whatever significance these matters may have for others.

Civic Indifference
So at this point we may say that a subject of indifference (someone or something) is
indifferent to some object (i.e. the civic vulnerability of homeless people) when that subject
displays a non caring orientation (i.e. lack of response) toward that object in a certain
context (driving past the homeless person on the off ramp as you exit the freeway).99 Civic
Indifference is the lack of an appropriate orientation of concern a society’s members,
institutions, or systems may have toward a person or group’s civic vulnerability (Chapter
1). It is a subset of Lillehammer’s indifference that has a fixed subject and object, both
pertaining to the civic dimensions of human life. In kind, civic indifference is a composite of
exclusionary indifference and negating indifference. In effect, civic indifference increases
moral distance and damages our ability to decrease the moral distance between ourselves
Readers that are interested in responsive accounts of love or concern should see Niko
Kolodny, "Love as Valuing a Relationship," Philosophical Review (2003); Justin Leonard
Clardy, "Love, Reason, and Romantic Relationships" (University of Arkansas, 2013).
98 Lillehammer, "The Nature and Ethics of Indifference." P. 23.
99 "Who Is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice," Philosophy 89, no. 04
(2014).
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and others that creates a social division.
As a kind of indifference, exclusionary indifference is present when a subject fails to
either cultivate or sustain an appropriate orientation of concern towards some ethically
significant feature of the world; where this failure plays a strategic or otherwise
instrumental role in the pursuit of either their own ends, or in the pursuit of the ends of
some collective of which they are a natural part; and where the nature of the object
excluded plays a significant role in that pursuit.100 Not all forms of exclusionary
indifference are ethically problematic because the distinction itself is sometimes morally
important. For example, a Jets fan at a sports bar might intentionally ignore the chants of
the supporters of a rival team in order to show support to his own team. However, there
are some cases that are ethically problematic because making such a distinction causes
disproportionate harm to those who are excluded from the concern. The demonstrations of
this orientation vary. You might fail to have compassion for a member of an out-group. This
orientation could also be demonstrated through individual failures of recognition or action
to systematic practices of discrimination such as using the facial images of Black males as
shooting targets in police training or the refusal to offer Blacks Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) loans which was a widespread practice in America throughout the
1950s and 1960s. 101, 102
Ibid. P. 568.
Miami NBC News published an article describing outrage in Miami over a Florida police
department using the faces of Black men as the targets in their shooting practice exercises.
See, Mc Nelly Torres and Willard Shepard, "Family Outraged after North Miami Beach
Police Use Mug Shots as Shooting Targets," NBC Miami,
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Family-Outraged-After-North-Miami-BeachPolice-Use-Criminal-Photos-as-Shooting-Targets-288739131.html.
102 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
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Lillehammer maintains that exclusionary indifference “has both intrapersonal and
interpersonal manifestations.”103 This means that indifference can occur in a relation
between persons (interpersonal) or it can manifest within the self or within one’s mind
(intrapersonal). On one hand, it’s possible to consciously cultivate a sense of indifference to
mark someone as a member of an out-group. For example, professional athletes may
consciously cultivate indifference towards the emotions of their opponents; and it is this
cultivation that, in part, marks their opponents as opponents. Additionally, this is the case
with Danish correctional officers who often, become indifferent to certain dimensions of
prisoners—marking their distinction from them—so that they remain attentive and alert to
safety protocol involved in their job which some times includes horse back riding and
golfing with inmates. Additionally, their indifference to the emotionally difficult aspects of
their work enables them to cope with difficult emotional aspects of a job from which they
cannot dis-identify completely through cynicism, irony, or humor.104
On other occasions the exclusionary aspect is hidden from our consciousness “either
because the exclusionary purpose is non-conscious, or because it is a function of social
forms, the nature and workings of which lie beyond the horizon of subjective
awareness.”105 In this case, a member of some in-group could be indifferent to an ethically
relevant feature of a member of an out-group while believing that she has no particular
beliefs about the out-group (that is, her indifference to the out-group might be believed to

Lillehammer, "Who Is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice." P. 569.
See, Jeanette Lemmergaard and Sara Louise Muhr, "Golfing with a Murderer—
Professional Indifference and Identity Work in a Danish Prison," Scandinavian Journal of
Management 28, no. 2 (2012).
105 Lillehammer, "Who Is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice." P. 570.
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be a virtuous expression of her commitment to the in-group).106 For example, in the 1990s
the language of “superpredators” was employed to transform perception around the war
on crime to one of “us versus them”. The “them”, in this case, were superficially cast Black
youth as radically impulsive and brutally remorseless.107 Sociologist Marc Lamont Hill
notes that “The term “superpredator” was also used under the Democratic Clinton
administration—by both President Bill Clinton and then First Lady Hillary Clinton, who
also publicly advocated for the policy—to justify the Crime Bill and three strikes legislation,
both which led to the expanded incarceration of people of color.”108 Ultimately, the
language of superpredators encourages members of our society to make superfluous
distinctions between whether criminals are one of us or one of them. Too often in what we
take to be a commitment to “us” we conclude that criminals are “one of them”.
Negating indifference is present when a subject fails to either cultivate or sustain an
appropriate orientation of concern towards some ethically significant feature of the world
and this failure involves the wrongful denial of some ethically significant status merited by
that feature.109 Unlike exclusionary indifference, negating indifference needn’t play a role in
a subject’s pursuit of his or her own ends.110 Lillehammer asserts that “The subject of
Here it is worth exploring the ways that there may be some connection between states
of indifference and states of denial. To provide an in depth analysis of the connections
between the two would take us too far a field here. Still it is worth noting that Stanley
Cohen’s work, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering lays a solid
foundation for such analytic exploration. See Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About
Atrocities and Suffering.
107 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
108 Ibid. P. 142.
109 Lillehammer, "Who Is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice." P. 571.
110 When it is, it is proper to say that the indifference is both negating and exclusionary.
Examples of such an attitude could come about when the loyalties that tie you to your own
social group is enhanced if you systematically ignore the suffering you cause to people
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negating indifference could be any individual, group, institution or structure describable as
having attitudes of as- signing or denying value to things. Its object can be any ethically
significant feature of the world, including individuals, groups or states of affairs.”111 When
the orientation of civic indifference is of the negating kind, it essentially involves the
subject’s refusal to accord its object some specific form of moral standing. With this refusal
comes a corresponding absence of concern by way of action, motivation, thought or feeling.
Lillehammer says “Negating indifference is an attitude taken towards another person
when some strict ethical boundary is drawn and the other is regarded either as falling into
a less favoured category of ethical concern, or is denied the status as ethically significant
altogether.”112 Historical descriptions of discrimination and oppression are replete with
examples of this kind of indifference. For example, in 1971 prisoners staged a rebellion in
response to overcrowding and harsh conditions. In a manifesto issued by the prisoners the
prisoners pronounced that:
We are MEN! We are not beasts and do not intend to be beaten or driven as
such. The entire prison populace has set forth to change forever the ruthless
brutalization and disregard for the lives of prisoners here and throughout the
United States. What has happened here is but the sound before the fury, of
those who are oppressed.113
More recently, on February 1, 2017 the inmates as Vaughn Correctional Center took
over the prison in a similar fashion—taking five officers hostage.114 Just like the inmates at
outside your group and where you justify your ignorance of this suffering by denying the
legitimacy of the claims from the people suffering; this is often the case with American
Police officers in regard to the victims of police brutality.
111 Lillehammer, "Who Is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice." P. 572.
112 Ibid. P. 572.
113 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond. P. 135.
114 Chris Boyette and Darran Simon, "Deleware Officers Held Hostage in Prison Standoff,"
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/us/delaware-prison-standoff/.
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Attica over forty years ago, prisoners staged a protest in response to the conditions that
they are forced to endure at Vaughn—a prison known for it’s serious overuse of solitary
confinement.115 In a statement released by the leaders of the rebellion the inmates explain
the reason for their rebellion:
We’re trying to explain the reasons for doing what we’re doing. Donald Trump.
Everything that he did. Everything that he is doing now. We know that the institution is
going to change for the worse. We got demands that you need to pay attention to, that
you need to listen to and you need to let them know. Education, we want education first
and foremost. We want a rehabilitation program that works for everybody. We want the
money to be allocated so we can know exactly what is going on in the prison budget.116
Without quibbling about the feasibility of some of the inmates’ demands such as “a
rehabilitation program that works for everybody”, others like access to education and
transparency regarding the prison’s budget certainly seems feasible. The history of prison
rebellion in America uncovers our indifference towards prisoners; we draw strict ethical
boundaries that cast prisoners into a less favored category of ethical concern and we ignore
their status as ethically significant altogether.117 Heather Ann Thomson writes:
Today, in prisons across the country, the conditions that sparked the Attica uprising
are even worse. Prisons are more overcrowded. Food rations are meager and, since
meal services are often contracted out to for-profit companies that food is
sometimes spoiled and rotten. Medical care is substandard and, again thanks to
privatization, is often legally negligent. Prisoners are kept for long periods of time in
solitary confinement and face serious physical abuse—often accompanied by racial
epithets and threats—from officers who retain utter control over them.118
The negating element of indifference is present in the fact that we ignore prison
conditions across the country are far worse now than the conditions that sparked the
Heather Ann Thompson, "What Happened at Vaughn Prison?,"
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/vaughn-prison-hostage-attica-uprising/.
116 Ibid.
117 Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. See
particularly chapter 5.
118 Thompson, "What Happened at Vaughn Prison?".
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uprising in Attica forty-six years ago, for instance.
In effect, civic indifference increases psychological and moral distance and it damages
our ability to decrease the distance between ourselves and others which creates a social
division. Moral distance is a sense of difference and separateness—or otherwise,
‘otherness’—between others and ourselves.119 Civic indifference intensifies a sense of
social division, difference and separateness between you and the civically vulnerable. As a
result we often fail to experience a sense of commonality of a shared civic fate, or of
common humanity. Further, because it increases moral distance and damages our ability to
decrease the it, civic indifference reduces our perception of similarity to others. Insofar as
emotions like compassion, empathy, and sympathy involve thoughts of similar possibility
and perspective-taking, we must break the barricades of civic indifference if we are to fully
harness these emotions.
An orientation of civic indifference is sustained by three kinds of mechanisms—
psychological, political, and social—that underlie intergroup interaction. These
mechanisms interact with one another and affect us in ways that sustain civic indifference
and in some cases reproduce civic vulnerability.
On a psychological level, attribution biases and implicit biases are widespread. The
fundamental attribution error for example, is a tendency to overstate the role played by
My usage of the concept of moral distance is my best interpretation of what Lawrence
Blum means by the term in “Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis”. However,
Blum does little to develop this concept within the framework of the paper. On page 276 he
says that, “ To see a group through a stereotype is to intensify one’s sense of its and its
members’ ‘otherness’. It is to experience a sense of moral distance from them,” and “any
stereotyping intensifies a sense of difference and separateness between the stereotype and
the stereotyped.” Beyond this, Blum does little to elaborate what the concept of moral
distance involves. See, Lawrence Blum, "Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis,"
Philosophical papers 33, no. 3 (2004).
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personal characteristics, and understate the role played by environmental factors.
Corresponding with this error is often the indifference to the effects of other mechanisms
as causes to poverty such as the effects of class segregation of people who are in poverty.
The result is misunderstanding the experience of an impoverished Black woman, for
instance, who has had her opportunities diminished by class segregation and instead
regard her as a ‘Welfare Queen’.120 Further, implicit association tests (IAT) have been
showing that a great many people including those who genuinely profess themselves to be
impartial and explicitly disavow any form of prejudice, display subtle signs of bias toward
both people and groups.121 These biases are just two examples where psychological science
shows our cognitive capacities to be impaired even in cases where we have little to no
introspective access to our own impairment. This cognitive impairment increases the
The irony of this error has been recorded in The Sympathetic State (Michele Landis
Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State
(University of Chicago Press, 2012). In this work, Landis Dauber traces the historical
origins of the American welfare state. New Dealers recognized the early power of
photography to construct sympathetic icons of the Depression’s ravaging effects. Over the
course of the Great Depression legislators were careful in how they depicted its victims
when crafting the narrative. Because early legislators did not suspect images of Black
bodies to be able to elicit sympathy from the nation, the most iconic image of the push for
social welfare relief was “The Madonna of the Flood” taken in 1937. The image is of a
helpless white woman breastfeeding her child at a refugee camp.
121 Daniel Kelly and Erica Roedder, "Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias,"
Philosophy Compass 3, no. 3 (2008); Anthony G Greenwald, Debbie E McGhee, and Jordan
LK Schwartz, "Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test," Journal of personality and social psychology 74, no. 6 (1998); Jerry Kang
et al., "Implicit Bias in the Courtroom," UCLA Law Review 59, no. 5 (2012); Tamar Szabó
Gendler, "On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias," Philosophical Studies 156, no. 1 (2011);
Laurie A Rudman and Stephen E Kilianski, "Implicit and Explicit Attitudes toward Female
Authority," Personality and social psychology bulletin 26, no. 11 (2000); Alexander R Green
et al., "Implicit Bias among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for
Black and White Patients," Journal of general internal medicine 22, no. 9 (2007); B Keith
Payne, "Weapon Bias Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping," Current
Directions in Psychological Science 15, no. 6 (2006); "Prejudice and Perception: The Role of
Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon," Journal of personality and
social psychology 81, no. 2 (2001).
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likelihood that we misrelate to our fellows by failing to accord them proper respect or
acknowledgement.122
There are also political mechanisms. Through its legal and political institutions the
state has been responsible for expanding and sustaining indifference by sustaining spatial
segregation, for example.123 The historical importance of state action in sustaining civic
indifference should not be ignored nor underestimated.124 For example, in August of 2015
the Mayor of San Francisco said he would enact 10 day edicts that order the homeless of
the city off its streets during the week of the 2016 NFL Super Bowl because being homeless
is both “illegal” and “dangerous”.125 For another example in our society prisoners are
spatially segregated from the rest of society (I guess correctional facilities don’t
complement the architecture of fashion malls). Rather than a coincidence, this reflects a
commitment that the state has made endorsing such spatial segregation.
The story of St. Louis’ “White flight” throughout the late 1940s and 1950s also
illuminates the way civic indifference is sustained by political mechanisms. White flight is
the term used to describe “the movement of White Families (and necessary resources) out

Blum, "Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis." P. 262.
Anderson, The Imperative of Integration.
124 A compelling example can be found in The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness, Michelle Alexander carefully outlines the state’s role in crafting
legislation—such as the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act—that is civically
indifferent to the civic vulnerabilities that populations of Black and Brown people in
America face. Former United States President Bill Clinton who signed the act into law, has
admitted that this legislation has made the vulnerability of Black people worse in relation
to the justice system in America. See, Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Colorblindness; Dan Murica, "Bill Clinton Says He Made Mass Incarceration Issue
Worse," CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/bill-clinton-1994-crime-bill/.
125 Heather Knight, "Nothing Like a Super Bowl to Fix S.F.'S Homeless Problem," San
Fransisco Chronicle, August 28, 2015 2015.
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of the cities and in to the suburbs.”126 To decrease the likelihood that Black families could
follow White ones in to the suburbs, “many of these suburban communities adopted strict
zoning regulations” that eliminated the kinds of resources that Blacks would need and
desire.127 By the mid 1940s there was a growing concern that downtown St. Louis was
losing its residential character.128 In fact, Hill mentions that “A 1948 study raised the issue
of the unsightliness of the city’s slums—not so much out of concern for those who lived in
them as for those who had to witness this blight on their daily commutes to downtown
attractions.”129 Officials attempted to clear the city’s slums by designing and building public
housing developments and relocating residents from segregated relocation offices.130 The
establishment of these developments faced both economic and social limitations. The social
limitations included attitudes that public housing should be situated downtown while
simultaneously leaving the commercial core of the city intact. Economic limitations came
by way of strict construction-cost guidelines and policies that the buildings “be maintained
on rent monies alone.” 131 The construction-cost restrictions placed on the project’s
architects constrained their choices of usable materials and ultimately opted for the
cheapest materials that did not hold up very well. Hill reports, “Doorknobs came off on first

Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond. This narrative, in particular is about the Pruitt-Igoe housing projects in St. Louis. In
its early days, Pruitt-Igoe was praised by urban planners “as a demonstration of how
design could survive social change. Ultimately, the project failed due to social and economic
factors.
127 Ibid. P. 7.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid. It is worth noting that while the authors of the report regarded the concerns of the
commuters, they remained indifferent to the very residents themselves who has to live in
the very conditions the commuters judged to be an eyesore.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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use; locks were quickly broken and windows shattered. Pipes froze and burst.”132 To solve
the problems likely generated by the use of cheap materials, officials attempted to raise the
residents’ rent. Ultimately, the public housing developments were a failed government
project that failed due to political and economic factors.
Third, there are social mechanisms such as norms of civil inattention and individual
attitudes. Civil inattention is the attention we are encouraged not to pay to one another
when sharing civic spaces. In a concentration on civil inattention Erving Goffman
characterizes civil inattention as “a courtesy that tends to treat those present merely as
participants in the gathering and not in terms of other social characteristics”.133 Performed
through interpersonal rituals, such as meeting with the eyes of another person passing on
the street and casually casting your eyes down as you pass them (as if to “dim the lights”),
civil inattention “constantly regulates the social intercourse of persons in our society.”134
We are conditioned to pay little attention to strangers in spaces that we share with them—
“Don’t be rude!” we tell our children. Goffman himself admits that “In performing this
courtesy the eyes of the looker may pass over the eyes of the other, but no “recognition” is
typically allowed.”135 As a mechanism sustaining civic indifference, it is likely that the
normalization of civic inattention dissuades us from recognizing one another, passing over
other’s situations entirely.
Additionally, individual perceptions, memory, and political attitudes are fed
stigmatizing images of vulnerable groups. For instance, media portrayals of Blacks as ‘lazy’,
Ibid. Hill also notes that “Because occupancy levels were less than capacity, the rent
monies were not sufficient to fix these and other problems.”
133 Erving Goffman, Behavior in Public Places (Simon and Schuster, 2008). P.86.
134 Ibid. P. 84.
135 Ibid.
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‘thugs’, ‘violent’, etc., relentlessly propagate stigmatizing images of Blacks. In addition to
being false and unwarranted, these images present the larger society with
overgeneralizations about groups through a narrow and rigid lens of group-based images,
rather than being sensitive to the range of characteristics constituting each member as a
distinct individual. Additionally, these kinds of images homogenize groups, as they are
indifferent to the internal variety of the group. Again, civic indifference is sustained in this
case through the failure of recognition that is directed toward the group, and to individuals
insofar as they are members of that' group.

The need for civic tenderness
Civic indifference towards civic vulnerability prevents us from confronting
important issues of justice in a candid and critical way. If civic compassion is to be fully
harnessed then these attitudes of indifference should be targeted and eliminated. The
cultivation of civic tenderness—the appropriate orientation of concern a societies members,
institutions, or systems should have toward a person or group’s civic vulnerability—can
target this indifference by responding to civic vulnerability. Civic indifference can be
effectively addressed by means of the very psychological, political, and social, mechanisms
that sustain it. We can move out of a state of civic indifference by being made more aware
and thus attuning our orientation to one of concern as it pertains to the ways our fellows
are civically vulnerable.
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Chapter 3:
Civic Tenderness
Civic indifference creates difficulties for the outward extension of civic compassion
because it increases distance and damages our ability to decrease this distance between
others and ourselves. If we are concerned with cultivating compassion in our society, we
will need to find ways to alter this indifference. The emotion of tenderness has not been the
object of much study in the philosophy of love nor has it been the object of any study in
political philosophy. Yet because we are seeking a response to vulnerability, it would seem
that no emotion is more important than tenderness. Tenderness functions as a response to
perceived vulnerability that enables us to experience emotions that require that we take
the perspective of others and see things from their shoes. Consequently, it may well be the
case that tenderness is associated with other empathic emotions such as fear, anger, pity,
and joy. Elaborating the relation between tenderness and these emotions, however, take us
too far afield and so shall be left for another time.
The main goals of this chapter are to address important questions about the nature
of civic tenderness and its role in achieving justice. What is civic tenderness? What is its
relationship to empathic concern? I argue that Civic tenderness is an orientation of
concern, brought about in response to civic vulnerability that provides an impulse toward
caregiving behavior. If tenderness can be collapsed in to empathy, it might seem that our
time and energy is better spent on trying to perfect the mechanism of empathy instead of
tenderness. Distinguishing tenderness from empathy is necessary if we are to demonstrate
that tenderness is important on its own. I also argue for the outward extension of civic
tenderness through a process I call tenderization.
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I begin with a characterization of empathic concern and remark on its relation to
tenderness. My analysis then transitions in to a positive characterization of civic
tenderness before describing the process of tenderization.

Empathic Concern
The empathy-altruism hypothesis states that:
feeling other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare
of another person in need (i.e., empathic concern) produces a motivational state
with the goal of increasing that person's welfare by having the empathy-inducing
need removed (i.e., altruistic motivation). The more empathy felt for the person in
need, the more motivation to have the need removed.136


I follow Charles Batson in characterizing empathic emotions as "other-oriented
emotions elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone else" and
empathic concern as "other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived
welfare of someone in need."137 Further, empathic concern produces altruistic138
motivation only when it is felt as a result of perceiving others to be in need.139 Understood
in this way, empathic concern is a collection of emotions. Batson says that empathic
concern "includes feelings of sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow,
sadness, upset, distress, concern, and grief."140 An important feature of empathic concern is
that it is other-oriented. Its orientation emphasizes that this concern involves feeling for
others. While some emotions like compassion and sympathy are inherently other-oriented,
Charles Daniel Batson, Altruism in Humans (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011). P. 29.
Ibid. P. 11. Batson explains that in this context, congruent refers not to the specific
content of the emotion but rather to the valence of the emotion—that is, positive when the
perceived welfare of the other is positive; negative when the perceived welfare is negative.
138 My usage of altruism is broad in that I am using it to mean “a motivational state with the
ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare.” Ibid. P. 20.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
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others such as concern or distress can sometimes be oriented toward ourselves. These
latter emotions belong to the class of empathic concern when experiencing them involves
an orientation directed toward others who are in need.
Historically, empathy has not referred to a single phenomenon. This has contributed to
an already immense, and steadily growing body of research and researchers still mean
different things when they use the term ‘empathy’. Beyond conflations of empathy and
sympathy, empathy has been associated with projection, perspective taking, and
knowledge of another’s internal state. Empirically, a reason to prefer one of these usages to
others has not yet emerged. As a result, thinking about empathy can become very confusing
rather quickly. My intention is to stipulate my usage of empathic concern and distinguish it
from these other usages in order to minimize the confusion that we might otherwise
encounter. The stipulation will also help clarify how each usage relates to empathic
concern. Some are cognitive and perceptual precursors of empathy concern and others are
potential facilitators of empathic concern.
Empathic concern is distinct from knowing another person's internal states including
their thoughts and feelings. While it may appear that knowledge of another person's
thought and feelings is a necessary condition for empathic concern, it is not.141 Batson says
that it only requires that "one think one knows the other's state because it is based on a
perception of the other as in need" not that this perception be accurate nor that it match
the other's perception of their internal state.142 Empathic concern can thus be experienced
based on a false perception of another person's internal state. It’s this feature that, in part,
makes empathic concern particularly tricky. As Batson notes, "action prompted by concern
141
142

Ibid. P. 13.
Ibid.
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based on a false perception, even altruistically motivated action, is apt to be misguided."143
Although empathic concern can be authentically experienced based on a false perception,
the likelihood that it prompts misguided action increases. In this case, I might, instead of
actually helping my fellow who is in need, fail to come to the aide of my fellow; and, in some
cases, I may worsen their situation. We do better if we can gain an accurate perception of
the need others might be in. Further, if we can identify a mechanism that attunes our
perceptions of the need others are in, we can get closer to gaining this accurate perception
and place ourselves in a position to more likely be of benefit.
There is also distinction between empathic concern and adopting the posture or
matching the neural response of others that we perceive to be in need. Preston and de Waal
have suggested that experiencing empathic concern is partly based on the ability of
perceivers to take over or mirror others' suffering, in response to certain expressive signs
of distress or sadness.144 However, the suggestion that mirror neurons are responsible for
enabling all of our experiences of empathic feelings seems a bit far reaching and
overestimates the role these neurological processes play in humans. Batson maintains that
these neurons do not automatically nor do they always, lead to feelings.145 For example, “To
find oneself twisting and turning when watching someone balance on a tightrope is a
familiar experience; Yet we can watch someone file papers with little inclination to mimic
the action.”146 Further, our emotional reactions to the state of another do not always
Ibid.
Stephanie D Preston and Frans BM De Waal, "Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate
Bases," Behavioral and brain sciences 25, no. 1 (2002); Karsten R Stueber, Rediscovering
Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences, vol. 1 (Cambridge Univ Press,
2006).
145 Batson, Altruism in Humans. P. 14.
146 Ibid.
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require perceptual cues or shared response. We sometimes, experience empathic emotions
without observing another person's behavior altogether as when I am reading a news story
about the plight of vulnerable groups.147 This is not to say that mirror neurons are never
responsible for facilitating feeling empathic concern; but rather, that it is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for doing so.148
Empathic concern is also different from coming to feel the same or similar emotion as
another person feels. Notably, both David Hume149 and Adam Smith150 rely on this
characterization and more recently, Stephen Darwall.151 However, there are some forms of
empathy, such as contagion, that if it leads to focusing on our own state, prevents us from
experiencing fuller, more robust forms of empathy. Batson provides the following example,
"Sensing the nervousness of other passengers on an airplane in rough weather, I too may
become nervous. If I then focus on my own nervousness, I am not likely to feel for them."152
In other cases, it is sufficient for empathic concern to know that others are in need or hurt.
We feel sorry for a friend who is has lost their job, even if they feel hurt by it.
This concern is also distinct from understanding empathy as projection of oneself into
the other’s situation. When empathy was first translated in to English from its German
origin Einfühlung, it was associated with a process of aesthetic pleasure that is derived
from a projection of feelings on to a work of art particularly, and other objects in the
Aaron Simmons, "In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy," Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 17, no. 1 (2014); Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the
Origins of the American Welfare State; Knight, "Nothing Like a Super Bowl to Fix S.F.'S
Homeless Problem."
148 Anton JM Dijker, "A Theory of Vulnerability-Based Morality," Emotion Review 6, no. 2
(2014).
149 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Courier Corporation, 2012).
150 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Penguin, 2010).
151 Stephen Darwall, "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89, no. 2 (1998).
152 Batson, Altruism in Humans. P. 17.
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natural world generally.153 This understanding of empathy laid the foundation for an
expansion of the notion in to the language of social feeling.154 Over time, the term began to
be associated with a process of inner imitation whereby an expressive act by another elicits
a feeling in ourselves and that we project into the other by being attached to the perceived
gesture. It some cases, projecting ourselves into the other’s situation can give us a sense of
what the other is feeling and so projection can facilitate empathic concern. But there are
some situations where projection is not needed precisely because the situation of the
other’s need is obvious to us. When you see your fellow homeless on the street, you do not
always have to project into her situation what you would feel. Sometimes you immediately
are drawn to a light sadness or pity in response to her situation. There are other times
where your homeless fellow’s situation is not obvious however as in the case of someone
who is “transient homeless”.155, 156 In these situations, we might increase the likelihood that
we impose an inaccurate interpretation of her situation on to her.157
We should also be careful to distinguish empathic concern from a form of perspective
taking that involves imagining how the other is feeling or thinking. Batson characterizes
empathic concern as that which is evoked, in some cases, by perspective taking.158 In 1978,
Gillian Swanson, "The Tender Instinct Is the Hope of the World': Human Feeling and
Social Change before Empathy," new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics 79, no.
79 (2013).
154 Ibid.
155 SAMHSA SOAR TA Center, "Definitions of Homelessness,"
https://soarworks.prainc.com/article/definitions-homelessness.
156 Christine Schanes, "Homeless Myth #7: "Oh No! A Transient,"
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christine-schanes/homelessness-myth-7-ohno_b_480127.html.
157 Franz J Neyer, Rainer Banse, and Jens B Asendorpf, "The Role of Projection and
Empathic Accuracy in Dyadic Perception between Older Twins," Journal of Social and
Personal Relationships 16, no. 4 (1999).
158 Batson, Altruism in Humans. P. 18.
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Batson and his colleagues found that
empathic emotion mediates the effect of perspective taking on helping. Taking the
victim's perspective, by itself, was not sufficient to motivate helping. Subjects who
took the victim's perspective, but were led to misattribute the vicarious arousal
resulting from doing so, did not offer more help.159
This suggests that insofar as empathic concern motivates us to remove need, perspective
taking is not sufficient to motivate this behavior and is instead, itself mediated by empathic
emotion. Importantly, there is at least one other form of perspective taking that involves
imagining how we would feel. This form of perspective taking differs from the conception
of projection discussed above in that this form of perspective taking is more narrowly
focused on how one actually feels rather than how or what one would feel if they were the
other.160 Perspective taking that is other-oriented increases the likelihood of experiencing
feelings of fear or distress.161 This form of perspective taking, though it can be a basis for
understanding another’s situation when their situation is unclear, can still be inhibitive. For
instance, if the other’s situation is unclear and the other differs from you, your own
thoughts or feelings might mislead your potential helping behavior or inhibit your feeling
empathic concern.
As described, empathic concern is a source of altruistic motivation. By no means is the
Jay S Coke, C Daniel Batson, and Katherine McDavis, "Empathic Mediation of Helping: A
Two-Stage Model," Journal of personality and social psychology 36, no. 7 (1978). P.73.
160 Batson, Altruism in Humans. P. 18. Batson also notes that in the literature on perspective
taking, many conflate the two forms of perspective taking (imagine-self orientation and
imagine-other orientation). On the same page, He says, “The imagine-self and imagineother forms of perspective taking have often been confused or treated as equivalent,
despite research evidence suggesting that they should not be. When attending to someone
in distress, imagining how that person is thinking and feeling can stimulate empathic
concern. Imagining how you would think and feel in that situation can too. However, in
addition to stimulating empathic concern, an imagine-self perspective is likely to elicit selforiented feelings of distress, whereas an imagine-other perspective is not.”
161 Ibid.; Peter A Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and Tenderness," in The Person
and Primary Emotions (Springer, 1988).
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claim that empathic concern is the only source of altruistic motivation. Still, this description
lacks an explanation of why this is the case. In other words, it fails to mention a mechanism
that would explain why perceivers who normally experience fear or distress at the sight of
need, would care about alleviating or removing the other’s need. A gap in our explanation
of pro-social behavior remains without specifying the mechanism associated with a
disposition to care for others instead of resisting or remaining indifferent to them in their
situation of need.
Civic Tenderness
At a basic level, civic tenderness is the expansion of tenderness among a society’s
members, institutions, or systems. Civic tenderness is an orientation of concern, brought
about in response to civic vulnerability that provides an impulse toward caregiving
behavior. Importantly, since civic tenderness is an expansion of the emotion of tenderness,
its features reflect the features of tenderness. Tenderness is both cognitive and affective
and there are two important features that we should note: First, tenderness is a distinct
emotion that is responsive to vulnerability.162 Next, tenderness is responsible for

Batson, Altruism in Humans; Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and
Tenderness."; Anton J Dijker, "The Influence of Perceived Suffering and Vulnerability on the
Experience of Pity," European Journal of Social Psychology 31, no. 6 (2001); Anton JM Dijker,
"Perceived Vulnerability as a Common Basis of Moral Emotions," British Journal of Social
Psychology 49, no. 2 (2010); Antonius Johannes Maria Dijker and Willem Koomen,
"Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological Analysis of Responses
to Deviance," (2007); Juan Pablo Kalawski, "On the Subjective Distinction between
Tenderness and Joy" (University of North Texas, 2006); "Is Tenderness a Basic Emotion?,"
Motivation and Emotion 34, no. 2 (2010); Lishner, Batson, and Huss, "Tenderness and
Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions Elicited by Different Forms of Need."; William
McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (Psychology Press, 2015); Lidewij W
Niezink et al., "Empathic Concern: Distinguishing between Tenderness and Sympathy,"
Motivation and emotion 36, no. 4 (2012); Gary D. Sherman, Jonathan Haidt, and James A.
Coan, "Viewing Cute Images Increases Behavioral Carefulness," Emotion 9, no. 2 (2009).
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motivating protection and a variation of pro-social behaviors such as care.163 The course
for this section is to first present some general remarks about tenderness. Beyond this, I
detail my analysis through an analysis of the work of Peter Bertocci164 and Anton Dijker165
respectively.
There is considerable consensus surrounding the idea that tenderness necessarily
involves an appraisal of vulnerability.166 In other words, we experience tenderness when
we perceive a target as vulnerable.167 Vulnerability, then, is a perceptual or cognitive
antecedent of tenderness.168 Tenderness is sometimes thought to belong to the class of
empathic emotions.169 Here, however, it serves us well to be mindful of the distinction
between emotions and emotional dispositions.170 Emotions differ from emotional
dispositions in that the former have a shorter duration than the latter. Disposition, as I
Dijker, "A Theory of Vulnerability-Based Morality." P. 176; Kalawski, "On the Subjective
Distinction between Tenderness and Joy."; "Is Tenderness a Basic Emotion?."
164 Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and Tenderness."
165 Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance."
166 Lishner, Batson, and Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions
Elicited by Different Forms of Need."; Dijker, "The Influence of Perceived Suffering and
Vulnerability on the Experience of Pity."; Dijker, "A Theory of Vulnerability-Based
Morality."; Niezink et al., "Empathic Concern: Distinguishing between Tenderness and
Sympathy."; Sherman, Haidt, and Coan, "Viewing Cute Images Increases Behavioral
Carefulness."; David A Lishner et al., "The Effect of Infant-Like Characteristics on Empathic
Concern for Adults in Need," Motivation and Emotion 32, no. 4 (2008); Kalawski, "On the
Subjective Distinction between Tenderness and Joy."; "Is Tenderness a Basic Emotion?.";
Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance."
167 Lishner, Batson, and Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions
Elicited by Different Forms of Need."; Lishner et al., "The Effect of Infant-Like
Characteristics on Empathic Concern for Adults in Need."; Dijker and Koomen,
"Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological Analysis of Responses
to Deviance."
168 Dijker, "A Theory of Vulnerability-Based Morality." P.176.
169 Lishner, Batson, and Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions
Elicited by Different Forms of Need."
170 Kalawski, "On the Subjective Distinction between Tenderness and Joy." P. 24.
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understand it here is expressive of tendencies toward. To say that one has a tender
disposition toward some object is to be oriented toward that object in a way that you tend
to be sensitive and responsive to it in situations of vulnerability. We properly speak of a
tender disposition in love. To some degree, when we are in love, it is not uncommon to be
tenderly disposed toward our beloved. We are particularly apt to experience the empathic
emotions such as fear or anxiety when they are in danger or joy when they succeed.
Tenderness, as an emotion may well belong to a class of empathic emotions.171 However,
civic tenderness is a kind of emotional disposition. As an emotional disposition, tenderness
is the mechanism that underlies the class of empathic emotions and can help us explain
why people who normally experience fear or distress upon perceiving other’s vulnerability,
are motivated to alleviate or remove their suffering instead of turning away or reducing
attention to the other, for instance.172 The fact that tenderness is activated by vulnerability
helps to distinguish it from other empathic emotions.
In “Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions Elicited by Different Forms
of Need,” David Lishner et al., characterize two different forms of need.173 While
vulnerability can be thought of as a kind of need, still, it is a need that is distinct from
current need.174 Vulnerability is a dispositional need. Following Charles Batson, Lishner
In “Tenderness and Empathic Concern” (Forthcoming) I elaborate in detail the
relationship between the emotion of tenderness and empathic concern.
172 Dijker, "A Theory of Vulnerability-Based Morality."; Kalawski, "Is Tenderness a Basic
Emotion?." William McDougall also makes note of this on p. 99 of An Introduction to Social
Psychology where he says “A tender mother will sometimes turn away from a vomiting
child with an irresistible impulse of repulsion.”
173 Lishner, Batson, and Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions
Elicited by Different Forms of Need."
174 Batson, Altruism in Humans. P. 35. Batson says, “Even when there is no specific
immediate discrepancy between what is and what is desirable, another may be perceived
to be vulnerable to such discrepancies which is itself a form of need.”
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says, “Perception of need involves perception of a negative discrepancy between a person’s
current state and what one desires for that person on one or more dimensions of wellbeing.”175 We can be said to perceive need when we perceive that someone’s state of wellbeing is deficient in some respect. Lishner informs us that “Dimensions of well-being
include the absence of physical pain, negative affect, stress, danger, and disease, as well as
the presence of physical pleasure, positive affect, satisfaction, and security.”176 Our
description of the perception of need thus takes on a more detailed explanation. Perception
of diminished or diminishing well-being may vary across dimension. Among these
dimensions it is further possible to distinguish between two functionally different forms of
need—current need and vulnerability. Current need “involves perception of an existing
discrepancy on one or more dimensions of well-being.”177 When we see rows of tents,
populated with our fellows, lined up along the streets of Downtown Los Angeles, Detroit, or
Downtown Palo Alto, what we are seeing is existing discrepancies across the dimensions of
security, danger, physical pleasure, and potentially disease, for instance.
In contrast to current need, vulnerability constitutes a different kind of need such that
“Even when no discrepancy exists between what is and what is desirable, a person may be
seen as vulnerable to future discrepancies.”178 Current need as a form of need implies
vulnerability. That is, “one must be vulnerable to a given need to experience it, current
need is evidence of vulnerability.”179 Thus, current need indicates that the target is
vulnerable because if they were not vulnerable to experiencing the situation of current
Lishner, Batson, and Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions
Elicited by Different Forms of Need." P. 615.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
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need in which they now find themselves, then they would not be experiencing the situation
of current need in which they now find themselves. Since you must be vulnerable to a
current need before you experience the need, current need is evidence of vulnerability. If I
perceive someone (or a creature) as vulnerable, although they might not be in a situation of
current need, to perceive them as vulnerable is to perceive their situation as one that might
soon change.
Tenderness is more than just cognitive appraisals of vulnerability leading to the
experience of a warm, fuzzy, tender emotion. In part, tenderness is a potent source of
motivation to help relieve the empathy-inducing need.180 That is, tenderness is responsible
for motivating protection and a variation of pro-social emotions such as sympathy and
compassion. Researchers across disciplines noted the motivational force of tenderness.
Kalawaski calls tenderness “the emotion ‘surge,’ that corresponds to love as caregiving;181
Nico Frijida says that “tenderness can be regarded as the impulse toward tender—that is,
caregiving—behavior;”182 Sherman et al. found that tenderness "is more than just a positive
feeling state-- it can literally make people more physically tender in their motor
behavior;"183 Peter Bertocci holds that tenderness involves an "impulse to protect";184 For
Aton Dijker, tenderness is present when "a desire to protect another individual is
activated”;185 In another place he says “tenderness essentially is a pleasant emotional state
Kalawski, "Is Tenderness a Basic Emotion?."
Ibid.
182 Nico H. Frijda, "The Emotions: Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction," Paris: Maison
de Sciences de l'Homme (1986). P. 83.
183 Sherman, Haidt, and Coan, "Viewing Cute Images Increases Behavioral Carefulness." P.
285.
184 Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and Tenderness." P. 263.
185 Dijker, "The Influence of Perceived Suffering and Vulnerability on the Experience of
Pity." P. 660.
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with the primary goal of preventing other individuals from suffering by offering them
protection – behavior that is, of course, much more adaptive than starting to help and
nurture individuals once they are physically harmed and can be empathized with”;186
Batson et al. include tenderness in a class of empathic emotions that are a "potent source of
motivation to help relieve empathy-inducing need";187 Social Psychologist William
McDougal speaks of tenderness in constant conjunction with its "protective impulse"
throughout his An Introduction to Social Psychology first published in 1908.188 When we
perceive others as vulnerable and experience tenderness, we are motivated to act on behalf
of the vulnerable in a way that attempts to increase the others’ welfare by protecting them.
McDougall's An Introduction to Social Psychology is one of the most frequently cited
studies of the developmental origins of tenderness. McDougall’s work is an inquiry in to the
role that principal instincts and primary tendencies of the human mind play in human
societies. McDougall believed that attention to the characters of the individual mind is of
prime importance for the social life of man. In this conviction he aimed to describe how the
natural tendencies of our human make up and our social environment, in part, influence
the arrangement of these tendencies.189
McDougall characterizes tenderness as instinctual because he thinks that we see traces
of tender behavior in animals most like ourselves in tending to their young. Primarily, this
Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance." P. 52.
187 C Daniel Batson et al., "Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for
Strangers," Basic and applied social psychology 27, no. 1 (2005). P. 15.
188 McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology. Take for example what he says on page
78. McDougall says that the purposes of tenderness’s impulse is “primarily to afford
protection to the child, especially by throwing arms about it; and that fundamental impulse
persists in spite of the immense extension of the range of application of the impulse and its
incorporation in many ideal sentiments.”
189 Ibid. p. 17.
62
186

tender instinct traces back to “The maternal instinct, which impels the mother to protect
and cherish her young, [which] is common to almost all the higher species of animal.”190 He
says, “Like other species, the human species is dependent upon this instinct for its
continued existence and welfare.”191 At the time of McDougall’s writing, the association of
tenderness with parenting seems to have been fairly widespread.192
In Stigmatization, Tolerance, and Repair one of Aton Dijker’s aims is to describe the
motivational systems that enable individuals to generate adaptive responses when
confronted with deviance.193 One difficulty in describing this mechanism is that “some
deviant conditions activate psychological response mechanisms that causes people to
experience fear and hence motivates them to protect themselves against the deviant
individual” while others “may activate in people a mechanism for feeling tenderness and a
tendency to protect and care for the deviant individual.”194 Aware of potential criticism
about the broad usage of deviance from social psychologists and sociologists (and now
perhaps philosophers), Dijker’s own definition of deviance is rather broad and a little bit
unclear. Introducing the book, the first words of the first chapter are, “People are regularly
confronted with a wide variety of features and behaviors in other that they may find
undesirable or deviant, such as a bleeding wound, a missing leg, a harelip, depression,
bullying, leprosy, cowardice, theft, unwillingness to work, low intelligence, or some
threatening feature of racial or ethnic minority or out group, to name only a few
Ibid. P. 69.
Ibid. P. 70.
192 Ibid. P. 72.
193 I should note that Dijker is listed as the first author of the co-authored work where
Willem Koomen is listed as an author as well. For simplicity, I will be referring to the claims
made in the work as that of Dijker’s.
194 Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance." P. 2.
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examples.”195 On page 3, Dijker provides a somewhat brief explanation of his commitment
to the term “deviance”:
Scholars from such diverse research disciplines as sociology, anthropology, history,
evolutionary biology, and social psychology have used a wide variety of terms to
describe and explain social responses to deviance, often without clearly defining
them and distinguishing them from one another. To anticipate an important
conceptual disagreement in this field of inquiry, some disciplines such as social
psychology and sociology vigorously deny the usefulness of the term deviance — a
term that we find essential as our book title suggests — and would like to replace it
by terms such as stigma or label. These disciplines similarly advocate analyzing
responding to deviance entirely in terms of stigmatization or labeling, rather than,
for example, social control. In contrast, in other disciplines that have shown interest
in describing how small communities respond to deviance, such as anthropology, we
rarely encounter the terms stigma or stigmatization.196
Dijker is more concerned with societal response to whatever conditions people take to
be deviant and so thinks that concern is more appropriately placed on how we characterize
social control. Responses to deviant behavior, for Djiker, include repair, stigmatization and
tolerance. I maintain that Dijker’s characterization of deviance indexes situations of need
that necessarily emerge from sources of vulnerability characterized in chapter 1 (inherent,
situational, and pathogenic). Since vulnerability is conceptually prior to need, it is also
prior to deviance. I maintain then that our analysis of the mechanism that responds to
vulnerability is relevant to the mechanism needed to respond to deviance in a particular
kind of way—tenderly. Further, I will use Dijker’s notion of ‘deviance’ interchangeably with
‘vulnerability.’ Activating this mechanism can be difficult because some conditions of
deviance fail to generate experiences of tenderness and instead generate experiences of
fear, motivating them to close themselves off and protect themselves against the vulnerable
individual or group. In some, more extreme cases, exposure of the deviant individual as
195
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vulnerable engages harshness, which can be thought to be the opposite of tenderness.197
Tenderness is generated and sustained by engaging certain psychological
mechanisms.198 If we can engage the mechanisms that sustain tenderness then we can gain
a more accurate perception and recognition of the vulnerable situations others are in and
increase the range of and frequency of experiencing empathic emotions toward them.199 I
suggest that tenderness does this by decreasing the distance between others and ourselves.
McDougall commented long ago that tenderness “draw us near to the suffering…seeking to
alleviate their distress.”200 In addition to its impulse toward protective behavior,
tenderness pushes us closer to the situation of need or suffering. Positioned closer to the
Philip G Zimbardo and Anarchist Black Cross, Stanford Prison Experiment (Stanford
University, 1971). In 1971 psychologist assigned citizens to simulated roles of prisoners
and prison guards in an effort to study the effects that prisons can have on human
behavior. The study, originally intended to last for a duration of two weeks, had to be cut
short because of the traumatic toll brought to bear on the participants. In a matter of just
six days the study had to be brought to an end. They came to find that the people that were
assigned the role of prison guard came to treat the prisoners in inhumane and rather
sadistic ways.
198 Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance." P. 35.
199 Ibid. Dijker provides good evidence for thinking that the motivational component of
tenderness is compatible with mechanisms which enable individuals to realize their goals
by quickly adapting their current behavior to properties of the environment. (For example,
on page 56, he says “The neurophysiological aspects of the motivational system responsible
for parental care, associated by us with a more general care system, are also increasingly
well documented. The system is anatomically located in what MacLean has termed the
limbic system or paleomammalian brain.”) The mechanisms that Dijker has in mind enable
individuals to: (a) Accurately perceive, recognize, and differentiate between certain
objective features of deviance (e.g., a threatening move forward, taking away food, a bodily
injury, a cry for help); (b) Get into the right motivational state or emotion at the right
moment (e.g., fear, anger or tenderness), urging them to do the right thing (e.g., to flee,
aggress, or protect) once these features occur; and (c) Adapt their responses to the
particular behavior of the deviant individual (while learning from past failures and
successes) and persevere in responding until the harmful consequences are reduced (e.g.,
run until a safe distance has been reached, punish until the other changes his or her
behavior or begs for forgiveness, nurture and heal until the other is cured and less
dependent).
200 Ibid. P. 81.
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situation of vulnerability that the other is in allows us to make for the good of the other—to
give them the benefit of the doubt in other words. As a result, the likelihood that we are
motivated to appropriately intervene in a situation of need is also increased.201
We are motivated to protect and care more often when we perceive vulnerability to be
passive.202 When we perceive vulnerability active and intentionally brought about by the
other or as controllable, it is more likely to arouse angry, fearful and punishing behavior
and not tenderness. 203 This is the case whether or not the other really brought about the
vulnerability in question. Further, even when we perceive vulnerability to be passive, yet
controllable, it might arouse protective feelings mixed with anger or frustration.
Tenderness is most likely to be engaged when vulnerability is perceived as both passive
and uncontrollable.204 In addition to perceiving vulnerability to be active or passive, it
appears that a perception of the controllability of vulnerability bears on the experience of
tenderness. Dijker reasons that when we perceive vulnerability to be both passive and
uncontrollable, our capacity for care is more easily activated and its threshold is lowered.
Because the threshold has been lowered, it is more likely that the care system will be fully
activated when the triggering situation is a concrete sign of passive vulnerability.205 One
strategy for transforming the perception of vulnerability that is perceived to be active and
brought about on one’s own accord is to supply information that highlights the lack of
responsibility that is associated with civic vulnerability. Vulnerability that is perceived to
be an active state for which our fellows are responsible for bringing about themselves,
Ibid.
Ibid. P. 32
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid. P. 65.
205 Ibid. P. 138,176.
201
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often involves mistaken assumptions about choice from a fixed ranged of alternatives
(otherwise, control) and thus often leads to mistaken attributions of responsibility.
Peter Bertocci speaks of tenderness conjoined with its protective impulse, as
“tenderness-protection.” He says, “Tenderness-protection is the primary emotion
experienced when a person interprets a being’s situation as helpless and requiring aid. The
objective is to protect that being from impending harm.”206 Bertocci’s belief that tenderness
is a response to a situation of helplessness is consistent with tenderness being a response
to vulnerability insofar as helplessness is a kind of vulnerability. A person who is helpless
had to have been vulnerable to becoming helpless, yet a person who is vulnerable needn’t
be helpless. All this means is that the class of situations that may be described as vulnerable
include situations that can be described as involving someone who is helpless. Bertocci
indicates that there seems to be an evaluative component to tenderness having to do with
deservedness. He mentions that “Protection may not be attempted if the agent believes that
the helplessness and suffering is deserved, in accordance with his value-outlook.”207 So far,
no one else identifies this feature of tenderness and it has not been supported by empirical
literature. Yet, I also have not come across literature that examines whether or not
tenderness is evaluative. Compassion, on the other hand is more often thought to contain
this evaluative component.208 This might suggest that Bertocci is conflating the empathic
emotion of compassion with tenderness. Tenderness, which underlies empathic emotions,
can sometimes co-occur with the empathic emotions that it gives rise to.209 It is entirely
Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and Tenderness." P. 271.
Ibid. P. 263.
208 Nussbaum, Political Emotions.
209 Kalawski, "On the Subjective Distinction between Tenderness and Joy."; Lishner, Batson,
and Huss, "Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions Elicited by Different
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possible then, that Bertocci conflates tenderness, the precondition of compassion, with
compassion itself.
Bertocci continues by saying tenderness, when elicited involves “a unique want-to-help,
even if it turns out that help is not finally offered.”210 This brief passage is particularly
enlightening as it informs us that tenderness can be experienced without aid actually being
given. Tenderness is consistent with not offering help insofar as it is experienced with a
desire to help. In some cases, the desire to help does motivate us to act, especially when it is
paired with emotions such as sympathy and compassion. Tenderness is still important in
its own right. If we can cultivate a tender disposition, we can increase the likelihood that
we experience these other empathic emotions and the likelihood that we actually be
motivated all the way to helping behavior.211
Bertocci is sensitive to the challenges at the periphery of agency that trying to protect
vulnerable others presents. In describing a tender mother, he says “if she also believes her
child must come to rely on his own ability to solve situations in which he regards himself as
relatively helpless. This does not mean that she does not experience (I almost said, an even
deeper quality of) tenderness, as she steels herself against offering help.”212 The insight
contained here is that sometimes when we experience tenderness, even though we
experience a desire to help, we resist giving it when we think it is important for them to
solve it on their own. Bertocci continues on to say that “It is all the more understandable
Forms of Need."; Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative
Psychological Analysis of Responses to Deviance."; McDougall, An Introduction to Social
Psychology.
210 Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and Tenderness." P. 264.
211 Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance."
212 Bertocci, "Primary Emotions: Anger, Fear, and Tenderness." P. 267. The parentheticals
are as they appear in the original text.
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that any societal code and evaluations would face, for similar reasons, some uncertainty in
sorting out situations of helplessness and what ought to be done about them.”213 I would
not be surprised to find that the enchantment with individualistic conceptions of liberty
and independent conceptions of self sometimes found in capitalistic societies like our own,
feed our mistaken perceptions of which situations are important for vulnerable members
to solve on their own. In attempting to protect the vulnerable we have to be careful and
creative in our solutions to their situations as to not undermine their capacity for
autonomy and to somehow strengthen it.
With this understanding of tenderness in place, I now provide a description of the ways
that it can be expanded among a society’s members, institutions, or systems. I call this
process tenderization.

Tenderization
By virtue of their status, the civically vulnerable are members of our community that
are in need of protection on this basis. What we should expect from a just society is that its
social and political structures are responsive to and seek to mitigate the effects of civic
vulnerability, so as to aid in lifting the burden the civically vulnerable bear. Remember that
civic vulnerability is contingent upon social positioning (Chapter 1). A socially just state
therefore has an obligation to develop social, political, and legal institutions that foster civic
tenderness—a protective response to situations of people and groups who are civically
vulnerable. While the just society cannot ensure that the relations among its members
always involve civic tenderness, it must do all it can to foster it and to ensure that social
213
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and political institutions support the kinds of social relationships that promote tenderness.
Our society's institutions can serve to either ameliorate or complicate our situation of
vulnerability. Imperfect in their own right, our society's institutions cannot eliminate civic
vulnerability altogether and they often exacerbate the vulnerability that the civically
vulnerable experience. They may fail in the wake of institutional and political compromises
or human prejudice for instance. Social and political institutions that serve to protect the
civically vulnerable or engage measures to reduce civic vulnerability across the society may
also decrease dependency frequently experienced by the civically vulnerable.
At the outset, we said that civic tenderness involves the expansion of the emotion of
tenderness among a society’s members, institutions, and systems. Civic tenderness is an
orientation of concern, brought about in response to civic vulnerability, that provides an
impulse toward caregiving behavior. So much of civic tenderness depends on whether we
can extend this emotion throughout our society. There is evidence that such extension is
possible. Bertocci says:
The experience of tenderness, with its impulse to protect, is by no
means limited to one's own offspring. To be sure, the reasons for
being especially sensitive to the helplessness of one's own children,
and especially on the part of the mother, are easy to understand.
What I do urge is that the root emotive experience and objective is to
help or protect a being (or beings) conceived of as "helpless and
needing protection" (whether or not the protection can be given).214
Dijker says:
The motivational system, originally evolved to secure the fitness and health of
vulnerable and needy offspring by the means of protection and tenderness (which
we referred to as the care or C system), allows individuals to adaptively respond to
objective signs of passive deviance; also when associated with unrelated or
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unfamiliar individuals of increasingly larger social groups.215
McDougall says that tenderness:
may be evoked by the sight of any very young animal, especially if in distress;216
Batson remarks:
Tender emotion and the protective impulse are, no doubt, evoked more readily and
intensely by one’s own offspring, because about them a strongly organized and
complex sentiment grows up. But the distress of any child will evoke this response
in a very intense degree in those in whom the instinct is strong.217
These writer's remarks suggests that we are capable of experiencing heightened
sensitivity and responsiveness towards people who are unrelated and unfamiliar to us. The
disposition of civic tenderness can be brought about by strengthening the capacity to
respond in sensitive and protective ways to situations of civic vulnerability that people or
groups may find themselves in. As a process, tenderization initiates and sustains the
expansion of tenderness. Tenderness is both cognitive and affective and is engaged when
vulnerability is perceived. Tenderization, then, is initiated when we perceive or interpret
situations of civic vulnerability. The process is sustained by continual engagement of our
capacity for experiencing tenderness for people and groups that are civically vulnerable.
Insofar as the state has obligations to extend the emotion of tenderness, it may seem
that the state would only be so motivated once civic tenderness, as an appropriate
orientation of concern, has been achieved. This is due to the fact that the state is made up of
people—congresswomen and men, senators, presidents and various other administrative
aides—who are responsible for getting things done; they are the pulse of the state. How
Dijker and Koomen, "Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair. An Integrative Psychological
Analysis of Responses to Deviance." P. 65.
216 McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology. P. 76.
217 Batson, Altruism in Humans. P. 47.
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then can tenderizing reform be passed if the state’s pulse is indifferent? This challenge may
lead us to quickly consider whether tenderizing reforms—legislation, programs, and the
like— must precede the formation of a tender pulse of the state. If this were the case, we’d
be left with a practical mess given that this is an exercise in non-ideal theory—the state’s
pulse is already indifferent—and we would need tenderizing reforms already in place to
motivate the state’s pulse to pass tenderizing legislation. Ultimately, this is a question
about the direction of causation between the disposition of civic tenderness and the
process of tenderization. A plain and more traditional way of stating the question is
whether the disposition of civic tenderness is brought about by the process of
tenderization? Or is the process of tenderization brought about by people who are already
tender? Call this a tender dilemma.
To explicate the causal relations in the process of tenderization, it will be important for
me to make some distinctions through shorthand: First, we have to remember that civic
tenderness is an orientation of concern brought about in response to civic vulnerability,
that provides an impulse toward caregiving behavior. I will refer to the disposition of civic
tenderness as CT. Next, tenderization is the process of increasing the society’s awareness of
civic vulnerability in the hopes of cultivating the disposition of CT, I will refer to this
process as TZ. Last, the behaviors, legislation, social programs, etc. that the tenderization
process might produce will be referred to as TO (short hand for tender outcomes).
One view we may take holds that CT and TZ are independent entities that combine to
produce a TO. It appears that each horn of the tender dilemma maintains that these are
independent entities and looks to uncover a unilateral relation between them. But on my
view, CT and TZ do not function as independent determinants; they determine each other
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(CT determines TZ and TZ determines CT). The issue with the tender dilemma, then, is in
its framing—it assumes that there must be a unidirectional relationship of causation
between CT and TZ.
On a slightly different view, we may posit that CT and TZ are interdependent causes of
TO. But, on this view, TZ is treated as though it is only a byproduct that does not figure in to
the causal story itself. On my view, TO are themselves interacting determinants and not
merely outputs of TZ that have no effects. The weakness of this view is that it does not treat
TO as an interdependent factor, but rather only as a dependent one.
My view is that CT, TZ, and TO all operate at interlocking determinants of each other.
The process involves a triadic reciprocal interaction rather than a dyadic conjoint or a
dyadic bidirectional one. I have already noted that CT and TZ function as reciprocally
interacting determinants. CT and TO also operate as reciprocal determinants of each other.
For example, CT influences TO and the TO created by CT, in turn, through TZ cultivates CT.
Now, the relative influence exerted by CT, TZ, or TO will vary in different societies and
under different circumstances. In some cases, TZ constrains what TOs will be, and so TZ
emerges as an overriding determinant in this context. If, for example, over the
tenderization process the civically vulnerable are depicted as vulnerable to becoming
homeless, then we might expect many to think that the tender outcome should involve
welfare programming aimed at housing the potentially homeless and the now homeless.
In some cases the TO is the central factor in the interlocking and TZ and CT are not
much involved in the process. The TO is self-regulated over time by the effect it produces.
For example, take the TO of Affirmative Action—programs that are meant to break down
barriers, both subtle and overt, and try to ensure that all people get a fair break;
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Affirmative Action programs are not meant to guarantee equal results, but rather to
buttress the notion that if equality of opportunity were a real thing, then Black Americans,
women, people with disabilities and other groups facing discrimination would be fairly
represented in the nation’s work force and educational institutions—might sustain TZ218
by mitigating the effects of racial and gender biases in hiring and college admission
practices, for instance.
In other cases, one’s default disposition is highly influential in the process. Indifferent
dispositions can prevent the generation of TOs by insulating one’s orientation from the
influence of prevailing corrective TZ mechanisms, thus creating a strong reciprocal
interaction between CT and TO. In extreme cases, the possibility of generating a TO is so
controlled by one’s default disposition that neither their disposition nor the actions
proceeding from them are much affected by even the most intense or aggressive forms of
TZ. On the other extreme, it also seems true that for someone who’s disposition is already
very tender, TO’s might be constrained in a way as to not lead to outward helping behavior,
but rather being overcome with warm, fuzzy feelings in our selves.219
Still more, sometimes CT, TZ, and TO are all highly interdependent. Here each factor
reciprocally affects each other. The New Deal is a good example. Michele Landis Dauber
outlines the origin of New Deal Social Welfare legislation to the tradition of disaster relief
appropriations made by congress. The United States Constitution grants Congress the
discretionary authority to appropriate funds for the general welfare of citizens. As early as
the late 1700s, the United States had appropriated funds to the victims of disasters that had
This will be explained in subsequent paragraphs.
This point was pointed out to me by the audience at the APA Central Division Meeting in
2015.
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undergone sudden and unforeseeable loss. These disasters included famine, floods,
crickets, hurricanes, droughts, and sugar industry bailouts, among other things. By the time
of the Great Depression in 1930, there existed a long-standing precedent for the
appropriation of funds to the victims of disasters. The recipients of these funds, by this
time, included domestic and foreign citizens. Landis Dauber articulates the challenge that
New Deal lawyers faced was to construct the circumstances of old age, unemployment, and
famine as a disaster. She draws on various media outlets including newspapers, legal
briefings, law school curriculum of the time, political speeches, letters from American
citizens, and the art (photographs mostly) and literature of the time, to show how the Great
Depression was crafted as a disaster afflicting citizens through no fault of their own and
thereby shaping public opinion. As a result President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration was able to pass the series of social programs that came to be known as the
New Deal which included the Fair Labor Standards Act (which established a federal hourly
minimum wage), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). In this case, TZ (increased awareness of those afflicted by the Great
Depression) shapes CT (how citizens were oriented toward, and thereby perceived those
afflicted by the Great Depression). Also, CT (how citizens were oriented toward, and
thereby perceived those afflicted by the Great Depression) shapes TO (the passing of the
New Deal social programs). TO (the passing of the New Deal social programs) also shapes
TZ (increased awareness of those afflicted by the Great Depression). CT (how citizens were
oriented toward, and thereby perceived those afflicted by the Great Depression) shapes TZ
(increased awareness of those afflicted by the Great Depression) too. All the factors, in
other words, reciprocally affect each other.
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Searching for a unidirectional causal relation is therefore an idle exercise because in an
interactional process, one and the same event can be a cause, effect, or reinforcement,
depending on at what point in time the process begins. The status of same events can
change from TZ to TO at different entry points in the flow of interaction, for example. We
can reasonably expect that The New Deal’s status may shift from TO to TZ depending on the
point in time from which we are asking the question of which of the two it is (TO or TZ).
When it was introduced, the New Deal was a TO. As the programs remain in place offer
time, the New deal also has the subsequent effect of perpetually tenderizing (TZ) citizens
who enter the society beyond the point the New Deal programs became normalized. They
are tangible objects for us to engage in the process of offering and receiving reasons for its
support or removal. These reasons cannot escape references to the vulnerability of the
groups that they set out to help. Ultimately, one cannot speak of TO and TZ as if the two
were fundamentally different events. People are constantly engaged in the process of
appraising the progression of events. Their thoughts about the probable effects of
prospective TOs partly determine how TO are effected by TZ. To increase the predictive
power of the theory, it is necessary to broaden the analysis to include what default
dispositions a person may be bringing with them. If they are already tenderly disposed, it
may be that it is more likely to have the effect of producing a TO; if they are indifferent, it
may be that the production of a TO is not very likely.
Depending on one’s default dispositions, people may attribute different meaning to TOs
and they may develop different expectations for TOs— this explains why, for instance,
there seems to be a polarization of attitudes surrounding Affirmative Action, for instance.
This enlarges the fact that tender dispositions are not developed and shaped in a vacuum.
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Our dispositions are shaped by what we believe about the effects we observe from other’s
behavior that we believe to be tender. If we see them harmed, it may decrease our
willingness to cultivate a tender disposition. Dispositions are also developed and shaped by
what judgments voiced by others. Even more, dispositions are developed and shaped by
external influences including TO and TZ. External influences also activate the disposition as
well. Different inputs (sight, sound, smell, etc.) will elicit quite different reposes. Therefore,
while CT influences TO, CT, is fashioned from or mediated by transactions with TZ.
The cognition of the perception of vulnerability can perhaps be cultivated by raising
awareness of the civic vulnerability that the victims of systematic injustices face as a result
of being less insulated from the consequences of bad luck within a society. While no
empirical work has been done on this, it is plausible that over time, doing so would finetune our capacities for perceiving situations of civic vulnerability. As a result our
orientation toward the civically vulnerably becomes attuned in a way that increases the
likelihood that we will experience other empathic emotions toward the civically vulnerable
such as compassion and sympathy. Specifically, tenderness provides an impulse toward
protective behavior. More generally, tenderness provides an impulse toward experiencing
empathic behavior and other empathic emotions beyond tenderness. This means that
tenderness is a potent source of motivation in the direction of reducing empathy-inducing
need. Providing the surge toward the situation of the others, civic tenderness closes the
distance between you and me (Chapter 2), bringing us nearer to one another. This is
important to understand in attempting to mobilize people's political sentiments in order to
get them to see what the real problems are and to do something about these problems.
In order to initiate tenderization in our society, we should adopt legislation that calls
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attention to the historic, systemic, and institutionally caused vulnerability of a particular
group. One example of this that already exists is Affirmative Action. However, even tender
legislation such as Affirmative Action has not tenderized everyone. As contemporary
charges from conservatives of “reverse-racism” show, some people just don’t get it. Rather
than becoming more tender they have become more hostile toward the vulnerable. I
believe that, in large part, this is the result of telling American history from a linear
perspective.220 For example, African, African American, and African Diaspora studies have
long demonstrated the dangers of linear historical narratives.221 If we are going to be
successful in designing effective strategies going forward it will be imperative that our
strategy incorporate a variation of voices and perspectives that have long gone
underrepresented and suppressed throughout history and American literary cannon. Doing
so can possibly illuminate the extent to which vulnerable people and groups are vulnerable
as a result of being less insulated from the results of bad luck because of structural
oppression. In chapters 4 and 5, I make targeted prescriptions for tender legislation aimed
at the American Criminal Justice System and American poverty.
We will have to work to ensure that tenderization will engage citizens in the right
ways—ways that promote human values and not destroy them. As a process of increasing
awareness of civic vulnerability, tenderization might not always bring about the desired
effect. Because some issues do not result from our material circumstances but instead from
the attitudes that we have, there is a reintegration process where persons outside of these
Chimamanda Adichie, "The Danger of a Single Story," TED Ideas worth spreading
(2009).
221 Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin DG Kelley, "Unfinished Migrations: Reflections on the
African Diaspora and the Making of the Modern World," African Studies Review 43, no. 01
(2000).
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vulnerable groups need to respond to them in more tender ways. For example, ex-convicts
and welfare recipients whose lives are socially stigmatized are viewed and treated as
parasites. To view the recipients of these safety nets as parasites is to bear the indifference
to their circumstances that we set out to eliminate. The state should tenderize the rest of its
citizens in order to reintegrate vulnerable citizens into society.
Our society can cultivate civic tenderness by doing things like preserving and or
memorializing its buildings that when they reach a delicate state. McDougall mentions that:
Let us imagine ourselves standing before a great Gothic cathedral whose delicate
and beautiful stonework is crumbling to dust. We shall probably feel admiration for
it, and the spectacle of its decay, or of its delicate and perishable nature, awakens
directly our tender emotion and protective impulse.222
These memorials and preserves can awaken our tender emotions and thus cultivate a
disposition of tenderness by engaging our admiration for them.223 Additionally the state
could provide for spaces and times where citizens can be vulnerable with one another such
free music festivals celebrating (and perhaps raising funds on behalf of) vulnerable people
and groups. To avoid attracting homogeneous groups, officials can issue community based
surveys to take inventory of the musical interests of their particular communities in the
service of providing entertainment that reflect the diversity of these interests. Schools
could integrate mixed reality technology that engages students’ tender emotions, bringing
them nearer to the perspective of vulnerable groups.224, 225 Communities could host
McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology. P. 138.
Ibid.
224 Giuseppe Riva et al., "Affective Interactions Using Virtual Reality: The Link between
Presence and Emotions," CyberPsychology & Behavior 10, no. 1 (2007).
225 By providing students with a curriculum that involves MR in our classrooms, we can
present the next generation of students with fully immersive and engaging learning
experiences that place them in the perspective of vulnerable groups in our society. White
students could inhabit the circumstances of Black students in series of MR lessons, and
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viewings of films that bring awareness to vulnerable groups such as 13th226 or Orange is the
New Black227; or book clubs for communities to come together to discuss works that
perspectivizes vulnerable people and groups such as The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Colorblindness or Between the World and Me. These tools enable the revision of
our initial attitudes, and thus orientation of civic indifference by informing the basis of our
initial judgments about the civically vulnerable through reinterpretation.228 To this point,
social psychologists Thomas Mann and Melissa Ferguson have examined the conditions
under which durable revisions of implicit evaluations are possible and identified
reinterpretation as a mechanism through which this is possible. What is important about
their study is that it shows people’s initial negative implicit evaluations as going beyond
neutrality or ambivalence229; instead they show “negative-to-positive change in implicit

learn about the various forms of oppression that Black students face. Men could inhabit the
circumstances of women to feel more fully the forces of patriarchy that permeate
throughout our society. Cisgendered students could inhabit the circumstances of
transgendered people and could come to grasps with what it feels like to be an object of
harsh attitudes and violent treatment that often result in death. By using MR as a
perspective taking mechanism in this way, perhaps we can orient students toward
tenderness.
226 13th is a Netflix Documentary that explores the American Prison System and the Prison
Industrial Complex.
227 Orange is the New Black is a Netflix original series that focuses on the lives of inmates in
an all women’s correctional facility. Throughout the series, the show provides backstories
of the inmates prior to their life in the prison. In many cases, viewers can see just how the
choices of these inmates were squandered prior to making choices that landed them in
prison. As a result, viewers come to experience empathic emotions for some of the
characters throughout the course of the series.
228 Thomas C Mann and Melissa J Ferguson, "Can We Undo Our First Impressions? The Role
of Reinterpretation in Reversing Implicit Evaluations," (2015).
229 Kathryn L Boucher and Robert J Rydell, "Impact of Negation Salience and Cognitive
Resources on Negation During Attitude Formation," Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 38, no. 10 (2012); Richard E Petty et al., "Implicit Ambivalence from Attitude
Change: An Exploration of the Past Model," Journal of personality and social psychology 90,
no. 1 (2006); Kurt R Peters and Bertram Gawronski, "Are We Puppets on a String?
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evaluations and identifies a powerful mechanism driving it: not only must new information
imply the opposite evaluation of the target, but the initial information must also be
reframed.”230
Not all of the work in this regard is the state's. You have work to do too and the biases
to be overcome are yours. If we are cognizant of civic vulnerability, we can change the
dispositions we direct towards vulnerable groups and change our behavior towards them.
Emerging psychological literature on implicit biases have shown that people can be trained
to ‘‘say no’’ to associating their negative stereotypical attitudes with certain vulnerabilities.
Working on yourself in this way decreases the likelihood of automatically making these
stereotypical associations when later confronted with individuals and groups with
particular vulnerabilities.231 Monteith et al. found that when instructed not to display
racism and sexism, individuals in fact showed a decrease in biased responses in tests for
implicit attitudes.232
There are challenges to be overcome for the extension of tenderness. Sometimes when
people become aware of another's vulnerability they prey upon it or become hostile. Sick

Comparing the Impact of Contingency and Validity on Implicit and Explicit Evaluations,"
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37, no. 4 (2011).
230 Mann and Ferguson, "Can We Undo Our First Impressions? The Role of Reinterpretation
in Reversing Implicit Evaluations." P. 36.
231 Jules Holroyd, "Responsibility for Implicit Bias," Journal of Social Philosophy 43, no. 3
(2012); Mann and Ferguson, "Can We Undo Our First Impressions? The Role of
Reinterpretation in Reversing Implicit Evaluations."; Margo J Monteith, Jeffrey W Sherman,
and Patricia G Devine, "Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy," Personality and
Social Psychology Review 2, no. 1 (1998).
232 "Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy." I should note that the effectiveness of
suppression as a mechanism is at best limited. For example, increased attention to the
stereotyped feature may direct your attention towards the stereotypical behaviors of social
targets. However, their results show, at least, that stereotype suppression will not be
equally overwhelming for all people in all situations.
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and elderly people have had this need exploited by money hungry capitalists.233 Men jeer
invasive catcalls to women walking on city streets. The well-known Stanford Prison
Experiment has show us that evil can triumph in "good people" when they are given the
power to exploit the vulnerability of others.
One challenge toward the extension of tenderness is that, to the extent that the situation
of the vulnerable might be perceived as active (a situation for which the vulnerable
themselves deserve) or threatening or harmful to you, your capacity for experiencing
tenderness for them is limited. Former prisoners provide us with a good example. In our
society, the situation former prisoners find themselves in are sometimes perceived as just.
Additionally, this is sometimes accompanied by a belief that they are dangerous—
especially when they are Black. In these cases you expect your vulnerable fellow to merely
exercise more self-control, to submit to social norms, and to stop behaving dangerously.
But "Whether or not it is unjust that a person has certain vulnerabilities or has such a high
degree of those vulnerabilities will depend on whether the source of those vulnerabilities is
an injustice."234 This highlights the importance of supplying information that highlights the
lack of responsibility that is associated with the situation of the vulnerable.
Sometimes contact with people who are civically vulnerable can be perceived to involve
harmful consequences for you. For example, you might resist contact with people who are
homeless because of your belief that mental health disorders are widespread among them,
rendering their behavior less predictable and more prone to harming you. This too might
limit your capacity for experiencing tenderness for the civically vulnerable. Over the
Andrew Pollack, "Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight," New York Times
2015.
234 Dodds et al., "Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability." P. 90.
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process of tenderization, then, we have to be careful when presenting the narratives of
those who are civically vulnerable. In raising awareness about their situations, we have to
emphasize the ways that contact with these vulnerable groups needn’t involve harmful
consequences for you.235 Further, if we believe that people who fall in to vulnerable
situations are more harmful or threatening when they occupy those positions of
vulnerability, we have more reason for adopting preventative measures aimed as offsetting
or preventing this kind of vulnerability from occurring.
McDougall notes, "It is true that reason, working in the service of the egoistic impulses
and sentiments, often circumvents the ends of this instinct and sets up habits which are
incompatible with it. When that occurs on a large scale in any society, that society is
doomed to rapid decay."236 McDougall thinks that the extent to which we are oriented
toward concern for ourselves rather than others, works against the experience of
tenderness. Additionally, he sees that cultivating habits incompatible with tenderness
make no small difference. Further, he draws attention to the vulnerability of society itself.
When this egoistic orientation pervades a society, society's fabric unravels. This means that
the awareness that tenderization raises must highlight the ways that we are connected to
one another as members of the same society.

Conclusion
This chapter introduced the emotion of civic tenderness. At a basic level, civic
tenderness is the expansion of the emotion of tenderness among a society’s members,
institutions, or systems. Civic tenderness is an orientation of concern, brought about in
235
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response to civic vulnerability that provides an impulse toward caregiving behavior. An
analysis of the emotion of tenderness showed us that (i) tenderness is both cognitive and
affective; (ii) tenderness necessarily involves an appraisal of vulnerability; (iii) tenderness
enables the capacity for experiencing other empathic emotions; (iv) tenderness
characteristically involves a response to perceived vulnerability; (v) tenderness
characteristically involves an impulse toward caregiving behavior; (vi) Tenderness is
generated an sustained engaging certain psychological mechanisms; (vii) experiencing
tenderness is not limited to people who are familiar to us. From (vii), I argued that civic
tenderness can be cultivated throughout a society’s members, institutions, and systems.
The process of tenderization describes ways that our society can engage its member's
tender emotion toward the goal of cultivating the disposition of civic tenderness.
This chapter concludes our conceptual discussion of the civic tenderness. Ultimately,
civic tenderness combats civic indifference by pushing us nearer to others and closing the
distance between others and ourselves. In the next part of this dissertation, I apply civic
tenderness to the situations of poverty and the American Criminal Justice System and
American Poverty.
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Chapter 4:
Tenderization and the American Criminal Justice System
The United States incarcerates more of its people than any other country in the
world.237 Since World War II, the capacity of the United States to surveil and imprison its
citizenry has undergone tremendous expansion. 238 Legal scholar Michelle Alexander
mentions that “In less than 30 years the United States penal population exploded from
around 300,000 to more than 2 million”.239 Nearly, “one in every twenty-eight American
children has a parent in prison” and forty-six percent of these children are Black.240 Six
million Americans cannot vote because they have been convicted of a felony.241 One in
three African American men are under the control of the criminal justice system.242 The
number of girls and especially girls of color in the juvenile justice system is increasing.243
Roughly around 16 percent of transgender adults have been incarcerated for any reason.244
Further, transgender inmates in many facilities are housed strictly based on their genital
anatomy.245 In many ways, the expansion of the carceral state has been central to the
Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness; Jody
Marksame and Harper Jean Tobin, "Standing with Lgbt Prisoners: An Advocate’s Guide to
Ending Abuse," (2013).
238 Amy E Lerman and Vesla M Weaver, "The Carceral State and American Political
Development," in The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development (2014);
Christopher Slobogin, "American Criminal Justice Exposed," Criminal Justice Ethics 31, no. 1
(2012).
239 Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
240 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
241 "The Sentencing Project," http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/felonydisenfranchisement/.
242 Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
243 Saar et al., "The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story."
244 Marksame and Tobin, "Standing with Lgbt Prisoners: An Advocate’s Guide to Ending
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building of state capacity—the ability of a government to administer its territory
effectively. Criminal justice has been a major site of activity over the past 50 years.246 Mass
incarceration and the growing reach of an expansive criminal justice system has
disproportionately targeted Black and Brown women and men, the poor, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender people, and anyone who is gender nonconforming (GNC).247 These
circumstances are the results of systematic injustice to which many Americans are
indifferent.
Who are the civically vulnerable in relation to the American criminal justice system?
What does civic indifference look like in the case of the American Criminal justice system?
How might civic tenderness be of use in reforming the American criminal justice system? I
begin by providing a picture of those who are vulnerable to the American Criminal justice
system. Once this picture is in place, I explain how the American criminal justice system
and mass incarceration are sustained by civic indifference. I then transition to a discussion
of how we might chart a direction forward that is consistent with civic tenderness.

The Civically Vulnerable and the American Criminal Justice System
Race, alone, does not fully explain the ongoing legitimacy of imprisonment. While it
plays a central role in the development of the current carceral state, the impact of our
Lerman and Weaver, "The Carceral State and American Political Development."
Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness; Hill,
Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond;
Lerman and Weaver, "The Carceral State and American Political Development."; Marksame
and Tobin, "Standing with Lgbt Prisoners: An Advocate’s Guide to Ending Abuse."; Saar et
al., "The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story."; Matthew Desmond and Nicol
Valdez, "Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City
Women," American Sociological Review 78, no. 1 (2013); Becky Pettit and Bruce Western,
"Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in Us Incarceration,"
American sociological review 69, no. 2 (2004).
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criminal justice system has extends beyond race.248 When class and gender intersect with
race peculiar vulnerabilities are generated. So, our portrait should also recognize the
impact of gender and poverty on the American criminal justice system.
The disproportionate target for the American criminal justice system has been Black
and Brown bodies. Even more deplorable, America profits from targeting these bodies in
the form of fines, court fees, and the cost of incarceration. Many local police departments in
the United States rely on fines and fees to generate revenue for the department. In the city
of Ferguson, Missouri for example, a city that is approximately 67% Black, former
President Barack Obama has observed that the Ferguson police department “used its
justice system as a cash register, imposing steep fines for a range of minor offenses,
including $302 for jaywalking and $531 for untended lawns.”249 The extent of this reliance
has led scholars like Mary Bosworth to consider whether the U.S. could “sustain its current
criminal justice system, if one out of four African-American men of a certain age were not
under some form of incarceration or surveillance?”250 Michelle Alexander and Marc Lamont
Hill have both recently published works on the American criminal justice system that
illuminate the extent to which Black and Brown people are targeted and affected by it. In
many ways, Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
is the endoskeletal framework to Hill’s melanated flesh presented in Nobody: Casualties of
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America’s War on the Vulnerable from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond. I will focus on these
two works in painting our portrait.

Criminalizing Blackness
Beyond the increased likelihood of incarceration, harassment from racial profiling
and from stop and frisks, Black men stand constant risk to having their lives taken by
officers of the state whether they are armed or unarmed.251 In 2014 both Michael Brown
and Eric Garner, both unarmed Black men, had their lives taken at the hands of state
officers—literally.252 Fresher to our public memory might be the public executions of Alton
Sterling and Philando Castile.253 An attempt to tell the stories of each of these men would
demand more space than this project allows. I would like to, however, focus on Philando
Castile in order to show how the State’s violence enacted upon him reflects a deeper
problem in America—a system designed to criminalize Blackness.
Philando Castile, a fourteen year employee of the St. Paul Public school district, had
already been stopped fifty-two times in Minnesota before his fatal encounter with police
aired live on Facebook on July 16th, 2016.254 Castile was sitting in the passenger seat of his
girlfriend’s vehicle when officer Jeronimo Yanez approached the vehicle and asked Castile
Payne, "Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in
Misperceiving a Weapon."
252 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond.
253 David A. Graham, "The Second Amendment's Second-Class Citizens,"
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/alton-sterling-philando-castile2nd-amendment-guns/490301/.
254 Larry McShane, "Philando Castile Stopped by Cops in Minnesota 52 Times in the Past 14
Years for a Slew of Misdemeanors,"
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/philando-castile-stopped-cops-52-times14-years-article-1.2705348.
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for his license and registration. Yanez is said to have believed that “Mr. Castile matched the
description of a suspect in a nearby armed robbery from a few days earlier.”255 Yanez
formed this belief on the basis of Castile’s “wide-set nose”. 256 Oddly, in the short
conversation that Yanez had with Castile, he failed to mention the robbery (or the
marijuana that he would later mention to investigators that he smelled). Shortly after
Yanez approached the vehicle, Castile—legally permitted to carry and conceal a weapon—
informed Yanez that he had a gun.257 According to Castile’s girlfriend Lavish Reynolds,
Yanez then instructed Castile not to move. In an act of compliance with the officers
command, Castile tried to put his hands up—an act of surrender—and within seconds was
filled with bullets from Yanez’s gun.258,259 The Atlantic columnist David A. Graham says that,
“Castile was attempting to comply with contradictory imperatives: first, the precautionary
step of declaring the weapon to the officer; second, the officer’s request for his license and

Christina Capecchi and Mitch Smith, "Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Is Charged with
Manslaughter," https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/us/philando-castile-shootingminnesota.html.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid. Castile’s girlfriend recounts Castile as saying “Sir, I have to tell you that I do have a
firearm on me.”
258 Graham, "The Second Amendment's Second-Class Citizens". A New York Time’s article
on the case states that shots were fired just 62 seconds after the encounter began. See,
Smith, "Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Is Charged with Manslaughter".
259 An insensitive reader might point out that to the extent that Castile was raising his
hands in surrender, he was not acting in compliance with the officer. Avoiding a petty
debate over minutia, I’d like to point out that raising this point largely overstates the extent
to which a person should have to comply with an officer of the state in order to avoid
execution. Additionally and anecdotally, Castile’s actions were in alignment with life
lessons taught privately in the homes of several Black families. Black boys are often taught
from a young age to be “courteous and compliant” when pulled over by police officers.
Some, to a further extent, are taught to place their hands outside of the window
immediately after coming to a stop and to keep them there until the officer approaches
your vehicle in order to reduce the risk that these kinds of encounters, often between
White officers and Black civilians, result in death.
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registration; third, the officer’s command to freeze.”260 Castile was put in to a position
where the assurance that he’d keep his life was impossible. Castile’s death is not the result
of isolated incidents that occur at different places at different points of time, but rather
representative of a system of deadly encounters between Black bodies and state power.261
Castile’s death was preceded by the deaths of Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, Tamir Rice,
Ray Tensing, Eric Garner, and Alton Sterling (who was executed by a Louisiana police
officer just one day before Castile). Overwhelmingly, to be Black in America is a
criminalized—to be treated as if you have committed a crime. As legal scholar Paul Butler
mentions, Blacks and Black men in particular “are the prototypical criminal in the eyes of
the law.”262 Even worse than this is that some white people who actually commit crimes,
such as American mass murder and white supremacist Dylan Roof, are often treated better
than Black people who do not.263
The United States criminalizes race. 264 Police departments nationwide stand
accused of targeting, injuring, harassing, and killing women and men of color. Law
enforcement agencies have been shown to routinely target Black drivers for stop and
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searches.265 Black teens that commit few crimes are as likely to go to jail as often as White
teens that commit dozens.266 Additionally, public nuisance laws have disproportionately
targeted and harassed people of color. Black residents of St. Louis County have been cited
for things such as “loud music, unkempt, property, disruptive behavior and even “saggy
pants””.267A study of the NYPD found that “from 2001 to 2013, 7.3 million citations were
issued for everything from public urination and littering to possession of small amounts of
marijuana and consuming alcohol on the streets, and that ‘roughly 81 percent’ of these socalled offenders were either Black or Latino.”268 In fifteen states across the country Blacks
are admitted to prison on drug charges at rates ranging from twenty to fifty-seven times
higher than their White counterparts despite the fact that Blacks and Whites use drugs at
similar rates.269 These facts reflect the extent that it is a crime to be Black in America.
For many Black Americans, the carceral state has become central in defining
citizenship for themselves and for future generations of Black youth. Amy Lerman and
Vesla Weaver tell us that:
Given that criminal justice expansion has significantly altered the types of
contact that citizens are likely to have with political authority, criminal
justice has important consequences for the attitudes and behaviors that
individuals develop in the political world. 270
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The effects of this expansion has disproportionately affected low-income and minority
citizens. For example, “a young urban Black male is far more likely than his suburban White
peers to report having been stopped and frisked by the police.”271 Marc Lamont Hill reports
the same phenomenon in New York City:
In 2002, there were roughly 100,000 Terry272 stops in the city; in 2011, there
were 685,724. A little more than half of the 4.4 million stops conducted
between 2004 and 2012 included a frisk for weapons, but, of those frisks,
weapons were discovered in only 1.5 percent. Only 6 percent of the stops in
this same period resulted in an arrest and 6 percent more in a summons. And
of those stopped, more than half were Black; another 30 percent were
Latino.273
Black men and boys are not the only one’s affected. Incarceration disrupts families
and destroys communities. Further, more than their White and Black male counterparts,
Black women and girls are targeted and arrested for petty crimes in disproportionate
numbers.274 Roughly, fifty-seven percent of all women in U.S. prisons have been minorities
over the past two decades.275 It is to these women that we now turn to continue painting
our portrait of who the civically vulnerable to the criminal justice system in America are.

Women and Girls
Ibid. P.12.
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the case Terry v. Ohio. This case is
widely recognized as the original “stop and frisk” case or at least the legal precedent for it.
In their ruling, the Court gave police the power to stop people when there is a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, and to frisk people who they reasonably believe are in
possession of a weapon. As a result, it has become commonplace to refer to stop and frisk
contact with the criminal justice system as Terry stops.
273 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond. P. 58.
274 Saar et al., "The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story."; Hill, Nobody:
Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond.
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Hill explains how the mysterious death of Sandra Bland in 2015 is tied to an
American criminal justice system that criminalizes Black womanhood. On July 10th, 2015,
Bland was pulled over and approached by a state trooper for “not signaling a lane change”
although she had not been “otherwise driving recklessly.”276 Understandably irritated after
being pulled over on a hot Texas summer day, Bland and Texas state trooper Brian Encinia
had a somewhat heated exchange over Encinia’s command to put out her cigarette; a
command that Hill emphasizes has “no basis in the law”. 277 Frustrated by Bland’s
resistance, Encinia opened Bland’s car door and attempted to yank her from her vehicle
while informing her that she was under arrest. Bland was arrested forcefully and taken to
Waller County Jail. Hill notes “this is not an uncommon expectation of Black women and
girls who are disproportionately arrested (compared to their White and Black male
counterparts) for minor crimes because their behavior is deemed by law enforcement to
have “violated conventional norms and stereotypes of feminine behavior.””278 Despite the
insistence by Bland’s family that she had never shown signs of attempting suicide, Bland
was found dead in her jail cell after being held in police custody for three days—her death
was declared a suicide. That same month, Kindra Chapman, Joyce Curnell, Ralkina Jones,
Alexis McGovern, and Raynette Turner all died in police custody.

Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond. P. 61. Regarding the lane change, it is important to not Bland’s own words
explaining it: “I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up, tailing me, so I move
over and you stop me. So, yeah, I am a little irritated, but that doesn’t stop you from giving
me a ticket, so write your ticket.”
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid. P.64. Hill continues that “For Black women and girls, these oppressive norms are
compounded by longstanding social narratives that also depict them as immoral, angry,
violent, and emasculating.”
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In America, the rate of women and girls involvement in the criminal justice system is
growing. In the American juvenile justice system, “African American girls constitute 14
percent of the general population nationally but 33.2 percent of girls detained and
committed” and Native American girls make up 1 percent of the population nationally but
3.5 percent of the girls committed and detained.279 In addition to criminalizing women of
color, we also criminalize women who have been sexually and physically abused.280 Saar et
al. report that “many girls who experience sexual abuse are routed into the criminal justice
system because of their victimization.”281 For example, one 1998 study revealed that 81
percent of girls detained had experienced one or more instances of physical or sexual
abuse.282 Further, the most common symptoms of abuse turn out to be the things girls are
most commonly arrested for—running away, substance abuse, and truancy.
Once inside jail and prison walls, the vulnerability of women and girls is
exacerbated by a system that is unprepared to identify and treat the violence and trauma
that lie at the root of their arrest. For example, “only approximately half the youth in the
juvenile justice system are placed in a facility that provides mental health evaluations of all
residents”.283 As a result, these women are put into environments that may trigger trauma
or be subjected to new incidents. On top of this, many facilities nationwide are ill-equipped
to meet women’s reproductive health needs. For all of the exploitation that women and
girls face on the inside, the women’s story of and the effects of the American criminal
justice system is not told entirely by what goes on at prison facilities.
Saar et al., "The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story." P.7.
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282 Leslie Acoca, "Outside/Inside: The Violation of American Girls at Home, on the Streets,
and in the Juvenile Justice System," NCCD news 44, no. 4 (1998).
283 Saar et al., "The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: The Girls' Story." P. 14.
94
279
280

Michelle Alexander, legal scholar and Black mother of three, brings out the ways
that mass incarceration’s impact extend beyond the prison walls. She reports that in 2002,
for example, there were “3 million more adult Black women than Black men in Black
communities across the United States, a gender gap of 26 percent.” 284 According to
Alexander, facts like these frustrate women in their efforts to find life partners. She
observes, “The public discourse regarding “missing Black fathers” closely parallels the
debate about the lack of eligible Black men for marriage.”285 What she means here is that in
some cases the expansion of the carceral state, and not factors like laziness and immaturity,
has been responsible for fatherless Black children and for the removal of lovers (and
potential lovers) from their partners. Alexander doesn’t mean to imply that Black men who
go to prison are prima facie ineligible for marriage. Yet, given the increased likelihood of
recidivism of people who have been convicted of felony or the increased likelihood of
coming in to contact with the criminal justice system themselves, it is at least reasonable
for Black women who want to marry or start a family with a Black man not to consider
people who have been convicted of a felony. For example, women who are involved in
some romantic relationship with men who have been accused of drug crimes are among
the most frequent claimants in forfeiture cases. Courts often conclude that the
circumstances of a romantic relationship may give rise to inferential knowledge of the
seized assets.286 As a result, women risk losing their own assets even though they are not
convicted of a crime.

Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
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So far, we have seen how being a Black or Brown person, a woman, or a girl places
people in precarious positions in relation to the American criminal justice system. People
who identify as lesbian, bisexual, gay, transgender, GNC, queer, intersex or asexual also
have peculiar vulnerabilities that emerge from their sexual or gendered identities. A look at
the ways that people who identify as LBGTQIA will wrap up our discussion, albeit
incomplete, of who the civically vulnerable are.287

LBGTQIA288
Orange Is the New Black is a Netflix original series that is set in a privately owned
federal prison facility. Amongst the show’s diverse ensemble of characters is transgender
inmate Sophia Burset played by Laverne Cox—a Black transgender woman. Burset was
admitted in to Litchfield federal prison after being convicted for credit-card fraud that she
used to finance her sex reassignment surgery. Throughout the series, Burset experiences
particular vulnerabilities such as physical, emotional, and verbal abuse both at the hands of
fellow inmates and prison staff and administrators, an unexplained reduction in her
My aim in this section was not to paint a complete portion of the civically vulnerable. I
do not have the space for such a complete portrait. Other people, and groups are also
civically vulnerable such as elderly and disabled persons, and children. Further, I also
imagine that this vulnerability is exacerbated when we take in to account their racial,
gendered, and sexual identities. In future work, I hope to explore the ways and the causes
of civic vulnerability of various groups across the world that are in precarious social and
political positions.
288 Many Americans are more familiar with acronym LBGTQ. The “I” and the “A” represent
the identities of intersex and asexual respectively. Intersex refers to a range of
developmental variations where individuals are born with a reproductive or sexual
anatomy or chromosomal pattern that do not fit the traditional definition of male or female.
Like transgender people, most intersex individuals identify as male or female, and some
may transition from their birth-assigned gender to another gender. People who identify as
asexual report that they do not experience sexual attraction to anyone or low or absent
interest in desire for sexual activity.
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hormone dosage, and inordinate amounts of time in solitary confinement. Unfortunately,
Burset’s experiences accurately reflect the experience of many transgender prisoners in
America’s prison system.
Like people who are Black in America, people who identify as LBGTQIA are more
likely to come in to contact with the American criminal justice system than their sex and
gender conforming peers. For example, The National Center for Transgender Equality
reports that “Transgender people, especially poor people and people of color, report facing
disrespect, harassment, discriminatory arrests, and physical and sexual assault by police at
very high rates.”289 LBGTQIA people are particularly vulnerable to abuse and mistreatment
once admitted into prison. Prisoners who identify as non-heterosexual have been reported
to be 3 times more likely to report sexual abuse.290 Transgender women in men’s prisons
are as much as 13 times more likely to be sexually abused than other prisoners.291 Strip
searches on transgender prisoners are sometimes performed by opposite gender officers
or officers with corresponding genitalia while effectively disregarding the gendered
identity of transgender inmates. Last, prisons and jails respond to the vulnerability of
LBGTQIA inmates by putting them in to solitary confinement under the guise of “solitary
protective custody.”292 The extent to which people who identify as LBGTQIA are civically
vulnerable can be drastically reduced if we can reduce profiling, criminalization, police and
prison violence against them.
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Civic Indifference and the American Criminal Justice System
The portrait above uncovers a set of problems that, through indifference, go
unaddressed by people in positions of authority, resulting in sustaining a broken system.
Civic Indifference is the lack of an appropriate orientation of concern a society’s members,
institutions, or systems may have toward a person or group’s civic vulnerability. There are
many things that we are indifferent to; there is less that we can afford to be. The myriad of
ways that the American criminal justice system disproportionally targets, surveils,
harasses, arrests, incarcerates and kills America’s most vulnerable citizens is well
documented. Yet, the situation of these vulnerable people is something that you are
persistently indifferent toward. We consistently blame the vulnerable for their failures
while ignoring how they have had the proverbial deck stacked against them. This is not
true of all of us. Some of us have called congressmen and women or jail and prison
administrators. Thousands of others have marched and protested for the rights and lives of
Black and Brown people, women, and people who identify as lesbian, bisexual, gay,
transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual. Still, by and large the injustices of the American
criminal justice system are an afterthought in American consciousness. As Hill notes
“Despite the fact that police brutality has become a popular grievance of a large segment of
our society—particularly Black, Brown and poor folk—many Americans remain unaware
of this reality.”293 It is worth noting that we might vary with respect to which dimension of
civic vulnerability we are indifferent to. In this particular quote, Hill is speaking to one
particular dimension of the indifference we direct toward the civically vulnerable—the

Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
Beyond. P. 83.
98
293

likelihood of facing police brutality. Still, there are various other dimensions of our criminal
justice system that are deserving of our immediate attention.
Civic indifference reveals the distance between citizens themselves, as well as
between the vulnerable and those in positions of authority. As argued in chapter two, civic
indifference is generated and sustained by social, political, and psychological mechanisms.
If this indifference is to be effectively combatted, then we will need to engage these
mechanisms both on the ground amongst ourselves and with those in positions of power so
that we might alter the systematic forces that squander the capabilities and life prospects
of the civically vulnerable. On a ground level, these mechanisms can be illustrated through
the use of excessive force against the civically vulnerable, as well as the connection
between public attitudes and the consistent increase of American incarceration rates.
A 1983 Supreme Court case challenged the application of chokehold against Black
citizens. Hill notes, “From 1975 to 1983, the maneuver had resulted in the deaths of sixteen
people in Los Angeles; twelve of those sixteen were African-American.”294 In a 5-4 decision,
the court ruled that the victim of the officer’s choke hold—Adolph Lyons—had standing to
sue only for the injuries he had already suffered, not prospective injuries to himself or
others due to a particular policy of the LAPD. Lyons had been choked unconscious and
made to pee and poop himself in an encounter with LAPD officers after being pulled over
for a broken taillight. In addition to his own injunctive relief, Lyons wished to have the Los
Angeles Police department end its policy of chokeholds. In its ruling, the court denied
standing for future use on the basis that Lyon’s position,
cannot be distinguished from that of any other person who may at some future date
have a confrontation with the Los Angeles police. This is the kind of injury we have
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previously characterized as "abstract" and, therefore, insufficient to create the
personal stake required by Art. III. Id., at 494, 94S.Ct. At 675. We could not conclude
that [the] respondent has standing to press his claims for equitable relief without
re-examining our holdings in O'Shea and Rizzo on the limits of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Art. III.295
It appears that the court denied standing for future use of the hold because one
needs to show that one has actually been harmed in order to have standing. While Lyons
was in fact harmed by what happened to him (having the chokehold applied, resulting in
damaging his larynx), the courts view is that he was not harmed by the existence of the
policy. The court’s rational was that the exposure to illegal conduct in the past does not,
itself show a present case or controversy nor does it constitute a real and immediate threat
of repeated injury.296 But the policy did in fact constitute real and immediate threat of
repeated injury because it cannot be evaluated aside from the contemporary and historical
social and political situation that American finds itself in. So long as it is true that Blacks are
systematically and disproportionately choked and restrained through this method, then the
policy is harmful in both a concrete (people like Lyon’s are actually physically injured as a
result) and an expressive sense (it is offensive to Black people to continue deem
permissible a policy that is used disproportionately and systematically on bodies that look
like their own).
The court’s ruling shows us how some forms of state violence may stem not from
police misconduct, but from legal police conduct. Further this conduct is often enacted on
vulnerable people and groups by adopting policies that extend the legitimacy of power that
officers purport themselves to have. American civilians justify and reinforce this power,
engaging the social mechanisms responsible for perpetuating the oppression of the
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vulnerable. Hill remarks on choke holds saying that, “excessive force of this nature is, in
fact, often justified by law enforcement, media, and everyday citizens. Absent clear video
footage numerous Americans continue to give the “benefit of the doubt” to police officers,
despite growing evidence against them.”297 An insight from Alexander builds on Hill’s
claim:
We may think we know how the criminal justice system works. Television is
overloaded with fictional dramas about police, crime, and prosecutors—
shows such as Law & Order. These fictional dramas, like the evening news,
tend to focus on individual stories of crime, victimization, and punishment,
and the stories are typically told from the point of view of law enforcement. A
charismatic police officer, investigator, or prosecutor struggles with his own
demons while heroically trying to solve a horrible crime. He ultimately
achieves a personal and moral victory by finding the bad guy and throwing
him in jail. That is the made-for-TV version of the criminal justice system. It
perpetuates the myth that the primary function of the system is to keep our
streets safe and our homes secure by rooting out dangerous criminals and
punishing them…These television shows [are] the fictional gloss placed on a
brutal system of racialized oppression and control.298
The justification of excessive force feeds irrational fears of Black and Brown bodies as
criminals. That is, the current system of control depends on a certain kind of civic
indifference to racial vulnerabilities.
As we saw in the section in the chapter on the civically vulnerable, race plays a
major role in American criminal justice. The relationship between indifference and a racist
system has not gone unnoticed. Alexander states, quite explicitly that mass incarceration
“has been supported by racial indifference—a lack of caring and compassion for people of
other races.” 299 As a result, in this regard the foundation for the disproportionate
representation of Black and Brown citizens is formed by civic indifference. As Hill and
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Alexander note, we are constantly fed stigmatizing images of Black and Brown bodies as
criminals and as threats to the public good. This input effectively creates a social
underclass that we perpetually and persistently ignore. This input is divisive because it
unduly stigmatizes these Black and Brown Bodies and maintains a distance between “us”
and “them”.
As the effects pervade our society more generally they become more dangerous. A
constant bombardment of this content influences our attitudes about crime and can create
a public demand to “get tougher on crime.” In America, the rise in incarceration rate
reflects a response to an increasingly punitive public. Electorally motivated politicians
consider their constituents’ interests. Further, Policy makers respond to the public’s policy
preferences. It has been shown that in this democracy, politicians have been more likely to
respond to public opinion by following it rather than leading it.300 Ronald Regan, for
example, “referenced “public concern” about crime, predicting this would be an important
issue in the upcoming presidential election.”301 The assumption that politicians discount or
ignore the public’s opinion is a horrific signal of a broken democracy. Political Scientist
Peter Enns frames this insight in the form of a question: “Why would politicians and
interest group leaders, who depend on the public for their political survival, help produce
the highest incarceration rate in the world if the public were unsupportive or uninterested
in this outcome?” Public attitudes directly influence the incarceration rate though various
pathways such as ballot initiatives and indirectly through the behavior of legislators. Policy
makers rely on public attitudes about crime to pass bills and legislation for greater
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punishments, more advanced weaponry, or increased surveillance often without public
recognition.302
Enns’ research shows that public attitudes about crime and punishment influence
incarceration.303 State and federal legislators (who have electoral incentives) influence the
capacity to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate by appropriating budgets that respond
to public attitudes about crime and punishment. These same legislators have a major
influence on incarcerations rates by defining what is a crime and imposing sentencing
requirements.304 There are also direct pathways of citizen influence. For example, in some
states, “Citizens have enacted “three strikes laws,” which impose mandatory minimum
sentences on repeat offenders.”305
The association with criminality can mollify the move toward the exclusionary kind
of civic indifference directed at people who are, ultimately, civically vulnerable which
makes their social and political situation easy to negate.

Tenderization and the American Criminal Justice System
I want to be clear in my aims for the following discussion. I intend for the discussion
offered here to serve as a prognosis for tenderly reforming the criminal justice system.
Many Americans are unaware of the fact that there are more than 4,500 offenses in the
federal criminal code and 300,000 more regulatory offences that carry criminal
consequences. The majority of Americans are also unaware of the fact that the equipment
of American police departments have been supplied by the United State Pentagon—
including helicopters, night vision goggles, grenade launchers, and of course bazookas—as
Michelle Alexander discusses in The New Jim Crow.
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That is to say that I do not intend for what is provided here to definitive by any means. The
intrusions of the American Criminal Justice System are pervasive in our society. We should
expect, then, that the process of tenderization would have to engage multiple
mechanisms—social, political, and psychological. From our portrait above we are able to
see that the issues extend beyond people’s attitudes, but also that some of America’s
institutions perpetuate the violence of the criminal justice system. Given this, we should
have questions about how effective our reform efforts can be if they rely on “conventional
criminal regulatory approaches to a wide array of social concerns, with all of their
associated violence: on criminalization, policing, arrest, prosecution, incarceration,
probation, and parole.”306 We have to avoid reformist projects that rely fundamentally on
maintaining a primary and central role for existing policing prosecution, or incarcerationfocused mechanisms of social order and maintenance.
The alternatives that I offer invite feedback and input from persons subject to
criminal enforcement. Additionally, the set of reforms that I offer is unfinished, partial and
in process. Allegra McLeod argues that “this unfinished quality ought not to be denied as a
source of critical strength and possibility.”307 Unfinished alternatives “seek to confront
criminal law’s violence by substituting alternative mechanisms of social order maintenance
and by enlisting in the project of reform other social entities and persons subject to
enforcement regimes themselves.” 308 Unfinished alternatives provide a ““sketch,” a
beginning, an attempt to change the existing state of affairs through an intervention that is
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partial, incomplete, and in process.”309 As our proposed reforms are cautious of relying on
the mechanism that maintain a primary and central role for existing policing prosecution,
or incarceration-focused, they must simultaneously be able to be articulated in terms that
are recognizable and conceivable to those who are embedded in the existing state of affairs.
Our reforms then should be both unlike existing arrangements and also legible within them
because our public imagination is constrained by the status quo and existing social
arrangements.
Doubtless, it can be challenging to maintain a sketch as a sketch in political life.
People want to know “how do we get there from here?” Given the reciprocally determined
causal nature of civic tenderness, we should resist discounting the ‘pioneering stages’ as
life itself; viewing it only as a beginning. Ultimately, even if readers come to reject what I
have to say here, I hope, at least they might find what I have to say here to be useful in
thinking about how we might bring about a society that is more tender and concerned
about protecting its most vulnerable citizens. Taking this task seriously we must be wary of
being prematurely prescriptive in the precise direction that we need to go and so dialogue
is welcomed and revision should not be resisted. It is also more likely that creative
solutions to these issues require collective rather than individual effort and so readers
should not rely on my own words as a godsend. However, I will do my best to get us started
down what seems to me to be a promising path.
As we have seen, public attitudes about crime and punishment have a considerable
influence on the American Criminal Justice System. In order to cultivate civic tenderness,
we need to get people to understand the injustice of the system—the circumstances of
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those who are victimized by it and the ways that they are victimized. We have to get people
to pay attention so that they can come to care about those who are placed in positions of
civic vulnerability and taken advantage of. In chapter three, I outlined some forms of media
that can be engaged as means for intervention and alteration the attitudes of our society.
These suggestions included state funding of and community viewings of films that bring
people to awareness of those vulnerable in the face of our justice system such as 13th and
Orange is the New Black.
Recently the publicly funded and the well-known children’s show Sesame Street
introduced a new character named Alex, who’s father is incarcerated as a part of their
“Little Children, Big Challenges” campaign.310 The show also has an online tool-kit for
children, parents, and providers who may be coping with the incarceration of a loved one.
While the tool kit and video resources provided are a step in the right direction, they can be
improved to be more tender. For example, in the tool kit’s video the puppet characters ask
their human friend “What is carcerated? And why was your dad in it?” Their human friend
responds, “Incarcerated is when someone breaks the law, ‘a grown up rule,’ and then they
have to go to jail or prison.” We should applaud Sesame Street’s efforts as they go some way
toward altering the indifference we have toward those impacted by the criminal justice
system. Still, the human friend’s language is problematic in that it perpetuates the trope
that people who are incarcerated are people who break laws. The portrait of the civically
vulnerable in this chapter tells a different story—that sometimes people are incarcerated
when they are not in fact guilty of a crime; and that sometimes people who commit crimes
are not incarcerated. A more tender approach to programming would take a more nuanced
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approach in educating children about incarceration that highlights the circumstances of
those who are victimized by injustices of the criminal justice system and the ways that they
are victimized. Further, the introduction of Alex as a character brings with it possibilities of
collaboration with software developers developing media (such as virtual and mixed
reality software) able to induce specific emotions—affective media—that serves to
produce interactive children’s education mechanisms.
The frontiers of affective media can also be helpful changing public attitudes about how
prisoners are treated and about the conditions that shape the choices people who wind up
as prisoners face. Software developers can develop software that immerses users in the
experiences of people who are incarcerated, including their subjugation to methods of
punishment such as solitary confinement. They might also be able to develop software
aimed at altering people’s attitudes about public health issues and publicly stigmatized
forms of medication such as marijuana use.
Technological resources are not the extent of things that we can do to reshape public
attitudes. Human resources are important too. Contemporary collective action has also
been effective. Groups like Black Lives Matter and the Movement for Black Lives have
reshaped public discourse and attitudes about policing and vulnerability of Black bodies
before the criminal justice system. Additionally, in 2014-15, in the wake of the deaths of
Mike Brown and Eric Garner, protests and other collective action events swept the nation.
Political Scientist LaGina Gause documents that:
the year began, with a continuation of marches, petitions, and rallies calling for
accountability of police officers and the valuation of black lives. Other events
marking the year included Confederate Flag rallies in South Carolina and Mississippi
and nationwide demonstrations against food companies. By year’s end, collective
action was erupting across the nation at universities and colleges with students
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exposing racism and calling for more inclusive community.311
These collective action events play a role in bringing about the reauthorization of the Death
in Custody Reporting Act and the authorization of funds to improve police training and the
issuing of body cameras.312 The power of protest and other forms of collective action
contain even more potential for the vulnerable as Gause finds that “Legislators are
generally more likely to represent the interests of lower resource groups than their higher
resource counterparts.”313 Even on an individual level, human resources are important, as
we should never underestimate the power of conversation. In our own lives, whether with
our families, friends, or strangers, we are influenced by the conversations that we have
with others. Engaging others in political dialogue and directing them to informational
resources is valuable, in part, because it may increase other’s awareness of civic
vulnerability by making more intimate connections that might create tender outcomes.
Altering our indifferent orientation towards the civically vulnerable would enable us to
consider alternative approaches to punishment. A shift from a retributivist focus to
restorative one would be useful for the process of tenderization. Approaching punishment
restoratively can create a space where it can be just for vulnerable offenders to believe that
they are amongst the victims in their situations. John Braithwaite discusses the role of the
notion of active responsibility—the virtue of taking responsibility for repairing the harm
that has been done and the relationships that have been damaged—in restorative justice
schemes. Braithwaite says that “restorative justice is about creating spaces where not only
offenders but other concerned citizens as well, will find it safe to take active responsibility
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for righting the wrong.”314 This is important because, in many cases, people who are
incarcerated have been victims of oppression or have been civically vulnerable in their
past. For example, as mentioned above many women who are incarcerated have been
sexually abused. Braithwaite thinks that “by accepting a jurisprudence of active
responsibility, it may be that can respond more compassionately to the injustices offenders
have suffered while increasing community safety”. 315 The reason that this kind of
jurisprudence could give rise to compassion is that creates the space for offenders to own
and present the ways that they are vulnerable which can alter our orientation and response
towards them.
Under a restorative approach, equal punishment for equal wrongs is a misguided.
Restorative justice theorists opt for contextualization rather than consistency. Braithwaite
mentions that “With restorative justice, it is the collective wisdom of the stakeholders in
the circle that decides what is the agreement in the view of any one person in the circle, but
one that all in the circle can sign off on as contextually just.”316 What results is unequal
punishment in response to unequal offenses and the stakeholders to the offense determine
this punishment. Restorativists are careful to avoid so radical an approach that any result
the victims want, they get. One way this can be done is to impose upper limits on
punishment. This way, the law can ensure that citizens will never be punished beyond
these limits. So, under restorative justice, “while victims cannot be guaranteed their wishes,
the law should assure them of a right to put their views in their own voice.”317
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Ultimately, a tender society should seek to eliminate the practice of imprisoning
citizens altogether. In other words, a tender society has the ultimate aim of removing
prison from our social landscape. This will require that we repudiate usual ways of
thinking about punishments as an inevitable consequence of crime. As Angela Davis urges,
“We could recognize that ‘punishment’ does not follow from crime in the neat and logical
sequence offered by discourses that insist on the justice of imprisonment”.318 The way
forward might thus involve a myriad of alternatives that require American society to
undergo several radical changes that address racism, sexism, homophobia, and class biases,
for example. What ever the case, our solutions going forward, if they are to be tender, will
have to bring attention to and increase the awareness of the ways that people who end up
incarcerated are civically vulnerable. The proposed reforms I introduce and develop build
on an abolitionist tradition and have been inspired by legal scholar Alegra McLeod. I also
turn to former President Barack Obama’s administration and #Blacklivesmatter activists to
highlight recent work toward criminal justice reform that is consisted with CT.

Towards criminal law reform
The direction toward a more tender society would involve confronting the violence of
the criminal law. One way forward would be the decriminalization narcotics and narcotics
related conduct. Decriminalization may serve to substantially reduce the criminal law’s
violence and shift resources and attention to other institutions as sites for managing
addiction and other forms of social disorder. McLeod proposes that “gradual
decriminalization reform will reduce the human and economic costs of late scale arrests
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and incarceration of persons for marijuana related offenses.”319 Many U.S. Jurisdictions
have decriminalized marijuana possession both partially and entirely, “including Alaska,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington,
among other states” in response to public sentiment that the criminalization of marijuana
is misguided.”320 There is also some precedent for places who have decriminalized a wider
range of controlled substances and have shift to a public health model for addressing the
problems of addiction. As recent as 2009, in Portugal for instance, following
decriminalization the number of people seeking treatment more than doubled and they
began to have lower rates of drug use than other European countries and substantially
lower than the United States.321 Further, instead of incarcerating individuals who are found
to possess small amounts of these narcotics can be set to panels composed of psychologists,
social workers, and legal counselors organized to decide rulings of appropriate treatment.
Such a shift toward decriminalization is tenderizing in that those who are vulnerable to
using or becoming addicted to narcotics would stop being treated and viewed as criminals
but rather as people who are in need of treatment to restore and maintain their health. The
rationale bolstering decriminalization, in this sense, should emphasize the ways that, for
instance, a person’s likelihood of using criminalized narcotics may be increased by things
such as the presence of said narcotics in their immediate living environment. I am not
suggesting that this is the only circumstance that contributes to the situation of the civically
vulnerable, but rather sketching one of the things that tender decriminalization reform
should consider.
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Complimenting our decriminalization efforts, another alternative we might consider is
alternative development assistance for narco-cultivators. Alternative development in the
criminal law context involves providing subsidies to narco-cultivators to introduce nonnarcotic crops—such as oil palm, which can be used as bio fuel or to make other consumer
products—and technical assistance with accessing international markets until the licit
alternative becomes self-sustaining. This project of alternative development has increased
the wealth of farmers though transitions to crops that are more lucrative and secure that
narco-cultivation.322 McLeod says that
Studies of the effects of alternative development programming show that on a local
scale many narco-cultivators elect to switch entirely to the licit alternative if it
allows them to better provide for their families enables an improved quality of life.
Areas that transition from narco-cultivation to other crops may also experience a
significant reduction in the violence associated with narco-trafficking.323
These alternatives, in come cases, are also tender environmentally insofar as they respond
to the vulnerability of our planet. In one instance, in Peru a coca-producing region of the
Huallaga Valley shifted to producing palm oil. Palm oil is derived from the fruit of small
tropical palm trees and can be used to produce vegetable oil, soap, and as an ingredient in
bio-fuels.324
Continued work on criminal sentencing and decarceration is also useful to the
tenderization process. As a part of his administration, President Barack Obama launched
the Smart on Crime initiative. In 2012, Obama passed the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which
reduced the disparity in the amounts of powder cocaine and crack cocaine required for the
imposition of mandatory minimum sentences for simple possession of crack cocaine.
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Importantly, “the FSA reduced a disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine that
had resulted in excessive and unwarranted punishments that fell disproportionately on
defendants of color.”325 Additionally, Obama took advantage of the presidential clemency
power as he commuted more federal prison sentences that the ten presidents that
preceded him, combined.326 Also, in 2010 the Department of Justice (DOJ) overturned a
policy that required prosecutors to bring the most severe sentences forth with prosecuting
a case. Obama writes that “The new policy instead instructed that cases should be charged
on the individual circumstances of the defendant, stressing that “[p]ersons who commit
similar crimes and similar culpability should, to the extent possible, be treated similarly,”
and that “equal justice depends on individualized justice, and smart law enforcement
demands it.”327 The new policy has explicit connections with restorative justice given its
emphasis of contextualization. Former Attorney General Eric Holder revised the DOJ’s
charging policies “to avoid triggering excessive mandatory, minimums for low-level,
nonviolent drug offenders.”328 As a result, the leverage that state prosecutors take with
them in plea bargaining scenarios was reduced and disallowed the waiving the right to
appeal based on ineffective counsel to be included as a part of the plea bargaining process.

Toward Prison Abolition
During his eight-year tenure as president, Obama observed, “with just 5% of the worlds
Population, the United Stated incarcerated nearly 25% of the world’s prisoners.”329 A
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majority of American prisoners are incarcerated for the use of illegal narcotics and illegal
narcotics conduct. Every dollar that the DOJ spends on excessive sentences for nonviolent
drug offenses represents a dollar that we do not have for investing in social health
programs that can more adequately address these issues. As Obama puts the point,
If one includes the cost of jail and prison at the state and local levels, the total U.S.
Budget for incarceration rises to a staggering $81 billion, enough to fun
transformative initiatives like universal preschool for every three- and four-year-old
in America—initiatives like that change the odds for so many kids by keeping them
out of the juvenile and criminal justice systems in the first place.330
In order to free up these funds and reallocate them toward public health initiatives we will
have to drastically reduce the prison population through decarceration.
For this process, the state could develop a separate court system that is not aimed at
punishment akin to traditional sentencing, but rather at reducing the sentences of
prisoners based on their participation in certain beneficial programming while
incarcerated. This court system should be facilitated by social work experts. This court
might also be responsible for reducing the sentences of drug offenders in relation to
evolving drug policy—especially in the case of marijuana. Alternatively, we can also staff
prisons with health professionals that are trained to provide gender and age appropriate
health care. The decarceration process can also be complimented by turning to
organizations such as The Vera Institute of Justice whose common justice initiative is
working to transform American incarceration based on restorative justice principles.331
Working with young people between the ages sixteen to twenty-four, they build practical
strategies to hold people accountable for harm that do not rely on incarceration. In 2012,
this initiative was recognized by the DOJ for their work serving victims especially young
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people of color, who are unlikely to address their material, emotional, and social needs
after serious crimes have been committed.332
Decarceration will not happen overnight and until U.S. Prisons are fully abolished, we
have to also improve the ways people who are currently incarcerated are treated. One
thing that we could offer credits to inmates for participating in certain beneficial
restorative programming while incarcerated, which could count toward the remaining time
on their sentences. It has been observed that “inmates who participate in correctional
education programs have significantly lower odds of returning to prison that those who do
not, and that every dollar spent on prison education save four to five dollars on the cost of
recarceration.”333 Restoring those in our prisons by providing restorative programming in
prisons not only improves lives but also promotes public safety.
Further, we should reconsider the use of solitary confinement. Obama says that “It is
estimated that as many as 100,000 inmates in U.S. Are currently held in solitary
confinement—a figure that includes juveniles and people with mental illness. Of these, as
many as 25,000 are in long-term solitary confinement which involves months if not years
with almost no human contact.” 334 Solitary confinement can have profound negative
consequences that exacerbate mental illness and undermine the goals of restorative justice.
Some work has already been done toward this end. In 2016, Obama directed the DOJ to
execute a series of important reforms including banning solitary confinement for juveniles,
prohibiting its use as a response to low-level infractions, expanding treatment of those with
mental illness, increasing the amount of time inmates spend out of their cells and ensuring
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inmates are not released in to communities directly from solitary confinement. Early in
2017, a Los Angeles board of supervisors approved restrictions on the use of solitary
condiment using language from the DOJ.335 Going a bit further, we can reform prisons
themselves over the decarceration process to more accurately reflect the conditions to
which they might return upon being reintegrated into our society. McLeod notes that at
Bastoy prison, inmates are housed in bungalows complete with a deck and a personal
outdoor dining table.336 The idea of reforming prisons to more accurately reflect the
outside world is consistent with providing beneficial restorative programming such as
education and work skill training.

Toward Re-entry and Spatial Reform
Many Americans who have served their time still face considerable challenges trying
to get their lives back on track. The obstacles that the formerly incarcerated face include
finding gainful employment, obtaining public benefits, pursuing higher education, voting,
and reintegrating in to the workforce. A few small steps could go a long way to offset these
challenges. For example, we could “Ban the Box” on job and education admission
applications. As it currently stands, some jobs and college applications ask applicants to
check a box that discloses whether or not they have gone to jail or prison. The United States
department of education has already emphasized the importance of banning the box
because “unnecessarily broad questions about criminal history can often deter and
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discourage qualified students from pursuing a college degree.”337 Banning the box would
prevent jobs and schools from asking questions about an applicant’s criminal history, at
least until a conditional offer has been made.
As a society, we could also cover the cost of state issued identification cards for
prisoners upon reentry. Many prisoners are released from prison with little money and
possessions. State issued id’s are needed to apply for most jobs in our society and most
state’s charge to issue them. To address this barrier in reentering the society, we should
absorb the cost of issuing these id’s to the formerly incarcerated.
Perhaps the most important right in any democracy is the right to vote and participate
in self-governance. For people who were formerly incarcerated this is sadly not the case.
Twelve states in the U.S. restrict voting rights to those who have completed their sentences
and are no longer under supervision by the criminal justice system.338 It is imperative that
we restore the formerly incarcerated with their right to vote. Obama states, “More than six
million American—disproportionately people of color—cannot vote because of a felony
condition that disenfranchise them.”339 How might this population have affected the 2016
Presidential Election of Donald Trump? Citizens who have paid their debts to society
should have some say in how they are governed and they by subject to the very laws and
leaders that, in some cases, contribute to their civic vulnerability.
Reforming how we organize our public spaces can go a considerable distance toward
reducing crime and violence. McLeod says that “The degree to which design—design of
physical spaces, cars, windows and the like—could inhibit theft and other interpersonal
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harm is uncertain, but it is a mode of thinking about social order maintenance and crime
prevention that moves toward a focus on space and opportunities to offer rather than on
conventional policing, prosecution and punishments.” 340 In other words, we can take
advantage of things like emerging auto prevention technologies to prevent things like car
theft and taking such an approach attempts to fix the issue of car theft without relying on
traditional forms of punishment. Additionally, we can reform our social infrastructure to
improve things like street lighting and store designs. As a result, American criminal justice
would aim to address the situational problems that can sometimes give rise to crime. Going
this direction might also involve building more public parks, city fountains, public
memorials, and open spaces for members of a community to come together and socialize
with one another in ways that can promote joy, safety, and trust.341 It has been showing
that “where abandoned urban spaces are converted to more constructive public uses, as
was the case for thousands of Acres in Philadelphia and Detroit, these projects create jobs
and usable space, and in so doing are often associated with reduced gun violence.”342
Groups like #Blacklivesmatter have made clear and public demands for things like swift
and transparent legal investigation of all police shootings of Black people, official
governmental tracing of the number of citizens killed by police, disaggregated by race, the
demilitarization of local police forces. Toward this end, we can advocate that more police
jurisdictions repot to the National Incident-based Reporting System which “significantly
improves the quality of our crime data by providing much richer details including the date,
time, location, and circumstance of the crime as well as characteristics about the victim and
McLeod, "Confronting Criminal Law's Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished
Alternatives." P. 128.
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118
340

offender and any relationship with them.”343 A shift to the use of this technology could go
far in holding police departments and officers accountable for the systematic oversurveillance, harassment, and violence take out disproportionately on Black bodies and
other people of color.
Conclusion
This chapter addresses the role of tenderization in relation to the American Criminal
Justice system. We saw a portrait of the civically vulnerable that include Black people,
women and girls, and people who identify as LBGTQIA. Additionally, we explored the
orientation of the civic indifference that we direct toward the civically vulnerable. Various
social and political mechanisms work to generate and sustain this orientation and our
public attitudes about the civically vulnerable. We saw that, for instance, that our public
and private attitudes about crime and punishment influence incarceration. Civic
Tenderness is an orientation of concern that is brought about in response to civic
vulnerability that provides an impulse toward caregiving behavior. I said that civic
tenderness requires that our society shift towards restorative justice through alternatives
that does not rely on traditional forms of punishment. Restorative justice approaches allow
us to better engage with the vulnerability of those afflicted by the violence of the criminal
justice system. Each of the alternatives provided here is legible within and existing state of
affairs in that each one intervenes in a practical manner with our current, non-ideal, state
of affairs. More importantly, some of these alternatives and initiative place the civically
vulnerable in positions of equal societal relationship, enabling them to depart from some of
the violence of the criminal justice system.
343
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Chapter 5:
Tenderization and American Poverty
Since the Recession of 2008, poverty in America has begun to look different and the
subject of inequality has become prominent in American political discourse. Before 2008,
Americans were able to think that people who were poor were so because they were
unemployable, recently incarcerated, or who in general had made poor choices of their
own accord and are deserving of their precarious positioning. Still today, too many
Americans falsely believe that a bad character or habits or lifestyle causes poverty.
However, after the Great Recession a class of working poor, many of whom were formerly
middle class Americans emerged; People whom, “once possessed relatively predictable and
reasonably comfortable lives [were] inexplicably cast into a maelstrom of economic
dispossession”.344 For many Americans, the possibility of living in poverty was close to
becoming a permanent reality. Over the past 25 years the income of the richest 1 percent of
Americans have seen a steady increase while the incomes of around 90 percent of
Americans have been stagnant. In 2012 there were roughly 600,000 homeless Americans
sleeping on our streets, in abandoned cars or homes, or in homeless shelters if they were
“lucky”.345 At the time of this writing, around 13.5 percent of Americans live in poverty and
about 7.9 million are unemployed.346, 347 Fortunately, some Americans are beginning to
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accept the harsh reality that the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans disproportionately
controls our economy.348
In addition to formerly middle class individuals falling into poverty, the landscape of
American poverty has also been changing on other fronts. For example, the thought that
poverty is only an inner-city problem is false. It is true that in some of our nation’s largest
urban areas, nearly one in four poor residents lives in high poverty.349 Yet, in the past
decade poverty has become regional as “the majority of poor American suburbs are home
to 16.5 million poor people, as compared to the 13.5 million who reside in inner-city
neighborhoods.”350 In 2011 more than 2.9 million American homeowners had foreclosure
cases filed against them. In 2016, 549,928 people were homeless and about 40 percent
(217,268) of these were women.351 The stability and security of our society is threatened
by pervasiveness of poverty and plunder amongst our nation’s most vulnerable citizens.352
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But even today, our attitudes toward the civically vulnerable remain highly judgmental.
Justice requires that this be remedied.
Who are the most vulnerable to being affected by poverty in American society?
What does indifference toward those who are poor or in poverty look like in our society?
How might civic tenderness be useful in fighting poverty and working toward the goal of
ending American homelessness? I proceed by painting a portrait of American poverty. Once
this picture is in place, I explain what civic indifference looks like toward people who are
poor or in poverty. Finally, I discuss what the process of tenderization in the case of
American poverty involves.

A Portrait of American Poverty: The Civically Vulnerable
We have to come to understand poverty, not simply as the result of low incomes, but as
the hardships and maladies too often experienced as correlated adversity linked across
multiple dimensions and institutions. The United States has long enjoyed a position
amongst the most affluent nations in the world. What often goes unnoticed, however, are
the economic problems that we have here at home. For example, 13.5 percent of Americans
are living in poverty and the United States has the second highest child poverty rate among
the world's most affluent countries.353 In some states, such as California, where the rate for
children in poverty is 23.1% compared to the 18.7% of their adult counterparts, there are
more children than there are adults in poverty.354 Our public discourse about American
poverty often lacks nuance. Our failure to highlight subtleties in poverty discussions is one
Santiago, "Fifty Years Later: From a War on Poverty to a War on the Poor." P. 6.
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of the reasons that poverty persists today. 355 When people who are poor are brought up,
what often results is a repetition of scripts and tropes that make superfluous distinctions
between poor people as deserving and undeserving, emphasizing individual behavioral
failures while simultaneously ignoring global changes in our economy and the ways many
of our social institutions come up short in protecting citizens against the risks of poverty.
Not all people who are poor are lazy, have accrued large gambling debts, or have blown
their fortunes on getting high on heroine or cocaine. Some people are poor because our
institutions have failed at preparing them to compete for living wage jobs or because
employers are biased against their racial identities. For one example, who gets seen as
deserving and undeserving in our society is racialized. In his paper “Working Twice as Hard
to Get Half as Far: Race, Work Ethic and America’s Deserving Poor”, Christopher DeSante
finds that whites are found to be more “deserving” than their Black counterparts despite
identical levels in perceived work ethic and perceived laziness.356
In the next section we will explore how this contrast between those who are deserving
of government help and those who are presumably culpable for their own disadvantaged
circumstances, is one of the primary weapons used against the poor. First I illustrate the
portrait of the civically vulnerable by focusing on children, the working poor, people of
color, and the elderly.

Children
Childhood poverty is a problem in America. For many American children, this is a bad
Santiago, "Fifty Years Later: From a War on Poverty to a War on the Poor." P. 6.
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situation because poverty means inadequate nutrition, fewer learning opportunities, poor
schools, and the exposure to toxins, family violence and homelessness. I would like to also
point out that childhood poverty rates have a dampening effect on our gross domestic
product (GDP)—a primary indicator of a nation’s economic health. Our society’s children
are indispensable assets to its future. Gone unchecked, childhood poverty can have harmful
consequences for the larger society by depleting its economy productivity and output.357 In
other words, high rates of childhood poverty can make it difficult to produce the skilled
workers we need in sufficient quantities, which “(1) affects out short- and long-term ability
to compete internationally; and (2) diminishes our capacity to address the needs of an
aging population.”358 Political Scientist Anna Maria Santiago notes, that poor children “are
also more likely to experience violent behavior and gang activity; are more likely to be
incarcerated; have limited access to fresh produce and healthy foods; have fewer
supporters and services; attend inferior schools; and have few, if any, safe places to
play.”359
In America, 23% of children live in poverty—that’s nearly one in every four children.
Santiago observes that “There are considerable racial and ethnic differences in children's
exposure to poverty: 13 percent of all Anglo and Asian children are poor as compared to 34
percent of Latino children and 39 percent African American children."360 African American
and Latino children are also twice as likely to grow up in a low-income household than
their white counterparts.361 Sadly, many of our children are living “in families that
Santiago, "Fifty Years Later: From a War on Poverty to a War on the Poor." P. 9.
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experience deep poverty, who are poor during early childhood, are more likely to have
lower levels of academic achievement; drop out of school; have poorer employment
outcomes; and experience more health, behavioral, and emotional problems.”362
Poor children’s health is also at risk. Poor children are more likely to be exposed to
environmental toxins.363 The connection between structural and economic barriers and
poor children’s futures was on prime display in the Flint water crisis. Flint’s narrative
surrounding the crisis highlights how civic vulnerability of children (in particular, Black
children) is sometimes perpetuated and sustained by civic indifference. Nearly half of
Flint’s residents live near or below the poverty line and roughly 10 percent of its residents
are unemployed.364 Flint’s economy once thrived during the boom of the automobile
industry. Over time, the automobile industry in America waned due to the development of
modern, global, and postindustrial technologies; this economic decline devastated cities
like Flint in particular because of a large dependency on the success of the automobile
industry. According to Marc Lamont Hill, between 2002 and 2011 Flint fell into a state of
financial emergency, running up a $7.3 million dollar deficit. The city “went into
receivership, a state of financial emergency in which a manager is appointed to oversee
operations.”365 In 2014, the city of Detroit (along with Pontiac and Highland Park) went in
to receivership status as well.366 Detroit’s receivership status had a deleterious impact on
Flint because Flint relied on the Detroit Water department for its water to supply the city.
Ibid. P. 9.
Ibid. P. 8.
364 Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America's War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and
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As a result of Detroit’s financial situation, Flint was increasingly being asked to pay higher
rates for their water, waging a “water war” between Detroit and Flint.367 The battle over
water servicing was motivated by an attempt to save money. Hill mentions that
“Encouraged by its city manager, who claimed that the move would save Flint four million
dollars a year, the city decided to join other municipalities in a new pipeline venture that
would bypass Detroit and bring water directly from Lake Huron.”368 In April of 2015, Flint
began receiving its water from the Flint River—a river with a history of being a depository
for industrial waste. Shortly after the switch, “Flint residents discovered that their drinking
water tasted different, looked different, and had a distinct color.”369 City authorities
ignored the complaints of the city’s residents and insisted that the water was safe for
drinking, ultimately stalling the expediency of corrective measures. Flint’s children were
forced to use contaminated water for drinking, bathing, and playing; water that ultimately
was carrying toxins into their bloodstreams everyday.370
Early in 2015 the water in Flint was reported to have high levels of coliform bacteria,
trihalomethanes, and lead.371 Lead exposure “can result in severe and lifelong neurological
complications”372 and lead poisoning is irreversible. Detroit Free Press Journalist Kristi
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Tanner has noted that all children under 6 years of age have likely been exposed to lead.373
The impact will be borne by Flint for decades to come and now must prepare for the
aftermath that will include, “children with learning disabilities, difficulty in fine motor
skills, problems with memory and speech articulation, and who develop a greater tendency
toward violence.”374 Perhaps the most heart-breaking part about the Flint crisis is that
many of these problems, often persist into adulthood; this position of deprivation results in
“poor children, particularly children of color, [being] less likely to meet developmental
milestones and face numerous barriers to opportunities.”375 Our future competitiveness
globally, and community vitality are inextricably linked to our children’s ability to succeed.
The story of Flint highlights how children are made civically vulnerable as a result of
systemic and structural indifference. If people in power in Flint actually took the claims of
its citizens more seriously, the crisis could have been brought to an end quickly.
Intermediate steps could have been taken to assuage the blow Flint was hit with. Flint
could have used anticorrosion treatments in the water or looked to partner with other
neighboring cities for instance. Instead, they were indifferent to the complaints and
insisted that the water was safe for drinking, prolonging the search for a solution.376

The working poor
The evidence that many Americans are playing by the rules but unable to escape
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poverty should generate important questions about why it is so easy for us to ignore those
whom we consider as undeserving of our assistance let alone our attention. Too often we
think that if a person is poor then they must have made the wrong choices or have bad
habits and lifestyle. People who are poor or who are in poverty are often stigmatized and
stereotyped as lazy, and thereby undeserving. How we craft our public policies go some
way toward this end. Some of our public policies are based on the assumption that poverty
can incentivize citizens to work more, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), food stamp work requirements, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).377 Yet
this assumption is mistaken because in America there are the working poor who cannot
avoid poverty despite occupying a position in the workforce. Ultimately the working poor
are those who whose earnings from formal employment are insufficient to avoid poverty.
One of the things that should surprise us about the working poor is that presumably they
“play by the rules” and still cannot escape living in poverty. This outcome stands in the face
of the reasonable expectation that work should be rewarded with a standard of living
above the poverty threshold.378 Between 9.3 and 11.0 % of working family heads are poor.
In some states, such as California, most poor families are working. One study found that
“78.9 of poor Californians lived in families with at least one working adult.”379 Also in
California, “For 55.1% of those in poverty, at least one family member reported working
full-time.”380 So the suggestion that the promise to work generates legitimate opportunities
to establish a decent life above the poverty standard of living is not true for nearly one in
Brian C Thiede, Daniel T Lichter, and Scott R Sanders, "America's Working Poor:
Conceptualization, Measurement, and New Estimates," Work and Occupations 42, no. 3
(2015). P. 268.
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ten working family heads and their dependents.381 Since 2007, there has been a downturn
in earning among full-time workers employed year-around—both men and women.382
Brian Thiede et al. observed “Approximately 6.4 and 8.0 million working family heads were
poor in 2012, and between 20 and 24 million persons lived in poor families with a working
head.”383
The existence of a class of working poor in America disrupts narratives that assume
that working provides a standard of living above the poverty threshold. We have to
reconsider these assumptions about poverty, work, and unemployment. Doing so can push
us toward progressive solutions for those who are civically vulnerable before our economy
including things like an increase in the federal minimum wage to that of a living wage. This
change, in particular, can enlarge opportunities to flourish in American for many
Americans. People who stand in opposition to increasing the minimum wage sometimes
rely on a rationale that points to teenagers as the primary beneficiaries of the increase. But
the evidence shows that there are many working adults who fail to bring home incomes at
a living wage; this is in spite of their willingness to work full- or part-time jobs or yeararound. This should be of bipartisan interest and ignite bipartisan action.

Blacks in America
In American there exists a tremendous wealth gap that disproportionately affects
people of color. In 2013, the median wealth for a white family was $134,000 whereas the
median for Black families was $11,000; the median for Latino families was $13,900; and
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the median for Native American families was $5,700.384 In 2014, Ta-Nehisi Coates writes:
Black families, regardless of income, are significantly less wealthy than white
families. The Pew Research Center estimates that white households are worth
roughly 20 times as much as black households, and that whereas only 15 percent of
whites have zero or negative wealth, more than a third of Blacks do. Effectively, the
black family in America is working without a safety net.385
The situation of Blacks in the American economy deserves particular attention because of
the role Blacks played in establishing the American economy.
The American economy was built on the backs of Black slaves. Coates writes, rather
ironically, “America [began] in Black plunder and white democracy.”386 Even more, the
White House and the Capitol building were built by slaves.387 The roots of American wealth
and democracy then are found in slavery and are they not incidental to America’s rise to
power as a nation, but rather it facilitated that rise. It was “by erecting a slave society, [that]
America created the economic foundation for its great experiment in democracy.388
This marks the great irony of the American economy—one the one hand it was built on
black labor, and on the other hand blacks now systematically face barriers participating in
it. Coates mentions that in antebellum south, “Nearly one-fourth of all White Southerners
owned slaves, and upon their backs the economic basis of America—and much of the
Atlantic world—was erected.”389 More than just their labor, Black slaves themselves were
the single largest financial assets in the American economy.390 The wealth gap that this
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market generated has not been rectified.391 Today, the decedents of slaves do not have
much better luck in the economy that their ancestors built. As Coates puts the point, “The
concentration of poverty has been paired with a concentration of melanin.”392
Black people are significantly overrepresented in the homeless population.393
Community Psychologist Geraldine Palmer notes that “In 2010, one in 141 Black/African
American family members stayed in a homeless shelter, a rate 7 times higher than for
White/European American families.”394 In 2012, newspaper columnist David Jones
reported “In New York City for example, while blacks comprised 25.2 percent of the general
population in 2010, they were 55.9 percent of the shelter population. Conversely, white
New Yorkers, 36.1 percent of the general population, comprised just 1.9 percent of those
living in homeless shelters.”395 Unemployment for African American men is twice the rate
for White men.396 For many Americans, job loss is linked to eviction.397 Additionally, these
racial and economic disparities are often confounded, which along with residential
segregation gives rise to racial and spatial differences in health. Since Blacks are more
likely to live in areas of lower economic status regardless of their individual income status,
they may experience exceptional barriers to accessing health care options and maintaining
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their health in their communities.398 Often, living in these areas of high poverty and lowincome has an impact on one’s life expectancy insofar as low-income individuals had the
highest mortality risk. 399
Studies that focus on the American achievement gap illustrate the extent to which
poverty is linked across our institutions—in particularly our nation’s schools.400 While
school settings can be stressful for any student “for African American students, the
academic environment involves an extra degree of threat not experienced by nonminority
students, due to the negative stereotype about the intelligence of their race.”401 Lowperformance of Blacks in education also feeds the school-to-prison pipeline.402 Loweducated Blacks meet a labor market with few opportunities for unskilled workers. In their
widely cited study, Becky Pettit and Bruce Western mention that, “The collapse of the
employment in poor urban neighborhoods [draws] young Black men into the illegal trade,
steeply increasing their risks of arrest and incarceration.”403 This is a double edge sword
because as we saw in chapter 4, having a prison record confers a persistent status of a
‘criminal’ or a ‘felon’ that can significantly impact life trajectories. In other words, lower
education attainment combined with a lack of employment opportunities constrain the
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choices of many Blacks (especially, young Black men), and as a result they often become
caught in the criminal justice system (where they are likely to suffer longer sentences than
white offenders for comparable crimes).

Civic Indifference and American Poverty
Despite our aforementioned portrait, how often do we pretend that the poor do not
exist? Many of us act is if poverty is contagious disease; as if even talking about it renders
us susceptible to catching it. The poor are universally stigmatized. The stigma of poverty
includes being perceived as incompetent and feeling shunned and disrespected.404 It can
lead to cognitive distancing, diminish cognitive performance, and cause the poor to forego
beneficial programs. Our portrait illustrates several issues that do not often get addressed
by people in positions of power and authority or by our fellow citizens. As we’ve seen in
chapter 4, in order to understand American public opinion, we have to understand the
perceptions of the social and political world we inhabit and the role the media, in its
various forms, plays in shaping these perceptions. We know that “mass media can exert a
powerful influence on public perceptions and attitudes.”405 Even some of our society’s
media outlets that are generally well intending, generate images of the social world that
consistently misrepresent poor and vulnerable citizens in harmful and damaging ways. 406
The reports that we get about the world come primarily through mass media. As we
rely on the media for information about our society, it shapes our social perceptions and
Crystal C Hall, Jiaying Zhao, and Eldar Shafir, "Self-Affirmation among the Poor:
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political attitudes. Distortions of social conditions represented in the media then are likely
to result in public misperceptions that reinforce existing biases and stereotypes. Our views
on poverty are colored by the belief that economic opportunity is widespread and that
anyone who tries hard enough can succeed. Stereotypes stigmatize, and condemn large
segments of the poor as undeserving. Many Americans believe that “If people weren’t lazy,
they wouldn’t be without jobs. If women weren’t sexually active, they would not be having
babies outside of marriage and becoming dependent on welfare, if people didn’t drink or
use drugs, they would not be homeless.”407 For people who perceive there to be an
abundance of opportunities, poverty itself is presumptive evidence of personal failure.
Sadly, many of us write off vulnerable citizens who are poor as undeserving because we
believe them to be lazy or as social parasites who prefer to live off the generosity of others.
The ideology of undeservingness is a primary weapon in generating and sustaining an
orientation of indifference toward the poor. It assumes that “those who do not behave
according to the rules set by mainstream America, particularly those related to work and
sexual activity, are undeserving and blames their poverty on deficient morals, behaviors,
values, and/or culture.”408 American politicians, such as Paul Ryan, have used pejorative
words and labels directed toward people who are poor.409 Ryan says “we have got this
tailspin of culture in our inner cities, in particular, of men not working and just generations
of men not even thinking about working or learning the value and the culture of work; and
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so there’s a real culture problem here that has to be dealt with.”410 Words like these add to
the misery that sometimes already exists as a result of a lack of money.411 When people in
power the poor are also impacted by reducing their spirit, morale, and humanity, and being
renders them invisible. For people who are in poverty “The stigma of poverty can be all
encompassing… low-income individuals suffer from the stigma and stereotyping associated
with being poor: they are scorned, perceived as incompetent, and disrespected."412
Children living in poverty and the working poor demonstrate that stigmas attached to
people in poverty are by and large a myth. The working poor “play by the rules” and still
cannot escape poverty. Children are poor and our society’s labor laws prevent children
from occupying positions in our labor force. Still, “The images of the poor are much less
likely to be employed than their real work counterparts.”413 In a study on the
misperceptions of people who are in poverty, Martin Gilens emphasizes, “Whatever public
sympathy might accompany the perception that the poor are trying to work their way out
of poverty is unlikely to emerge from [our society’s] newsmagazines.”414
Our indifference to the poor is also sustained by political mechanisms. As I mentioned
in chapter 2, in August of 2015 the Mayor of San Francisco said he would enact 10 day
edicts that order the homeless of the city off its streets during the week of the 2016 NFL
Super Bowl because being homeless is both “illegal” and “dangerous”.415 For another
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example, historically the practice of redlining is well known.416 In 1934 the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) was created and was responsible for insuring private mortgages.417
The FHA created a mapping system that ranked neighborhoods on the basis of their
perceived stability. Neighborhoods that were heavily populated with Black people were
usually considered ineligible for FHA backing. According to Ta-Nehisi Coates:
On the maps, green areas, rated “A,” indicated “in demand” neighborhoods that, as
one appraiser put it, lacked “a single foreigner or Negro.” These neighborhoods
where black people lived were rated “D” and were usually considered ineligible for
FHA backing. They were colored in red.418
This practice of Redlining was a legal practice in America until 1968. What resulted was
often spatial segregation of both race and resources—separating the civically vulnerable
from the less civically vulnerable; the have’s from the have-nots. Segregation of this sort can
proceed from various sources. For example, it may be that one is already indifferent to the
plight of these others and that is what makes them want to segregate one’s self from them.
One might intentionally stay away from a group because they outright do not like them. It
might also be the result of merely being gullible to information that their real estate agent
provides for them. Still, as a result of being separated from the vulnerable, indifference
grows For decades then, the state played a role in constructing and sustaining indifference
by restricting citizens' choice of neighborhood—thereby indirectly controlling the kinds of
interpersonal interactions people were likely to have. As Elizabeth Anderson explains:
When advantaged groups are able to segregate themselves from the disadvantaged,
they lose personal contact with the problems of the disadvantaged. They become
ignorant. Enclosed in secure enclaves, insulated from the problems their segragative
Coates, "The Case for Reparations"; Anderson, The Imperative of Integration; Mode,
Evans, and Zonderman, "Race, Neighborhood Economic Status, Income Inequality and
Mortality."
417 Coates, "The Case for Reparations".
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practices impose on others, they become complacent and insular: those people
problems are not ours.419
Importantly, Mode et al. has recently presented evidence that these practices continue in
cities like Baltimore and Washington DC, despite the fact that they are illegal. According to
Mode, "The cities of Baltimore, MD and Washington, DC reached a settlement with Wells
Fargo regarding steering approximately 4000 African American and Hispanic borrowers
during 2004-2008 into subprime mortgages when non-Hispanic White borrowers with
similar credit profiles received prime rate loans."420 If we are going to overcome the
barriers that civic indifference presents, it will be likely that we have to come in to close
quarters and interact on personal levels with people who are poor or who are in poverty.
Through mechanisms of mass media and segragative spatial control civic indifference is
sustained. These mechanisms are not intended to be all encompassing—a lack of
curriculum in our society's primary and secondary schools that focus on the myriad of
issues people who are in poverty face may also be a contributor as well, among other
things. However, they do occupy centralized role in the generation, construction, and
sustaining of the civic indifference that we direct at people who are civically vulnerable
which, as we have seen earlier on, makes their situation easy to negate.

Tenderization and American Poverty
As in chapter 4, I intend for the discussion here to serve as a prognosis for tenderly
reforming our society in ways that can positively impact people who are poor or in poverty.
We should keep in mind that tenderization is a process. Further we should also be
Anderson, The Imperative of Integration.
Mode, Evans, and Zonderman, "Race, Neighborhood Economic Status, Income Inequality
and Mortality." P.8.
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reminded that as a process, tenderization will have to engage various mechanisms.421 The
set of reforms that I offer here, much like the set of tender reforms offered in chapter 4, are
unfinished.422 As such, they invite feedback and input from those afflicted by American
poverty.
The measures offered here for protecting vulnerable Americans from having their
chances for flouring restricted by the American economy could be defended in more ways
than one. In this way, viewing the measures through the lens of tenderness and
tenderization offers a companion justification for their adoption and implementation in our
society. Some measures like the universal food delivery system for children can be justified
by Rawlsian concerns of social justice.423 Other measures like protecting social security can
be justified by economic reasons that are independent of social justice. Many Americans
may believe that it is a problem inequality exists and would be in favor of supporting the
measures offered here from one or other of these complimentary rationales for
justification. Still, if some of the economic reform measures that civic tenderness prescribes
can be justified in a number of ways then so much the better for those programs as we
would have more reason to do it. My endorsement of the measures proposed here is
because these measures, aside from whatever else they might achieve, would achieve the
goals of raising awareness of the vulnerability of the poor and protecting them.
As we have noted above, mass media can affect our social and political situations by
affecting the importance that we attached to the situation of the poor or to different
See chapters 3 and 4.
See chapter 4, in particularly see the section on Tenderization and the American
Criminal Justice system.
423 Rawls, "Justice as Fairness."; Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University
Press, 2001); Martha Nussbaum, "Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social
Justice," Feminist economics 9, no. 2-3 (2003).
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political issues. Further, it can influence what we believe to be the causes of national
problems, the standard that we use in making evaluations, and even how we perceive our
political candidates and elected officials.424 The society's association of character individual
flaws both reflects and perpetuates negative stigmas of the poor and decreases support for
many social welfare options for both those in a situation of poverty and those who are not.
425

The civically vulnerable are, to a large extent, not to blame for their poverty. People

who believe that the poor are to blame for their situation are more likely to think of them
as undeserving of societal and government aid than those with more accurate perceptions
of poverty.426 Admittedly, our media outlets are subject to some of the same biases and
misperceptions that plague our society and therefore are likely to reproduce those biases
in their portrayals of American social conditions.427 Still, with media serving as a primary
vehicle driving public perception, changes over time in media portrayals should be
associated with changes in public beliefs.428 The issue isn’t that we cannot construct
innovative, progressive, or transformative solutions to the problem of poverty. Rather, our
preoccupation with the ideology of undeservingness prevents us from seeing the problem.
We have to get people to pay attention to the ways people who are poor or in poverty are
vulnerable in our society precisely because of their precarious positioning if we are going
to be able to come to care about our fellow citizens.
Here, again, I think that the frontiers of affective media can be of use in intervening with
and altering public attitudes about what kind and how much help people who are poor or
Gilens, "Race and Poverty in America Public Misperceptions and the American News
Media."
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid. P. 516.
428 Ibid. P. 529.
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in poverty really do need. Software developers can develop software that immerses users
in the situations of not only those who are poor or in poverty, but also to the experiences of
job-loss and its aftermath, the effects of low-education and what classroom struggles are
like for the civically vulnerable and the like. Additionally, we should not underestimate the
impact collective organizing and protesting can have on public attitudes about the
economy. As Santiago states "The occupy movement that emerged in 2011 illustrate[d]
how issues of poverty and inequality [can galvanize] people worldwide to question
spending priorities, promote structural, change, and reclaim dignity.”429 The fore coming
proposals are suggestions toward moving our society towards the eradication of poverty.

Protect Social Security
Under the current Presidential Administration of Donald Trump, social security has
come under attack.430 In our society, social security plays a vital role in reducing poverty. In
America, social security lifts 14 million elderly Americans out of Poverty.431 A 2013 report
uncovers that "Without social security, 21.4 million more Americans would be poor."432 In
addition to 90% of people over the age of 65 receiving some form of income from social
security, this number includes 1.1 million children.433 Provided that we remain healthy, we
all will live to reach the qualifying age for social security and the risk of economic
Santiago, "Fifty Years Later: From a War on Poverty to a War on the Poor." P. 9. Also, in
The Rich and the Rest of Us, Cornel West and Tavis Smiley echo this sentiment
430 Russell Berman, "Will Trump Cut Medicare and Social Security?," The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/will-trump-cut-medicare-andsocial-security/514298/.
431 Paul N Van de Water, Arloc Sherman, and Kathy A Ruffing, "Social Security Keeps 22
Million Americans out of Poverty: A State-by-State Analysis," Center for Budget and Policy
Priorities (2013).
432 Ibid.
433 Ibid.
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insecurity experienced by older adults is high (and especially high for racial minorities).434
On average "A minimum of 10 million adults age 65 or older struggle to make ends
meet."435 Mutchler et al. state that "When resources fall short of what is needed to cover
necessary expenses, older adults have to make difficult choices--between refilling a
prescription and paying a utility bill, for example; or between paying the rent and
purchasing sufficient food to get though the month."436 These kinds of experiences, while
not being eradicated through the presence of social security, are offset by its presence in
our society. Going forward, we will have to work hard to ensure that this mechanism stays
in place.
In general, the response to the concerns of elderly citizens is usually positive.437 That is
to say that the public opinions and general orientation is tenderly disposed. Still, we will
have to do the work researching political candidates at election time and take the care to
understand their proposed agenda's and their potential impacts. We cannot afford to lose
such a valuable protective mechanism on account of ignorance.

Resource Initiatives
In our society, there is a “need to connect vulnerable groups to employment and
economic activity as well as ensure that new jobs are ones that offer family-supporting
wages, benefits, and opportunities for growth.”438 There are already some initiatives in
Jan Mutchler, Yang Li, and Ping Ku, "Living Below the Line: Economic Insecurity and
Older Americans, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Insecurity, 2016," 18 (2017).
435 Ibid. P. 1.
436 Ibid. P. 6.
437 Gilens, "Race and Poverty in America Public Misperceptions and the American News
Media."
438 Santiago, "Fifty Years Later: From a War on Poverty to a War on the Poor." P. 10.
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place that are working toward to doing this. In San Francisco, the Family Independence
Initiative develops programming that connects families to these resources by identifying
where they already exist in their own communities.439 The program also connects families
with other families to support one another while they are improving their lives in their
own way. Other organizations like the Delaney Street Foundation provides job training, and
employment "for some of the most difficult to employ poor people—former substance
abusers, ex-offenders, and the homeless.”440 In this way, these tender outcomes that works
with people who are poor and in poverty to empower and assure them that their own
views and their own voice matters, sustaining a sense of self-worth and integrity.
Additionally, the state might develop and implement curriculum geared toward training
citizens for the kind of jobs that offer opportunities for-economic security--such as green
jobs and jobs using sophisticated forms of technology. Also in, the San Francisco area,
programs like Roots of Success and the Earned Assets Resource Network (EARN) have
developed training curricula to respond to these emerging jobs.441

Universal Food Delivery System
Cornel West and Tavis Smiley state that "There are more than 50 million Americans in
this country who are hungry and who have no idea where their next meal will come
from."442 In their poverty manifesto, they argue for the development of a universal food
delivery system. The benefits would be two-fold in that such a development would create
sustainable jobs in the areas of farming, processing, and transportation while
Ibid.
Ibid.
441 Ibid.
442 West, The Rich and the Rest of Us. P. 193.
439
440
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simultaneously addressing hunger in America. Given that America is "rich with fertile farm
land and potential growing spaces in metropolitan areas" the two posit, "a new food
delivery system should be easiest to solve."443 The system would offset the degree to which
poor and impoverished citizens have limited access to fresh produce and healthy foods,
which in turn can impact the mortality rates of the poor. According to West and Smiley, "A
Universal Food Delivery System would support and work to expedite all local, national, and
international efforts aimed at delivering fresh, canned, and packaged produce to the
hungry and, in the process, create sustainable, living-wage jobs for Americans currently
underemployed or unemployed."444

Social Impact Bonds
Social impact bonds provide funding to innovative and effective service providers for
programs that address particular social needs. Santiago writes that
Instead of relying on government funding, philanthropic funders provide financial
resources to pay for the program. Government, service providers, and funders then
agree upon targeted social outcomes, and independent evaluators monitor program
performance. If the program reaches the agreed targets, the government reimburses
the initial funders for their “invested capital” and then will reinvest in the program,
thereby reducing the risk of taxpayers paying for ineffective programs.445
This particular measure of reform is tender in that it is in its nature a collective effort
and it works, on all sides, to protect the vulnerabilities that stakeholders assume. Having
their vulnerabilities met protects the recipients of these programs. Our philanthropists,
government, and taxpayers are also protected from the vulnerabilities that are potentially
generated by ineffective programs. Perhaps one investment our philanthropists can make
Ibid.
Ibid. P. 194.
445 Santiago, "Fifty Years Later: From a War on Poverty to a War on the Poor." P. 10.
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is toward the aggressive development of affective technologies as means of attitude
intervention and bringing about significant alteration in public attitudes.

Integrative Scattered Public Housing
In our society, "poverty rates [are] correlated with rates of homelessness because a lack
of adequate income prevents people from being able to afford market rate housing."446
Another reform measure our society might adopt, then, is the construction of subsidized
public housing facilities in affluent or suburban neighborhoods. Despite the myth that lowincome housing diminished property valued, it actually does not nor do neighbors do not
respond negatively towards the new residents.447 Geraldine Palmer found that housing in
more affluent neighborhoods has some influence on the increase of incomes.448 An
employment placement program provided by a city contract--as is already the case in many
affluent communities--so that the civically vulnerable have a legitimate shot at economic
stability can compliment this measure.449

Universal Savings Account for All Children
Some regions of America have embarked on more progressive solutions toward ending
poverty such as the establishment of savings accounts for children which are aimed at
accruing savings over the course of childhood to facilitate children’s ability later on to
attend college, purchase a home, or start a business. Santiago states that “The city of San
Palmer, "Examining the Effects of Scattered Site Supportive Housing on the Social and
Economic Integration of Men Who Are Formerly Homeless and Primarily Black/African
American." P. 848.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
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Francisco was the first county in the United States to offer a publicly funded, universal
children’s college savings account (kindergarten to college). In the fall of 2013, Cleveland
began the March into Kindergarten College Savings Accounts for 15,000 public school
children.”450 Establishing a national savings account for all children or a mechanism of
financial matching the savings that localized governments accrue for their children could
offset the school-to-prison pipeline and it could provide all of our nation's children a
legitimate opportunity for success in our society's labor market.

Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the role of tenderization in relation to issues of American
Poverty. We looked at a portrait of the civically vulnerable that included children, the
working poor, and Black Americans. Further, we explored our society's civic indifference
toward the civically vulnerable and some of the ways this indifference is constructed and
sustained through ideologies of undeservingness. As was the case in our application of
tenderization to the American Criminal Justice system, we saw that our private and public
attitudes about the poor are shaped by the media and spatial mechanisms that render the
concerns of the poor invisible. In the final section, I provide a sketch of a direction our
society can head towards in becoming more tender to those who live in poverty. The
provided sketch of reform measures is not exhaustive. This is a function of the unfinished
feature that these measures take on. What results are measures that serve as a springboard
platform for our deliberation about what the civically vulnerable need and how their
vulnerability can be met.
450
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